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Firms face uncertainty on many different dimensions: demand level, produc-
tivity and input prices, taxes and regulations. Furthermore, some argue that un-
certainty is higher in recessions (cf. Bloom et al. (2012)) and one of the causes of
the slow recovery during the recent Great Recession (cf. Stock and Watson (2012)
and Baker et al. (2012)). However, most trade models assume uncertainty away
by considering a deterministic framework or introduce uncertainty in a very limited
way.
In this dissertation, I argue that uncertainty can be particularly important for
two topics in international trade: (i) firms’ global sourcing decisions and (ii) firms’
exports decision when facing multiple sources of uncertainty. Firms’ decisions to
enter new foreign markets, exit from foreign markets that they are currently serving
and whether to vertically integrate or outsource with foreign firms (i.e. their global
sourcing decisions). Not only do these decisions require high sunk costs (cf. Roberts
and Tybout (1997) and Antràs and Helpman (2004)) but they are also subject
to an additional set of uncertain conditions, e.g. exchange rates, foreign market
conditions, and foreign policies. In particular, these potential multiple sources of
uncertainty can work as an amplification mechanism, specially during recessions.
The first chapter discusses the key insights that motivates my dissertation.
The second chapter develops a dynamic model of international trade with hetero-
geneous firms who endogenously decide when to start exporting to foreign markets,
under which sourcing scheme, and when to exit foreign markets in a framework
with foreign demand uncertainty. The third chapter focuses on empirically evaluat-
ing the theoretical model of the previous chapter using U.S. firm-level data. I find
that integration reduces the probability that a firm exits by as much as 8%, while
uncertainty increases this probability by 23%. The fourth chapter looks into the in-
teraction between demand and policy uncertainty during the Great Trade Collapse
and is joint work with Kyle Handley and Nuno Limao. We examine if the resulting
change in policy uncertainty initially deepened the collapse and then helped reverse
it, when the worst fears of protection were not realized.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
International trade takes place between firms that can either have an owner-
ship relationship (i.e. related party trade) or not (i.e. arm’s length trade). These
alternative ways of trading imply differences in setup costs and in the degree of
bargaining power between the trading parties, which in turn can affect how firms
react to exogenous shocks. Despite the fact that trade between related parties repre-
sented 28.2% of U.S. exports and 50.2% of U.S. imports in 2012, most of the existing
international trade models assume away these differences. Understanding both the
determinants of global sourcing decisions (i.e. trade with a related party or at arm’s
length), and exploring whether different global sourcing schemes generate heteroge-
neous responses to shocks is particularly relevant in uncertain environments where
shocks are frequent and/or large, such as the recent fall in international trade flows
during the Great Recession (a phenomenon known as the Great Trade Collapse,
GTC).
This paper makes the case that it is important to understand firms’ sourcing
decisions under uncertainty, an unexplored topic in the literature. First, uncertainty
has played a central role in recent policy debates on the causes of the GTC: some
argue that uncertainty is higher in recessions in general (cf. Bloom et al. (2012)), and
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that elevated uncertainty was one of the causes of the slow recovery during the recent
Great Recession (cf. Stock and Watson (2012) and Baker et al. (2012)).1 Second,
uncertainty is more relevant if firms face significant sunk costs, as is the case for firms
that engage in international trade in general (cf. Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007))
and global sourcing strategies in particular (cf. Antràs and Helpman (2004)). Third,
exporting firms are subject to additional sources of uncertainty, such as exchange
rates and foreign market conditions. Fourth, the impact of uncertainty on sourcing
decisions has yet not been explored in the literature. Fifth, heterogeneous responses
to aggregate shocks across global sourcing strategies can potentially be important
in terms of welfare and trade dynamics.
To address these issues, I first show that U.S. firms’ adjustment to the GTC
differs across sourcing schemes. Then, I develop a dynamic model with endogenous
entry and exit combined with global sourcing decisions in which firms face demand
uncertainty. Next, I construct a theory-based uncertainty measure and take the
model predictions to U.S. firm-level exports data for the period 2002-2011, with
special focus on the exit decision. Finally, I use the estimated results to quantify
the role of uncertainty and sourcing decisions. In the counterfactual analysis, I
find that if all firms behaved as related parties, the 2009 collapse of U.S. exports
would have been 10% smaller. Also, the counterfactual analysis shows that reducing
foreign demand uncertainty for all firms to the first tercile of the uncertainty would
1For example, in words of Olivier Blanchard, chief economist at the IMF “[Uncertainty] is
largely behind the dramatic collapse in demand. [...] Given the uncertainty, why build a new
plant, or introduce a new product now? Better to pause until the smoke clears.” Similarly, John
C. Williams, president of Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, remarks that “There is pretty
strong evidence that the rise in uncertainty is a significant factor holding back the pace of recovery
now.”
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have reduced the 2009 collapse in U.S. exports by 8%.
The data required to examine the impact of uncertainty on global sourcing
decisions and the impact of sourcing on responses to shocks are highly demand-
ing. In addition to requiring detailed information on U.S. firms’ export and import
transactions at high frequency, such a task requires information on the ownership re-
lationships between U.S. trading firms and their foreign partners. This information
is naturally scarce. However, U.S. firm-level international trade data is particularly
well-suited for the task under consideration, because it is one of the few datasets
that records the relationship between trading firms for every transaction, and thus
avoids the need to limit the analysis to a subsample of firms or to impose other
restrictive assumptions.2 Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, this paper is the
first to exploit this data in order to analyze the heterogeneity in the impact of shocks
across sourcing strategies.
Uncertainty rose sharply during the GTC. Bloom et al. (2012) show that both
microeconomic uncertainty and macroeconomic uncertainty show countercyclical
behavior for the period 1972-2010. According to Bloom et al. (2012), microeconomic
uncertainty increased by between 76% and 152% during the GTC, depending on the
measure of uncertainty used, while macroeconomic uncertainty increased by 23%.
These remarkable increases of uncertainty support the claim of policy makers that
elevated uncertainty was a cause of the GTC. Given the significant role of uncertainty
in policy debates and the evidence of its countercyclical behavior, it is striking that
2For example, Corcos et al. (2009) used a survey of manufacturing firms that have foreign
affiliates and trade more than 1 million euros in 1999.
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uncertainty has not been much explored as one of the potential factors behind the
GTC in the academic trade literature. A notable exception is Carballo, Handley, and
Limão (2013), who consider the impact of trade policy and economic uncertainty on
the firm export decision. This current paper expands on their work by constructing
a model where demand uncertainty plays a significant role. The interaction between
uncertainty and global sourcing decisions is then examined. Finally, I quantify the
impact of uncertainty and heterogeneity of responses by sourcing decision during
the GTC.
Carballo, Handley, and Limão (2013) show that the extensive margin accounts
for roughly one third of the collapse in U.S. exports during the GTC. Furthermore,
the exit margin is the main force driving the adjustment along the extensive margin
during this period. Most trade models are ill suited to understand the dynamics of
episodes such as the GTC, since they are primarily focused on entry and disregard
the exit decision. In order to overcome this limitation, I introduce an endogenous
exit decision into a model where firms also make entry and sourcing decisions. Fur-
thermore, I explore the impact of sourcing strategies on firms’ exit decision and find
that related party trade is more resilient to a large negative shock, such as the GTC.
As is standard in trade models, the model features heterogeneous firms that
have to pay a sunk cost to start exporting (see Melitz (2003)). Following Antràs
and Helpman (2004), I introduce incomplete contracts to model the sourcing deci-
sion and assume that integrating with a foreign firm requires to pay another sunk
cost.3 Firms also have to pay a fixed per period cost, which generates an endoge-
3Transaction costs and incentive system are alternative approaches used to model the integration
4
nous exit decision. Additionally, I impose that the final good is consumed in the
foreign destination.4 Finally, I introduce uncertainty by assuming that firms do not
know the future foreign demand level. In this setting, I show that uncertainty leads
firms to delay sunk investments, such as entry and integration, and makes them
less responsive to demand level changes. Firms internalize that demand is going
to change in the future, and thus they do not fully respond to the current demand
level. I further prove that sourcing strategies affect the exit decision: related parties
wait longer before leaving foreign markets. This impact arises due to the combi-
nation of uncertainty, additional sunk costs needed to export to a related party,
and the higher profit flow associated with integration. Moreover, I prove that un-
certainty generates heterogeneity on the impact of current demand changes across
organizational forms and margins, therefore breaking the homogeneous impact of
the deterministic framework. The reason behind this result is that in a deterministic
framework, profits are log-separable in the current demand condition. However, this
log-separability does not hold in a stochastic environment, wherein firms’ response
to changes in current demand level are affected by their sourcing strategy.
This work contributes to the literature studying multinationals broadly (see
Antràs and Yeaple (2013) for a recent survey) and more specifically to the literature
on multinationals and option value. Early work by Rob and Vettas (2003) focuses
on the choice between FDI and exports when demand growth is uncertain. Fillat
decision in the international trade literature. See Grossman and Helpman (2004) for an incentive
system approach and McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002) for a transaction costs
approach.
4According to Antràs and Yeaple (2013) a very small fraction of output is exported from foreign
affiliates back to the headquarter’s country. Furthermore, Ramondo, Rappoport, and Ruhl (2011)
show that most foreign affiliates sell all their output in their host country.
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and Garetto (2010) analyze the relationship between stock market return and risk
exposure of multinationals in a context of option value. More recently, Ramondo,
Rappoport, and Ruhl (2013) consider the decision between FDI and exports in two
period model with demand uncertainty. These papers focus on the choice between
multinational production or exporting as substitutes. In contrast, my work allows
for intra-firm exports and models firms’ decisions between exporting through related
parties or at arm’s length. In this sense, this paper is closer to Irarrazabal, Moxnes,
and Opromolla (2013), who consider multinational production with intra-firm trade
in a static context.5 However, they focus on geography and multinational production
and do not have information on whether transactions take place through related
parties or arm’s length trade. Thus, this research adds to the literature by analyzing,
for the first time, the role of demand uncertainty in global sourcing decisions using
U.S. firm level export data for the period 2002-2011. The analysis is performed
for the whole population of U.S. exporting firms, not just a sample, and without
imposing any assumption on the organizational choice, since U.S. Census Bureau
data provides the information about the type of relationship between trading firms.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the GTC in two ways.6 First,
this paper highlights differences across organizational forms in the dynamics of U.S.
firm-level trade during the GTC and its recovery. Second, this research evaluates
the contribution of uncertainty and its interaction with global sourcing decisions in
explaining the dynamics of U.S. firms’ exports during the GTC.
5See also Keller and Yeaple (2013) who consider multinational production with tangible and
intangible intra-firm trade.
6See Bems, Johnson, and Yi (2013) for a survey of the literature studying the GTC.
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1.1 Data and Descriptive Evidence
In this section, I use data on firms’ exports and characteristics to present
descriptive evidence on the recent Great Trade Collapse (GTC). I focus on differ-
ences in dynamics across organizational forms during this period. First, I present
aggregate evidence about related parties and arm’s length trade. Second, I show
evidence from several decomposition exercises that highlights differences in margins
of adjustment across organizational forms when firms respond to shocks in foreign
markets.
1.1.1 Data Description
The main data sources I use are the Longitudinal Foreign Trade Transactions
Database (LFTTD) and the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) for the period
2002-2011. Both databases are from the U.S. Census Bureau. The LFTTD provides
detailed information on U.S. firms’ export transactions with product and destination
disaggregation. The LFTTD has a longitudinal identifiers variable that allows me to
track firms over time. The LBD, meanwhile, is constructed based on administrative
data and provides firm-level information over time such as employment, age and
sector of activity.
The paper focuses on the sourcing decisions of U.S. exporters. Hence informa-
tion about the ownership relationship between trading parties is key. Importantly,
the LFTTD has a variable that allows one to identify whether the U.S. exporter
and the foreign firm involved in a transaction are related parties. According to the
7
Foreign Trade Regulations of the Department of Commerce, a related party export
transaction is “a transaction involving trade between a U.S. principal party in in-
terest and an ultimate consignee where either party owns directly or indirectly 10
percent or more of the other party.” (see Foreign Trade Regulations, 2013). This is
mandatory information that should be included in the automatic electronic system
data filing for export transactions (see Ruhl (2013)).7 Thus, the LFTTD provides
a complete picture on the sourcing decisions of U.S. exporters at high frequency
and over time, and avoids the problems that other studies in the literature have
faced when considering the sourcing decision of firms. For example, Corcos et al.
(2009) use a small sample of 4,305 French firms from a 1999 survey to analyze the
determinants of sourcing decisions.
Other sources of information used in the paper include uncertainty measures
introduced by Baker and Bloom [2013] and the International Financial Statistics
from the International Monetary Fund for country characteristics. Additionally,
I use the product concordances for the Harmonized Schedule developed by Pierce
and Schott (2009) in order to avoid capturing spurious changes along the extensive
margin due to schedule changes.8
7This mandatory filing of the relationship between trading parties assures that the information
covers virtually the whole universe of export transactions. The Census Bureau related parties data
is very consistent when compared with the Bureau of Economic Analysis data on Multinational
firms, which has been used more extensively in previous literature (see Ruhl (2013)).
8The U.S. harmonized product codes used to register import and export transactions are up-
dated over time. Pierce and Schott (2009) developed an algorithm that matches revised codes to
time-invariant identifiers to allow for following products over time.
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1.1.2 Heterogeneous Responses during the GTC
The 2008-9 global recession and its associated trade contraction is known as
the Great Trade Collapse in the literature. U.S. imports and exports begin falling
in the third quarter of 2008. By the end of 2009, imports had fallen by 22.7% and
exports by 19.0%, generating a 20.1% decrease in U.S. international trade. This
sudden trade collapse is remarkable since U.S. GDP only dropped 1.7% over the
same period while world GDP contracted by 1.1%. Interestingly, the overall drop
in total exports differed somewhat between related parties and arm’s length trade,
at 16.92% and 18.74% respectively.9 However, this difference across organizational
forms is magnified when other dimensions of the collapse are considered, such as the
number of firms and firm-varieties trading across organizational forms, or when the
GTC collapse is decomposed into the extensive and intensive margins using U.S.
firm level data distinguishing by organizational form.
Overall, the number of firms exporting fell by 12.16% during 2009. The number
of firms trading to related parties fell by 8.51% in 2009, while for arm’s length trade
the collapse in the number of firms is significantly higher, at 12.52%. The fall in the
number of firm-varieties traded by non-related parties during the GTC was almost
double the fall for related parties. More specifically, at the peak of the collapse the
number of related firm-varieties contracted by 5.73% while the contraction in the
number of firm-varieties traded at arm’s length reached the 11.38%. Moreover, the
9According to BEA data, the difference between related parties exports and arm’s length trade
is significantly bigger. More specifically, exports to affiliated foreign firms contracted only by 5.32%
while exports to unaffiliated foreign firms contracted by 22.10% over this period.
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number of firm-varieties for related parties recovered more quickly after the 2008-
2009 GTC. For example, by the end of 2009 the number of related firm-varieties
was actually 0.64% higher than its level in 2008. In contrast, the number of firm-
varieties for arm’s length trade at the end of 2009 was 5.07% lower than its peak level
in 2008, and did not recover its respective pre-crisis level until almost a year later.
Naturally, this difference in the evolution of the number of varieties traded across
organizational forms translates into differences in the exit rate of firm-varieties. The
exit rate for related parties is roughly two-thirds of the exit rate for arm’s length
trade at quarterly frequency during the GTC, at 42.7% and 62.2% respectively.
Thus, although the overall drop in total exports during the GTC was similar between
related parties and arm’s length trade, the difference in the behavior of the number
of varieties suggests that there is some heterogeneity in dynamics during the GTC
across organizational form (See table 1.2 in the appendix for more details.). To
further explore this heterogeneity, I decompose firm level trade into its intensive
and extensive margins.
Specifically, I perform the following decomposition exercise using highly dis-
aggregated U.S. data. First, I compute the midpoint growth rate of exports at the
firm-product-country level, in order to isolate the evolution of the extensive and
intensive margins of exports, and I do this separately for related parties and arm’s
length trade. I follow the literature on the GTC by working with data at quarterly
frequency, motivated by the timing of the collapse, as annual data would mask many
interesting dynamics(cf. Bricongne et al. (2012a), Behrens, Corcos, and Mion (2013)
and Eaton et al. (2013)).
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The midpoint decomposition breaks export growth into its intensive and ex-
tensive margins at the firm-country-product level. I then decompose each of these
terms into positive and negative margins. Finally, growth rates computed at the firm
level are aggregated to compute the aggregate midpoint growth rate. The aggregate
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where x denotes exports and i, c, k, q index firm, country, product and quarter re-
spectively; gick(q) is the midpoint growth rate of firm i exports of product k to
country c in quarter q; and sick(q) is the weight corresponding to gick(q) in total
exports.
Changes in exports at the firm-product-country level can be classified into:
(i) extensive positive (“Entry”) where xick(q) > 0 and xick(q − 4) = 0; (ii) ex-
tensive negative (“Exit”) where xick(q) = 0 and xick(q − 4) > 0; (iii) intensive
positive (“Growers”) where xick(q) > xick(q − 4) > 0; and (iv) intensive negative
(“Shrinkers”) where xick(q−4) > xick(q) > 0. Thus, the aggregate midpoint growth
































where NEck, NXck, CN1ck and CN2ck denote respectively the sets of enter-
ing, exiting, growing and shrinking firms exporting product k to country c. This
decomposition also allows me to compute the net extensive and net intensive mar-
gins, by adding up both positive and negative components of each margin. Figures
1.1 and 1.2 present the evolution of the net extensive and net intensive margins for
related parties and arm’s length trade during the period surrounding the GTC.(See
appendix for detailed tables 1.3 and 1.4.)
This decomposition exercise shows that the overall volume of related parties
and arm’s length trade followed a similar path during the GTC, but that their mar-
gin of adjustment differed substantially (see the appendix for detailed tables). In
both cases, the intensive margin was the main margin of adjustment. However, the
extensive margin took a more prominent role for arm’s length trade than for re-
lated parties. More specifically, during 2009, the extensive margin for arm’s length
trade represented -9.90% points of growth on average, while for related parties the
extensive margin contributed only -3.95% on average. Hence, the extensive margin
contribution for arm’s length trade was roughly two and a half times higher than
the extensive margin contribution for related parties. The opposite holds true for
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the intensive margin, whose average contribution for related parties was 1.5 times
the average intensive margin contribution for arm’s length trade. Importantly, this
pattern is robust to using lower frequency data and more aggregated firm-level data,
in particular computing the decomposition using data at the half-yearly frequency
and using firm-country exports aggregated over products. Furthermore, the differ-
ences between across related parties and arm’s length trade are robust to controlling
for firm size using employment level. When restricting the decomposition exercise
to firms with more than 250 employees, I continue to find that arm’s length trade
adjusts significantly more through the extensive margin than related parties trade.
Also, this result is robust to distinguishing between related-party and arm’s length
trade for both PTA partners and non-PTA partners. This robustness exercise is
motivated by the fact that PTA agreements can protect firms from additional un-
certainty as it is discussed in chapter 4.
1.1.3 Uncertainty and the Sourcing Decision
Demand uncertainty has not been considered in previous work as a determi-
nant of the sourcing decision of whether to export to a related party or at arm’s
length. However, descriptive evidence suggests that there is a correlation between
uncertainty and firms’ decision regarding the organizational form of trade.Table 1.1
shows that U.S. firms export on average less via related parties to countries with
high uncertainty, as measured by the volatility of GDP following Bloom (2014).
More specifically, I classify countries as low uncertainty if the standard deviation of
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their GDP growth belongs to the first tercile, while I consider countries as having
high uncertainty if the standard deviation of their GDP growth rate is in third ter-
cile. Country categories are time-invariant over the sample period considered. The
negative relationship holds both in terms of average total exports and the average
number of products, and , more importantly in terms of the average share of re-
lated parties exports in total exports and the average ratio of the number of related
parties products to the total number of product exported to that country.10 , 11
In this section, I present evidence that suggests that related parties and arm’s
length trade had different responses to the GTC in 2008/9. In particular, decom-
position exercises show that arm’s length exporters were more likely to exit foreign
markets than related parties during the GTC. Thus, the exit decision is a key mar-
gin along which the organizational form affects the response of firms. This evidence
on heterogeneous responses combined with the existing literature on uncertainty
during the GTC and the descriptive evidence above on the relationship between
uncertainty and the organizational form chosen by U.S. exporters are the key in-
sights that motivate me to build a dynamic model with endogenous entry, exit and
organizational choice when firms face demand uncertainty.
10Section 3.1 discuss a theory consistent measure of uncertainty. These patterns on the share of
related party exports and uncertainty hold when I use this theory-consistent uncertainty measure.
11Figure 1.3 shows that this correlation between uncertainty and the way U.S. firms choose to
serve a foreign market holds for the distribution of related party share in exports.
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1.2 Tables




Related Exports 8,770.00 1,000.00 4,510
[1,780] [2,030] [10,130]
Share of Related Exports 0.2331 0.1294 0.193
[0.1268] [0.118] [0.1331]
Number of Related Products Exported 264.79 140.28 195.09
[120.93] [118.49] [126.33]
Share of Related of Products Exported 0.6428 0.3877 0.5008
[0.2385] [0.2442] [0.2551]
Observations 310 310 310
Means and standard deviations in brackets.
Low and High refer to the bottom and top tercile of the uncertainty measure.
Total includes the full sample at country level.
Table 1.2: Net Extensive Margin: Related-Party vs Arm’s Length Trade
Firm
Related-Party Arm’s Length Trade Mid-point Difference
Fall at Trough -11.11% -15.47% 32.81%
Fall at Q4:2009 -6.86% -8.92% 26.11%
Recovery Peak 0.01% -0.53% 207.69%
Quarters until Recovery 13 >14 -7.41%
Firm-Country-Product
Related-Party Arm’s Length Trade Mid-point Difference
Fall at Trough -7.2% -12.64% 54.84%
Fall at Q4:2009 0.64% -5.2% 256.14%
Recovery Peak 15.94% 7.6% 70.86%
Quarters until Recovery 4 8 -66.67%
Mid-point difference computes the mid-point difference rate between related-party and arm’s
length trade. More specifically, the formula is (xRP − xAL)/(0.5 ∗ (xRP + xAL))
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Table 1.3: Midpoint Decomposition - 2006-2011 - Related Party Trade
Year Quarter
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
Growers Shrinkers Net Entry Exit Net
2007 1 0.238 -0.194 0.044 0.280 -0.241 0.039
2007 2 0.231 -0.200 0.031 0.277 -0.262 0.015
2007 3 0.236 -0.206 0.030 0.293 -0.278 0.015
2007 4 0.248 -0.205 0.043 0.317 -0.273 0.044
2008 1 0.216 -0.202 0.014 0.318 -0.263 0.055
2008 2 0.234 -0.232 0.002 0.338 -0.241 0.097
2008 3 0.232 -0.229 0.003 0.352 -0.238 0.114
2008 4 0.209 -0.278 -0.069 0.300 -0.284 0.016
2009 1 0.153 -0.368 -0.215 0.302 -0.335 -0.033
2009 2 0.154 -0.353 -0.199 0.284 -0.358 -0.074
2009 3 0.158 -0.290 -0.132 0.299 -0.378 -0.079
2009 4 0.203 -0.234 -0.031 0.350 -0.322 0.028
2010 1 0.285 -0.182 0.103 0.353 -0.271 0.082
2010 2 0.314 -0.170 0.144 0.344 -0.262 0.082
2010 3 0.272 -0.155 0.117 0.335 -0.260 0.075
2010 4 0.252 -0.173 0.079 0.316 -0.257 0.059
2011 1 0.246 -0.181 0.065 0.300 -0.230 0.070
2011 2 0.243 -0.197 0.046 0.304 -0.212 0.092
2011 3 0.237 -0.189 0.048 0.291 -0.218 0.073
2011 4 0.233 -0.208 0.025 0.302 -0.238 0.064
Midpoint decomposition of the quarterly log growth rate for U.S. firms exporting to related
parties. See Section 2.2 for detailed formulas. Growers denotes the positive intensive margin
and shrinkers denotes the negative intensive margin.
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Table 1.4: Midpoint Decomposition - 2006-2011 - Arm’s Length Trade
Year Quarter
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
Growers Shrinkers Net Entry Exit Net
2007 1 0.228 -0.197 0.031 0.439 -0.363 0.076
2007 2 0.235 -0.187 0.048 0.446 -0.370 0.076
2007 3 0.237 -0.183 0.054 0.453 -0.361 0.092
2007 4 0.257 -0.186 0.071 0.444 -0.362 0.082
2008 1 0.258 -0.168 0.090 0.458 -0.359 0.099
2008 2 0.252 -0.173 0.079 0.459 -0.347 0.112
2008 3 0.239 -0.182 0.057 0.473 -0.369 0.104
2008 4 0.185 -0.243 -0.058 0.436 -0.417 0.019
2009 1 0.142 -0.297 -0.155 0.396 -0.487 -0.091
2009 2 0.137 -0.292 -0.155 0.375 -0.528 -0.153
2009 3 0.162 -0.278 -0.116 0.373 -0.513 -0.140
2009 4 0.211 -0.212 -0.001 0.418 -0.433 -0.015
2010 1 0.260 -0.170 0.090 0.453 -0.369 0.084
2010 2 0.275 -0.157 0.118 0.457 -0.362 0.095
2010 3 0.257 -0.173 0.084 0.444 -0.353 0.091
2010 4 0.264 -0.171 0.093 0.427 -0.340 0.087
2011 1 0.254 -0.181 0.073 0.435 -0.334 0.101
2011 2 0.256 -0.175 0.081 0.435 -0.343 0.092
2011 3 0.260 -0.172 0.088 0.432 -0.342 0.090
2011 4 0.233 -0.200 0.033 0.410 -0.349 0.061
Midpoint decomposition of the quarterly log growth rate for U.S. firms exporting to related
parties. See Section 2.2 for detailed formulas. Growers denotes the positive intensive margin
and shrinkers denotes the negative intensive margin.
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1.3 Figures
Figure 1.1: Decomposition Related Party
Figure 1.2: Decomposition Arm’s Length
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Figure 1.3: Related Party Exports and Uncertainty
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Chapter 2: Global Sourcing and Uncertainty: Theory
This section develops a dynamic model with incomplete contracts in which
firms endogenously choose when to start and stop exporting and make global sourc-
ing decisions under demand uncertainty. The novel features of the model are the
stochastic demand process and its interaction with the exit and global sourcing deci-
sions. In the first section, I derive the basic elements of the model for exporting firms
under incomplete contracts: optimal demand, supply, pricing and profits. Then I
consider firms’ entry, exit and global sourcing decisions under demand uncertainty.
2.1 Incomplete Contracts
The incomplete contracts setting of the model follows the standard approach
of Antràs and Helpman (2004), in which incompleteness affects how the revenue of
a trading relationship is distributed between the firms involved. Interestingly, this
setup simplifies the analysis because the optimal quantity and price decisions are
invariant across global sourcing decisions. There are two countries, N and S, where
S is the foreign country. I assume that wages are higher in N , wN > wS.
Preferences in the foreign country are represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility
function over a homogeneous good, denoted x0, and a CES sub-utility index defined
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over differentiated goods X with constant expenditure share µ, where 0 < µ < 1.








where 0 < α < 1. Optimal demand for variety i when aggregate income is equal to






where P denotes the price index and p(i) is the
price of the variety.
There are two types of agents in the economy, entrepreneurs (H) and manufac-
turers (M). Entrepreneurs provide headquarters services and are located only in N ,
while manufacturers are located in S and provide assembly services. For simplicity,
firms in the North can only outsource or integrate with firms in the South.1 The








, where 0 < η < 1.
θ is the productivity parameter, while functions h(i) and s(i) denote headquarters
and assembly services respectively. As in Antràs (2014), headquarters services are
meant to include high-tech manufacturing or assembly, while assembly services also
encompass distribution, packaging or marketing services. Following Ramondo and
Rodŕıguez-Clare (2013) and Antràs (2003), I assume that there is trade in interme-
diates but no trade in final goods and that the final good is consumed only in the
foreign destination. This assumption is motivated by the fact that most foreign affili-
ates do not export back to their headquarters country (see Antràs and Yeaple (2013))
1Fernandes and Tang (2012) use the same assumption in the context of a static model.
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and that most foreign affiliates do not export to third countries (see Ramondo, Rap-
poport, and Ruhl (2011)). The entrepreneur (i.e. the firm located in N) can choose
either to integrate vertically with a firm located in S, or to outsource its demand for
assembly services to a firm located in S. In this setup, an organizational form con-
sists of an ownership structure k ∈ {Outsourcing (O), V ertical Integration (V )}.
As is standard in trade models, firms are required to pay a sunk cost to start
exporting (cf. Melitz (2003)). More specifically, firms have to pay fe in order to
start exporting via outsourcing, which is the default option to start exporting. If
firms want to integrate, they have to pay an additional sunk cost fv as is the case
in AH. All firms also must pay a fixed per period cost fp to operate in the foreign
market. This fixed per period cost allows me to consider the optimal decision to
stop exporting. Finally, to preserve the symmetry of the model, I assume that firms
have to pay a sunk cost fx to exit the foreign market.
2
Following AH, I assume that parties cannot write enforceable contracts contin-
gent on outcomes. Instead the entrepreneur and manufacturer bargain over surplus
from the relationship. Ex-post bargaining is modeled as a generalized Nash bargain-
ing game, in which the entrepreneur obtains a fraction ζ ∈ (0, 1) of the ex-post gains
from the relationship. Importantly, the ownership structure does not affect whether
or not there is ex-post bargaining. More specifically, the space of contracts is inde-
pendent of the ownership structure and the same is true for the ex-post bargaining
process. In the incomplete contract setting, the outside options for the two parties
determine the incentives that each party has ex-post. I assume that the outside
2Results do not depend on the sunk cost to exit, although this sunk cost simplifies the exposition.
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option for the manufacturing firm is zero in all cases, while the outside option for
the entrepreneur depends on the organizational form. In the case of outsourcing,
the outside option is zero while under vertical integration, the entrepreneur H can
seize a share of the final good δ, where 0 < δ < 1.
The mode of ownership is chosen at the beginning of the period by H to
maximize its profits. The contract includes an up-front fee (positive or negative) that
is paid by M in order to participate in the relationship. Under the assumption that
the supply of M is infinitely elastic, in equilibrium M ’s profits from the relationship
net of the participation fee should be equal to its outside option, zero. Under
outsourcing, when parties reach an agreement ex-post, H gets ζR(i) while M gets
(1 − ζ)R(i), where R(i) denotes the potential revenue of the trade relationship.3
If parties fail to reach an agreement, both parties get zero under outsourcing. In
contrast, when parties fail to reach an agreement under vertical integration, H can
sell an amount δx(i) of output which yields revenue δαR(i). Hence the ex-post gains
from trade are [1 − δα]R(i). Accordingly, in the bargaining, H receives its outside
option plus its share of the ex-post gains, or δαR(i) + ζ[1 − δα]R(i). This implies
that M receives (1 − ζ)[1 − δα]R(i). Hence, the fraction of revenue going to the
entrepreneur under integration satisfies:
ζV = δ
α + ζ[1− δα] ≥ ζo = ζ
In other words, H is able to appropriate a higher fraction of revenue under integra-










tion than under outsourcing.
Given the nature of the contract, parties choose their quantities of inputs
noncooperatively, since inputs are not contractible ex-ante. Thus, firms’ problems







After solving these two problems, I obtain the following expression for the total
current period profit:
πk(A, η, θ) =Aθ
α
1−αψk(η)
The profit function is the product of a term capturing the demand level (A =
(µY )P
α
1−α ), the modified productivity of the firm (θ
α
1−α ), a term capturing the











and the fixed per period costs wNfp.
The setup implies that H chooses the organizational form that maximizes
πk(θ, A, η). Operating profits for the two firms are:
πHk =ζkR(i) + t− wNh(i)
πMk =(1− ζk)R(i)− t− wSm(i)
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Given that the outside option for M is zero, then the fee t is set such that πMk =
0. Hence πHk = R(i) − wNh(i) − wSm(i) and in a subgame-perfect equilibrium
πhk = πk(θ,A, η). As in AH, there are no means to commit ex-ante to a division
rule of the surplus. The choice of ownership structure is the only instrument for
affecting the division rule. The entrepreneur producer then can choose between
ζk = {ζV , ζ0} which determines whether the H receives πv(θ,A, η) or πo(θ,A, η). In
general. πv(θ,A, η) and πo(θ,A, η) cannot be ranked without further assumptions
on η (intensity of headquarters services).
Note that the division rule of the profit ζk affects the slope of the profits func-
tion with respect to the productivity parameter θ and the parameter capturing the
demand level A. Furthermore, note that ζv > ζ0 is not enough to unequivocally
determine whether ψv(η) is greater or lower than ψo(η). The intensity of headquar-
ters services is key to determining which function ψk(η) is larger. Intuitively, the
incompleteness of contracts implies that neither party appropriates the full marginal
return on its investments. Hence both H and M underinvest, although this under-
investment is ameliorated by the fraction of the surplus that they receive. Thus, ex
ante efficiency requires that the higher the intensity of headquarters services (i.e.
high η), the higher the fraction of the surplus that should be allocated to H. This
relationship between the optimal ζ and η, combined with the assumption that ζk are
fixed, implies that for η, sufficiently large higher values of ζk generate more profits.
This, in turn, implies that for sufficiently large η, ψv(η) > ψo(η) given that ζv > ζo.
In contrast, for low enough η, ζo > ζv implies that ψv(η) < ψo(η). Note that given
that vertical integration requires an additional sunk cost, ψv(η) < ψo(η) is sufficient
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for outsourcing to be the optimal choice. In contrast, ψv(η) > ψo(η) is not sufficient
for vertical integration to be optimal given the additional sunk cost. In this case,
firms with different θ will choose different organizational forms in equilibrium. Since
this is the case I want to focus on, I will assume that η is sufficiently large enough
so that ψv(η) > ψo(η) whenever ζv > ζo. So far the setup of the model is standard
and uncertainty has not played any role. This is due to the fact that uncertainty
about current period state variables is resolved before firms take any decisions. In
the next section, I discuss how uncertainty is incorporated into the setup.
2.2 Demand Uncertainty and Firms’ Decisions
Firms face uncertainty when considering whether to enter or to exit a market
and when choosing their ownership structure. More specifically, firms have to deal
with uncertainty about foreign demand. Firms do not know next period’s value of
A, and today’s demand level is only partially informative about the future values
of A. This uncertainty is captured by a stochastic foreign demand process. The
foreign demand level is a random variable with CDF G(A), with shocks to the path
of foreign demand arriving with probability γ > 0. Furthermore, I assume that the
CDF G(A) is stable across time and that the arrival of shocks implies that a new
demand level is drawn from this stable underlying distribution. I also assume that
G(A) has support [A, Ā].
This uncertainty implies that firms solve an optimal stopping problem. In
a deterministic framework, firms make decisions by comparing the profit flows of
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each status with the cost of changing status. However, in a stochastic framework,
this approach, called the naive approach by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), ignores the
possibility of waiting. More specifically, comparing the flow of profits across states
leaves out the possibility that the optimal decision may be to switch status in some
future period when the environment has different conditions.
Firms in the model endogenously decide when to start exporting,, when to
stop exporting and what ownership structure to employ. Thus, firms that currently
only produce domestically must decide whether or not to enter exporting, and un-
der what ownership structure. Firms that currently export via outsourcing must
decide whether to continue, integrate or exit; and firms that currently export un-
der integration must decide whether to continue or exit. In each transition from,
firms compare the difference in value between each status with the cost of changing
status. For example, non-exporting firms at the margin of considering exporting
via outsourcing will compare the fixed cost of entry to the difference between the
expected value of being an exporter and the expected value of being a non-exporter.
It is worth noting that the expected value of not exporting in the current period in-
cludes the possibility of becoming an exporter in the future, because non-exporters
in the current period could begin exporting in some future period when conditions
improve. In other words, the value of not exporting implicitly includes the value
of waiting. Similarly, the value of exporting via outsourcing includes the possibility
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that the firm integrates in the future. Formally, non-exporting firms solve:
V = max {Vo − fe, Vv − fe − fv, Vw}
where Vk denotes the value function of each possible status (o, exporting via out-
sourcing; v, integrated exporter; and w non-exporter). Note that this problem can
be decomposed into two simpler problems, given the assumption that the profit
flow from outsourcing is lower than the profit flow from integration conditional on
the demand level.4 More specifically, a non-exporting firm will prefer exporting via
outsourcing to being a non-exporter if Vo − fe > Vw. Hence, equalizing the value of
exporting via outsourcing minus the sunk cost to the value of waiting implicitly de-
fines a demand level that makes a firm with given productivity θ indifferent between
these two options:
Vw(Aeo) =Vo(Aeo)− fe (2.2.1)
where Aeo is the demand entry threshold with outsourcing. This condition, when
evaluated at Aeo, implies that the difference in current period profits (note that
when the firm is not exporting, the current period profits of exporting are zero)
plus the difference in expected future value should be equal to the fixed cost of
entering. Similarly, non-exporting firms will prefer exporting with integration to
being a non-exporter as long as Vv−fe−fv > Vw. However, note that the condition
4This is due to the assumption that the sector is sufficiently intensive in headquarters services,




Vv − fe − fv > Vw is not relevant to a firm’s decision because for any demand level
that fulfills this condition it is also true that Vo − fe > Vw. Hence the optimal
alternative to integration for a firm on the margin is to export via outsourcing than
rather not exporting.
A firm exporting via outsourcing needs to consider whether to continue, inte-
grate or exit the market. Formally, firms exporting via outsourcing solve:
V = max {Vo, Vv − fv, Vw − fx}
which can be separated into two decisions, whether or not to integrate and whether
or not to exit. Each of these decisions determines a threshold demand level. A firm
that currently exports via outsourcing will integrate if Vv − fv > Vo. Hence the
following equation determines the demand integration threshold Aev:
Vo(Aev) =Vv(Aev)− fv (2.2.2)
Similarly, a firm that is currently exporting via outsourcing will stop exporting
if Vo > Vw − fx. The exit with outsourcing demand threshold Axo is determined by
Vo(Axo) =Vw(Axo)− fx (2.2.3)
Finally, a firm currently exporting under vertical integration will solve the
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following problem:
V = max {Vo − fo, Vv, Vw − fx}
Note that since Vv > Vo for all demand levels, it is never optimal for a currently in-
tegrated firm to switch to outsourcing. Thus, the relevant decision for an integrated
firm is whether or not to continue, which will be optimal if Vv > Vw − fv. Then the
exit with integration threshold Axv is determined by
Vv(Axv) =Vw(Axv)− fx (2.2.4)
In summary, firms can be in one of three states in the model: non-exporter,
exporting via outsourcing and exporting via integration. These three states imply
four relevant margins along which firms can be indifferent: (i) switching from be-
ing a non-exporter to exporting via outsourcing, (ii) switching from exporting via
outsourcing to integration, (iii) switching from exporting under integration to being
a non-exporter and (iv) switching from exporting via outsourcing to being a non-
exporter.5 These four conditions determine four demand thresholds (Aeo,Aev,Axo ,Axv)
for each firm that completely describe the firm’s policy function. The next step is
solve the value functions for each of the possible states. Figure 2.1 shows all the
5The other two potential margins that are left out are (v) switching from exporting with in-
tegration to exporting via outsourcing and (vi) switching from being a non-exporter to exporting
with integration. The former is irrelevant because exporting with integration is always more prof-
itable than exporting via outsourcing ex-post, and, hence no firm will optimally do this transition.
The latter is irrelevant because the following holds. In order to integrate, the non-exporter firm
needs that Vv − fe − fv > Vw and Vv − fe − fv > Vo − fe but since for any demand level satisfying
Vv − fe − fv > Vw it is also true that Vo − fe > Vw so that the two initial conditions collapse to
Vv − fv > Vo which is the same comparison for the transition (ii).
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transitions across states in the model with their respective demand thresholds.
Starting with the value of exporting via outsourcing, note that the firm per-
ceives a current profit from exporting equal to πo(At)− fp and a continuation value
that depends on the optimal decision for the next period. Formally, the value func-
tion for a firm with productivity θi that exports with outsourcing is:
Vo(A, θi) =πo(A, θi)− fp + βEmax{Vv(A′, θi)− fv, Vo(A′, θi), VW (A′, θi)− fx}
where Vk is the expected value with respect to the demand level conditional on A
and β is the assumed discount factor of the firm. From now on, I will drop the
productivity level for simplicity. Exploiting the structure of the stochastic demand
process and the threshold demand levels defined above, the value function can be
expressed as follows:
Vo(A) =πo(A)− fp + β(1− γ)Vo(A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
no shock
+ γG(Axo)β[EVw(A′ < Axo)− fx]︸ ︷︷ ︸
shock below exit
(2.2.5)
+ γ[G(Aev)−G(Axo)]βEVo(Axo < A′ < Aev)︸ ︷︷ ︸
shock between o and v
+ γ[1−G(Aev)]β[EVv(A′ > Aev)− fv]︸ ︷︷ ︸
shock above v
where the value of exporting via outsourcing is equal to current profits, plus the value
of remaining in the same status if no shock arrives, which happens with probability
(1 − γ), plus the value if a shock arrives. Note that the latter can be decomposed
into three terms involving demand thresholds. With probability γG(Axo), a shock
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arrives such that the new demand level is below the exit threshold, and the optimal
decision is to pay the sunk cost, fx, and exit. With probability γ[1−G(Aev)], a shock
arrives such that A′ is greater than the integration threshold and the firm decides
to integrate after paying the sunk cost fv. Finally, with probability γ[G(Aev) −
G(Axo)] the shock is between the exit threshold and the integration threshold, and
the optimal decision is to remain an exporter with outsourcing.
Similarly, the value of exporting with integration can be expressed as follows:
Vv(A) =πv(A)− fp + β(1− γ)Vv(A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
no shock
+ βγG(Axv)[EVW (A < Axv)− fx]︸ ︷︷ ︸
shock below exit
(2.2.6)
+ βγ[1−G(Axv)]EVv(A > Axv)︸ ︷︷ ︸
shock above exit
Note that in this case, there are only two possible choices conditional on the arrival
of a demand shock. As discussed above, this is because once a firm has paid the
sunk cost to integrate, it is never optimal to go back to outsourcing.
Finally, I consider the value of a non-exporting firm. In this case, the firm
does not earn profits in the current period from exporting, and the value of being in
this status stems from the possibility that the demand level changes in the future,
so that the firm would find it profitable to start exporting. Formally, the value of
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waiting as a non exporter is:
Vw(At) = β(1− γ)Vw(At)︸ ︷︷ ︸
no shock
+ βγG(Aeo)EVw(At)︸ ︷︷ ︸
shock below entry
(2.2.7)
+ βγ[G(Aev)−G(Aeo)][EVo(Aeo < A < Aev)− fe]︸ ︷︷ ︸
shock between o and v
+ βγ[1−G(Aev)][EVv(A > Aev)− fe − fv]︸ ︷︷ ︸
shock above v
Note that this is a flexible formulation in which firms are allowed to start export-
ing via outsourcing or as an integrated firm. Thus, I am are not imposing any
assumption of sequential entry to export markets.
2.2.1 Entry and Organizational Choice
Equations (2.2.5), (2.2.6) and (2.2.7) are a linear system in the value functions
that can be solved for each value function. After some manipulations, I obtain an
















where λ̃.xo ≡ [1− γG(Axo)] represents the probability that the firm remains an active
exporter in the next period. Hence at Aeo, the entry sunk cost is equal to the
discounted flow of current profits (as in the deterministic case) plus two additional
terms.7 The first additional term is the discounted difference in profits resulting from
6For a detailed derivation, see Appendix A.2, in general, and A.2.4, in particular.
7Note, however, that in the deterministic framework, the discount factor is (1−β) while in this
stochastic framework, the discount factor is (1− βλ̃.xo ). It is evident that λ̃.xo < 1.
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the arrival of demand shocks below the entry threshold but above the exit threshold,
such that the firm continues as an exporter via outsourcing. The second term reflects
the discounted cost of exit when the new shock is below the exit threshold.
Notice that the increased flow of profits from future demand shocks above the
entry threshold does not show up in the condition. This is the bad news principle in
action: gains from realizations above the entry threshold also accrue to the firm that
waits to become an exporter. Also, note that since firms can opt to stop exporting
in the case that a very bad realization arrives (i.e. a realization such that A < Axo),
profits under these realizations are replaced by the sunk cost of exit.
Finally, comparing (2.2.8) with the entry condition in the deterministic frame-
work, I show in the appendix (see A.2.4) that Aeo > AeDo because πo(Aeo) > πo(AeDo ).
Thus, a firm requires a higher demand realization to be willing to pay the cost of
exporting via outsourcing when there is demand uncertainty.
Considering the decision to integrate, after some algebra I obtain an implicit



















1− β + βγ
dG
where ∆voπ(A) ≡ πv(A)−πo(A) is the difference in profits between integration and
outsourcing for a given demand level A (See Appendix A.2.5 for derivation). This
condition implies that the integration sunk cost must be equal to the discounted
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difference in the flow of current profits between the two organizational forms, plus
two additional terms that capture differences in the impact of future shocks below
the integration threshold. The first additional term captures the discounted value
of the difference between organizational forms from changes in profits due to the
arrival of shocks in the inaction band [Axo ,Aev]. The second term captures the dis-
counted value of losses under integration due to the arrival of shocks that trigger
exit under outsourcing but not integration. Note that the integration condition is
similar to the entry condition (2.2.8) with the key difference that in (2.2.9), firms
earn profits in both states, which explains why the differences and double differences
show up in the condition. Since I allow firms to exit directly from integration, severe
negative shocks (below the threshold for exit for integration) do not show up in the
integration condition, since such shocks would trigger exit under both integration
and outsourcing. Meanwhile, in accordance with the bad news principle, realizations
above the integration threshold are also irrelevant for the decision to integrate.
Following the same strategy as before, I show in the appendix (see A.2.5)
that Aev > AeDv for all firms (or more precisely, for all productivity levels). Under
uncertainty, therefore, firms delay the decision to integrate because of the possibility
that the demand level will change in the future.
2.2.2 Exit from Foreign Destinations
Up to now I have considered the decision to start exporting and the choice of
organizational form. The next step is to examine the exit decision for both integrated
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exporters and firms exporting via outsourcing. Starting with the latter, note that
the exit threshold for firms exporting via outsourcing depends on the difference
between the value of exporting and the value of being a non-exporter, similar to the
entry threshold. In this case, the expression that explicitly defines the exit threshold















where λ̃Āeo ≡ [1− γ(1−G(Aeo)] represents the probability that the firm remains an
non-exporter in the next period. This equation shows that at the exit threshold
demand level, the sunk cost of exiting should be equal to the present discounted
value of current flow losses (where losses are the per period fixed cost minus the
flow variable profits), minus the potential profits that the firm gives up in the case
that a shock between the entry and exit triggers arrives, minus the cost of reentering
the export market in the case that a shock above the entry trigger arrives in some
future period. When there is no uncertainty, the last two terms disappear and the
discount factor becomes (1− β).
Equation (2.2.10) has no counterpart in Handley and Limão (Forthcoming),
since their model focuses only on the entry side of the extensive margin. However,
this exit condition is qualitatively similar to the one obtained for the entry decision.
The first two terms in (2.2.10) are identical in form to their counterparts in (2.2.8),
8(See Appendix A.2.6 for derivation)
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while the third term takes into account the sunk cost of entering instead of the
corresponding cost of exit. In addition, the discount factor is different in the exit
decision, since it takes into account the probability that a shock arrives above the
entry threshold. Note also that a good news principle applies to the exit decision.
Bad shocks with respect to the exit threshold, i.e. shocks below Axo , are not included
in the expected losses, since firms that do not exit today retain the option of exiting
in the future.
Note that since fx ≥ 0 and the second and third terms are negative, it has
to be the case that πo(Axo) − fp < 0.9 Thus, firms earn negative profits at the exit
threshold and will earn negative flow profits throughout the entire demand interval
[A,Axo ]. Hence the exit option allows firms to discard a part of the demand support,
where flow profits are negative.
Next, I consider the exit decision for an integrated firm. Note that in this
case, firms compare the difference between the value of exporting with integration
and the value of being a non-exporter. After finding an expression for this difference
(see Appendix A.2.3), I plug it into (2.2.4) and get the following implicit solution
9Notice that this result does not stem from the sunk exit costs. Even in the absence of sunk
cost to exit, current profits at the exit threshold have to be negative in order to compensate for
the expected cost of reentering. However, the sunk exit cost does create more incentives for the
firm to sustain negative profits before making the decision to exit.
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Note that this condition implies that firms sustain negative profits before deciding
to exit, since the last two terms are negative, and this implies that πv(Axv)− fp < 0.
Then, the exit decision allows firms to avoid states where profits are negative. Note
also that expected profits from exporting via outsourcing appear in this condition.
This is because the firm is comparing the future profits of remaining as an integrated
exporter with the future profits that accrue in the case that a demand shock above
the entry threshold for outsourcing (Aeo) arrives after the firm has exited, where the
optimal decision in that case would be to pay the sunk cost to start exporting again.
A visual inspection of the exit conditions for each organizational structure
shows clearly that the organizational form impacts the exit decisions. Furthermore,
I prove in the appendix (see A.2.8) that
πo(Axo)− πv(Axv) > 0
which implies that Axo > Axv since πv > πo. Thus, integrated firms wait longer
to exit than firms that outsource; this is true even conditional on the productivity
level. Furthermore, I show in the appendix that for a given productivity level θi all
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demand threshold can be ranked as follows: Axv < Axo < Aeo < Aev. Note that this
ranking hold conditional on productivity.
Summing up, firms optimally choose when to start exporting, how to export
(integrated or outsourcing) and when to stop exporting. All of these decisions are
completely described by the four demand thresholdsAev, Axv , Aeo, Axo and the current
status of the firm.
2.3 Impact of Uncertainty at Industry Level
The previous section derives implicit expressions for the demand thresholds
that describe the policy function at the firm level. The next step is to use these
conditions to describe behavior at the industry level. My approach is to start from
a realization of industry demand and then determine the productivity level of the
marginal firm for each decision. This parametrization will allow me to perform key
comparative statics exercises and will also allow me to compare industry behavior
in the stochastic framework with the deterministic framework.10
In the stochastic framework, after some manipulations (see A.4.1 for the de-















βγG(Atξxo )[fx + fe]






1− β + βγ
]ρ
(2.3.2)
and ξmk denotes the parameters relating At with the m ∈ {e, x} from the k ∈ {O, V }
threshold and ∆A(Ai,Aj) =
∫ Ai
Aj (A − Ai)dG is a function capturing the expected
difference in profits between the specific demand realization Ai and potential new
realizations over the interval (Aj,Ai). In this case ∆A(At,Atξxo ) < 0, and this term
reflects the loss if the new demand level is below the entry threshold but high enough
not to force the firm to exit.
Ψeo captures the ratio between the sunk costs of entry and exit when a bad
shock arrives, on the one hand, and the profits lost relative to profits at the entry
threshold in case that a shock in the inaction band arrives. Intuitively, Ψeo compares
the cost of becoming an exporter and exiting in the future, i.e. the sunk cost that
the firm has to pay in the case a new shock arrives forcing the firm to exit, with
the relative cost of exporting when a shock arrives in the inaction band, i.e. the
profit loss relative to profits at the entry threshold. Firms with productivity θi > θ
e
o
will find it profitable to pay the sunk costs to start exporting. Ψeo > 1 since the
numerator is greater than 1, while the denominator is less than 1 because the second
term in the denominator is negative but less than 1 in absolute value. Uncertainty,
therefore, delays firms’ decision to start exporting via outsourcing. Note that in the





Similarly, an expression for the productivity cutoff for exit from outsourcing
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can be derived in the stochastic framework in terms of the respective deterministic















ρ. Outsourcing firms with
θi ≤ θxo will exit and firms with θi > θxo will keep exporting. Ψxo captures the ratio
between the sunk cost of entry, on the one hand, and exit in the case that a shock
arrives above the entry threshold, and the profits gained if a shock arrives in the
inaction band, where ∆A(Atξeo,At) > 0. I show that Ψxo < 1 in the appendix.
Thus, compared to the deterministic framework, firms wait longer before exiting
the foreign market in the stochastic framework.
Next, I derive the following expression for the productivity cutoff for entry





























Ψev captures the ratio between the cost of exiting in the case a bad shock arrives, and
the profit loss in the case that a shock arrives in the inaction band for integrated
firms. Note that the profit loss takes into account that the alternative optimal
decision in the inaction band may either be integration or outsourcing, depending
on the realization of the demand level. In the appendix, I show that Ψev > 1. Hence
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demand uncertainty delays the decision to integrate. I also show in the appendix
that θeo < θ
e
v, since I am focusing on sectors with high headquarters intensity where
πv(A) > πo(A) for allA. Thus, only relatively productive firms, i.e. firms with
θi > θ
e
o will export, and only the most productive of these will integrate, the ones
with θi > θ
e
v.
The respective expression for the exit productivity cutoff for integrated ex-




























and Ψxv < 1 (see Appendix). Thus, integrated exporters with θi < θ
v
x will exit. Since
θxv < θ
xD
v , firms wait longer to exit foreign markets under uncertainty. This differ-
ence is due to the fact that firms internalize that with some probability, things
will improve in the future. Furthermore, I show in the appendix that θxv < θ
x
o
(see A.4.5). Hence the productivity level needed to keep exporting with integration
is lower than the productivity required to keep exporting via outsourcing. Thus,
firms characterized by θi ∈ [θxv , θxo ] will keep exporting if they are already exporting
with integration but will stop exporting if they are exporting via outsourcing. The
following propositions summarize the results for the productivity cutoffs:
Proposition 1. (Exit and Organizational Choice under Uncertainty) Under for-
eign demand uncertainty A, the productivity exit cutoffs are (i) proportional to the






k ∈ {V,O} and (ii) lower than their deterministic counterparts, θxk < θxDk ; (iii)
cutoffs are specific to organizational form, where the vertical integration cutoff is
lower than the outsourcing cutoff, θxv < θ
x
o , and (iv) differences across organiza-
tional choice are higher than in the deterministic setting, (θxo − θxv ) > (θxDo − θxDv )
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2. (Entry and Integration under Uncertainty) Under foreign demand
uncertainty, the entry and integration productivity cutoffs are (i) proportional to the




k where k ∈ {V,O} and (ii)
higher than their deterministic counterparts, θek > θ
eD
k ; (iii) the vertical integration




The results derived so far consider the impact of demand uncertainty on pro-
ductivity cutoffs compared to the deterministic framework. Additionally, I am in-
terested in uncovering how the introduction of uncertainty modifies the responses
of these productivity cutoffs to changes in the key parameters of the model. The
following propositions discuss the effect of uncertainty on the productivity cutoffs.
Proposition 3. (Delay) A higher arrival rate of demand shocks increases the pro-




> 0) and decreases the productivity cutoff for exit




< 0). An increase in the arrival rate of demand shocks




|γ=0 > 0) and decreases the exit produc-




|γ=0 < 0) for exporting with integration when evaluated around
43
the deterministic case, i.e. γ = 0. Moving away from γ = 0, a compensating factor,
the impact of uncertainty on the productivity cutoff for outsourcing, kicks in and
ameliorates the effect on integration productivity cutoffs.
Proof. See appendix.
This proposition implies that firms facing more uncertainty are more likely to
delay their entry and exit decisions. Note that this result refers to one of the elements
used to model uncertainty in this framework, namely the demand shock arrival rate,
holding fixed the other component of the demand stochastic process, namely the
cumulative distribution function. In the case of the integration productivity cutoffs
, the first order effect of higher γ is to delay entry and exit.
Proposition 4. (Heterogeneity in the responses by organizational form) The entry
and exit cutoffs for exporting via outsourcing are more elastic to demand changes
than the respective cutoffs for exporting with integration, i.e. (| ∂ ln θ
e
o
∂ lnAt | − |
∂ ln θev
∂ lnAt | > 0)
and (| ∂ ln θ
x
o
∂ lnAt | − |
∂ ln θxv
∂ lnAt | > 0).
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition for these results is that sunk costs dampen the response of the
productivity cutoffs to shocks. Since integration requires higher sunk costs compared
to outsourcing, it follows that demand elasticities for outsourcing cutoffs are higher
(in absolute value). This higher elasticity of productivity cutoffs for outsourcing than
integration sharply contrasts with the deterministic framework. In the determin-
istic framework, elasticities are similar both within organizational form and across
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organizational form. The reason is that all productivity cutoffs in the deterministic
framework are log-separable in the demand realization. This log-separability does
not hold in the stochastic framework since the current demand realization affects the
expected gains and losses of potential future changes in demand conditions. These
differences by organizational form in the elasticity to demand level are potentially
interesting, because productivity is the only reason for differences in the behavior
between integrated and non-integrated firms in the deterministic framework. In
the stochastic framework, however, demand uncertainty and partially irreversible
costs create another channel to explain the differences in the margin of adjustment
between integrated and non-integrated firms.
Recall that demand uncertainty is modeled as a two component stochastic pro-
cess: the demand shock arrival rate and the underlying demand distribution. Thus,
comparative statics in terms of the arrival rate do not capture all of the possible
effects of uncertainty in the model. Another approach to analyze the effect of un-
certainty in the model is to consider changes in the distribution function G(A). For
example, a perceived worsening of demand conditions can be parametrized as a shift
in mass towards the left tail of the distribution G(A). The following propositions
consider different scenarios in which I am able to identify the direction of the effect
of changes in G(A) on firms’ decisions.
Proposition 5. (Bad News I) Suppose that the distribution of demand G(A) changes
such that the new distribution G′(A) is first order stochastic dominated by the initial
distribution G(A). Then productivity cutoffs for entry with outsourcing, integra-
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tion, exit from outsourcing and exit from integration are higher under G′(·) That is,
θmk (G
′) > θmk (G) where k ∈ {V,O}and m ∈ {e, x}.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 6. (Bad News II) Suppose that the distribution of demand G(A)
changes such that G′(A) is a mean-preserving spread of G(A) such that G(A) and
G′(A) cross only once at Ã. Then the exit cutoff increases, θxk < θx′k , for current
realizations below Ã and declines, θxk > θx′k , above this threshold. Also, the entry
cutoff increases, θek > θ
e′
k , for current realizations below Ã and decreases , θek > θe′k ,
above this threshold.
Proof. See appendix.
These propositions imply that even when the current demand conditions re-
main constant, a change in the underlying demand distribution can lead firms to ei-
ther enter, exit or change their organizational form. The is because an improvement
in the demand distribution implies an increase of the expected gains of exporting.
Therefore some firms -those that had been waiting for good news before beginning to
export - decide to stop waiting and start exporting. Similarly, some firms that were
considering integration will decide to stop waiting, because their expected profits
from a new shock are higher than before. This result, interpreted from the perspec-
tive of episodes such as the Great Trade Collapse, implies that shocks that change
not only the current demand condition but also the underlying distribution in the
same direction would have stronger impacts than shocks to the current realization
only. This proposition can also provide a potential explanation for recoveries after
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a negative shock through an improvement of the underlying demand distribution
even if current conditions are unchanged.
To summarize, this section shows theoretically that uncertainty affects both
entry, exit and organizational form decisions via both the threshold levels and the
marginal response of these thresholds to shocks. This suggests that uncertainty can
play a significant role in episodes characterized by high and changing uncertainty
such as the GTC. The next section presents the steps I follow to test the model
empirically and to quantify the role of uncertainty in the GTC.
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2.4 Figures








Chapter 3: Global Sourcing and Uncertainty: Empirical Evaluation
The model developed in the previous sections has several predictions. In this
section, I focus on key predictions to test the model and to provide insights on
heterogeneous responses of firms across organizational choice. I focus on the decision
to exit from foreign markets for several reasons. First, the exit decision has not been
explored in detail by the trade literature. Second, the exit decision is a key margin
that highlights the differences between related parties and arm’s length trade, which
played a key role during the GTC. Third, the exit decision provides a better setting
than entry to identify the impact of uncertainty, as no assumption is needed to know
the level of uncertainty to which the firm is exposed. More specifically, since it is not
known a priori which foreign destination a firm would enter, it is not straightforward
to measure uncertainty in the case of entry.
Based on the theoretical results and the propositions in the previous section,
I expect the following: (i) related parties should survive longer following negative
aggregate shocks, (ii) an increase in foreign demand uncertainty, as measured by
the share of GDP that would be lost if a severe shock arrives, should induce firms
to exit, and (iii) the difference in exit thresholds between related parties and arm’s
length trade should be bigger during times of higher uncertainty. The first testable
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prediction is based on proposition 1 and the result that even conditional on firm
productivity the demand threshold to exit from vertical integration is lower than
the exit threshold for outsourcing, Axv < Axo . The second prediction is based on
proposition 5, which is applicable given the definition of uncertainty that I construct.
The third testable prediction comes from the fact that introducing uncertainty into
the model expands the differences in the exit cutoff between vertical integration and
outsourcing.
A straightforward approach to testing these predictions is to build a duration
model where the probability that the firm stops exporting in the next period is
modeled using a hazard function that depends on independent variables such as
measures of uncertainty and organizational form, including firm and destination
characteristics in order to control for potential differences across firms.
3.1 Uncertainty Measure
In order to test the model, the first step is to compute a measure of uncertainty.
In the model, firms are uncertain about the future value of A where A = µ× Y (t+
1) × P (t + 1)
α
1−α and Y (t + 1) is the income of the foreign country. Therefore, I
compute uncertainty by modeling the stochastic process for destination countries’
Gross Domestic Product. More specifically, I assume that ln gdpc(t) for country c
follows an AR(1) process in differences with a Gaussian distributed error term:
∆ ln gdpc(t+ 1) = ac + ρc∆ ln gdpc(t) + εc(t+ 1)
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After estimating this AR(1) process for all countries with at least 20 annual
observations in the 1988-2011 period, I then compute the uncertainty measure as
the share of GDP that a country will lose in the next period if a bad shock arrives.
uncc(t) = 1−
exp(ln gdpc(t) + ρ̂c∆ ln gdpc(t) + ε̂c,0.05)
gdpc(t)
This uncertainty measure assumes that firms base their decision to exit by
forming an expectation of how much profit would be lost if a severe shock arrives.
In the theoretical model, changes in foreign GDP are the only factor affecting A. In
reality, there are many other sources of uncertainty specific to destinations besides
GDP; however, destination GDP is surely one important factor about which export-
ing firms are uncertain. Implicitly, the measure is approximating the expected profit
loss using a two state process, involving GDP today and a bad shock at the 0.05
percentile of the distribution. This approach simplifies the construction of the mea-
sure and highlights the role of severe shocks, such as the GTC, in firms’ decisions.
Note that the country-specific uncertainty measure is varying over time. However,
most of variation comes from the country dimension compared to the time dimen-
sion. More spefically, country is the source of around 90% of the variation while
time accounts for the remaining variation.
As an alternative, I follow the literature on uncertainty at the macro level
and use stock market volatility in the foreign market as my measure of uncertainty
(cf. Bloom et al. (2012)). In particular, I use yearly stock market volatility in the
destination market, as constructed by Baker and Bloom (2013).
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3.2 Survival Approach
The standard approach in duration analysis when working with annual data is
to use a discrete time model.1 A discrete time model has the advantage that unob-
served factors which may affect the estimation can be controlled for relatively easily.
These factors, such as firm productivity and other unobserved firms characteristics,
are controlled by introducing a “frailty” term that varies at the firm level. Formally,
the hazard function is:
hipc(t) =Prob[exit ∈ [t− 1, t]|survive > t− 1]
where hipc(t) is the probability that firm i exporting product p to country c stops ex-
porting in period t. Under the proportional hazard assumption, the hazard function
becomes:
hipc(t) =1− exp (− exp (Xipc(t)β + jt + νipc))
where Xipc,t is a set of covariates that includes: (i) a dummy variable for related
parties, (ii) an uncertainty measure, (iii) the interaction of uncertainty and the re-
lated parties dummy, and (iv) additional controls. jt is the non-parametric baseline
hazard and νipc is assumed to follow a normal distribution, which implies that the
individual effect is distributed log-normal. The assumption of log-normality is par-
1In the duration literature it also common to use the Cox proportional hazard estimator. The
Cox proportional hazard model has the disadvantage of assuming that time is continuous and that
failures can occur at any point. This is clearly not the case when using annual frequency data.
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ticularly appealing for modeling the productivity of the firm, since there is evidence
that at least the right tail of firm productivity follows a log-normal distribution (see
Head, Mayer, and Thoenig (2014)).
As described in section 1.1, I use the LFTTD and LBD databases from the
U.S. Census Bureau as the main source of information. The LFTTD provides de-
tailed information on all U.S. export transactions at the firm level disaggregating
by product, destination and ownership relationship between the trading firms. The
LBD collects firm characteristics that I use as controls in the regression analysis.
The unit of analysis is firm-destination-product-year and the period is 2002-2011.2
According to the model predictions discussed above, a dummy variable cap-
turing whether firms engage in related party trade should have a negative impact on
the hazard function, while uncertainty should have a positive impact. Additionally,
uncertainty and GDP in the destination country should have a heterogeneous im-
pact across organizational form. More specifically, related party trade should be less
affected by uncertainty and the same level of GDP should have a stronger impact
on the reduction of the probability of exiting. These heterogeneous effects imply
that interactions between the related party indicator and the respective covariate
should be negative for both cases.
The set of control variables includes firm and market characteristics. Firm age,
size and previous export levels are introduced to control for firm productivity and
export history, since previous studies show that more productive and more experi-
2The period of analysis is determined by the data availability since 2011 is the last year for
which data on export transactions are available at the Census Bureau.
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enced firms survive longer (see e.g. Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988), Mata
and Portugal (1994), Pérez, Llopis, and Llopis (2004) and Volpe Martincus and Car-
ballo (2009)). Also, control variables are motivated by the results on determinants
of intra-firm imports for a sample of French firms by Corcos et al. (2013). They
show that importing from a related-party firm is more probable for more produc-
tive firms, firms more capital and skill intensive. Also, they show that French firms
are more likely to import through related-party from countries with better judicial
systems. First, the individual effects captures firms’ constant characteristics and
in doing so control for the constant component of skill intensity, capital intensity
and firm productivity. Second, employment size controls at least partially for time-
varying productivity. Also, in the robustness section I perform several exercises that
further control for these determinants.3. Destination country GDP is also included
to control for current demand conditions.
Results are presented in Table 3.1 in the exponential form as is standard in
duration model. These coefficients in exponential form should be interpreted using 1
as the reference. Coefficients lower than one reduce the probability of exiting while
coefficients above one increase it. The results confirm the prior predictions. The
indicator for related party trade is lower than 1 and significant in all specifications.
This implies that related parties firms have a lower probability of exiting compared
to arm’s length trade. In the specification where all controls are included, the
presence of related parties implies a reduction of 5.6% of the baseline exit hazard.
3 First, I introduce firm TFP for a sample of manufacturing firms. Second, I introduce industry-
specific baseline hazard that control for capital intensity and skill intensive differences across
industries. Third, I add measures for country rule of law to control for the quality of judicial
system. Results are robust to introduce all these controls.
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Note that the controls have the expected effects; bigger firms in terms either of
exports or employment are less likely to stop exporting and a higher GDP in the
foreign destination also reduces this probability.
Table 3.1: Firms’ Survival in Export Markets and Related Parties
Depvar: Exit (1) (2) (3)
Related Party 0.791*** 0.807*** 0.946***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)








Individual Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations (rounded) 17,600,000 17,600,000 17,600,000
Clustered standard errors at firm-destination-product in parentheses
Hazard function is non-parametric.
Coefficients are presented in their exponential form.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10
The results from estimating the impact of uncertainty on the firm decision to
exit are presented in Table 3.2. The measure of uncertainty used is the expected
GDP loss if a bad shock arrives, as we explain above. The impact of uncertainty
is significantly higher than 1, as it increases the probability of exiting in the next
period by 20% in the preferred specification in which all covariates and controls are
included. Note that the impact of trading to related parties remains negative and
significant when we control for uncertainty and also a dummy capturing whether
the year corresponds to the GTC.
Results presented in the previous tables show that uncertainty has a negative
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Table 3.2: Firms’ Survival in Export Markets and Uncertainty
Dep var: Exit (1) (2) (3)
Related Party 0.804*** 0.889*** 0.917***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Uncertainty AR(1) 1.046*** 1.080*** 1.232***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Crisis (2009) 1.082*** 1.084*** 1.099***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)








Individual Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations (rounded) 14,300,000 14,300,000 12,700,000
Clustered standard errors at firm-destination-product in parentheses
Hazard function is non-parametric.
Coefficients are presented in their exponential form.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05
impact on firms’ survival. However they do not provide with a measure of how much
uncertainty increases the probability of exiting. Hence, I estimate the marginal
impact of uncertainty for the full sample of firms. Figure 3.1 plots the marginal
effect for the full distribution of firms exporting in 2005. I find that for at least 50%
of firm-destination-product flows, uncertainty increases the probability of exiting
by at least 5 percentage points and that for the upper tail of the distribution the
increases is higher than 10 percentage points.
The third testable prediction is the heterogeneity in the impact of uncertainty
and GDP across organizational form. More specifically, uncertainty has a smaller
impact on the probability of exiting for related party exports according to the model.
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Figure 3.1: Uncertainty Impact
Similarly, related party exports respond less to changes in GDP and have a lower
cutoff of exiting given a demand level in the foreign destination. In order to test
this, I reestimate the model allowing for an interaction between uncertainty and
related parties. The specification in the case of allowing for heterogeneity in the
impact of uncertainty is as follows:
hipc(t) =1− exp(− exp(βuncuncc(t) + βRuncuncc(t)×R + βRR +Xipc(t)β + jt + νipc))
The approach for the case of GDP is similar to this where I introduce an interaction
between GDP and related parties. Table 3.3 presents the results of estimating these
heterogeneous impact across organizational forms for uncertainty and GDP.
Results show that trading to related parties rather than arm’s length reduces
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Table 3.3: Heterogeneity in Firms’ Survival in Export Mar-
kets
Depvar: Exit (1) (2)
Related Party (βR) 0.972*** 0.976***
(0.00876) (0.0053)
Uncertainty AR(1) (βunc) 1.307*** 1.152***
(0.0305) (0.0102)
RP x Uncertainty AR(1) (βRunc) 0.910***
(0.0113)
GDP (log) (βgdp) 0.956*** 0.957***
(0.007) (0.007)
RP x GDP (log) (βRgdp) 0.988***
(0.00225)
Firms Characteristics Yes Yes
Individual Effect Yes Yes
Observations (rounded) 14,300,000 14,300,000
Clustered standard errors at firm-destination-product in parenthe-
sis
Hazard function is non-parametric.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05
the impact of uncertainty on the probability from a 30.7% increase to a 18.9%
increase. This represent a reduction of the effect of almost 40%. In the case of the
GDP, trading to related parties implies an additional reduction on the probability
of exiting of 2.68%. Note this is inline with the fact that at the same level of
GDP related firms obtain higher profits and hence the probability of exiting is
smaller. However, this also implies that the impact of GDP is stronger for related
parties and, thus, this result contradicts the ranking of demand elasticity of the
productivity cutoffs across organizational form. To further explore the heterogeneity
in the impact of uncertainty, I compute the marginal effect for the full sample under
analysis and plot the impact for percentiles of the uncertainty distribution. Figure
3.2 shows that the difference in the increase of the hazard between related parties
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and arm’s length trade increases as uncertainty increases. For example, uncertainty
increases the probability of exiting by 5 percentage points or more for more than
80% of firms trading at arm’s length but only 50% of firms trading with related
parties.
Figure 3.2: Heterogeneous Uncertainty Impact
Note that the identified effects correspond to the average industries. However,
industries are heterogeneous in their production process. From the perspective of the
model, the η parameter is the one capturing this heterogeneity. According to it, the
impact of trading to related parties should be stronger the higher the η parameter
is, i.e. the more relevant headquarters services are in the production process. In the
robustness section, I introduce industry-specific hazard rates that control for these
potential differences as long as they are constant over time.
A key assumption of the model is that the final good is consumed in the foreign
destination. However, firms may have a multi-stage production process involving
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several countries. In particular, U.S. firms may be more likely to have a multi-
stage production involving countries such as Canada and Mexico, due to NAFTA
integration, or China, where the wage differential is higher. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to track multi-country production process given the information available.
However, I control for this potential issue by dropping these countries from the
sample. In the robustness section, I show that this does not affect the main results.
3.3 Quantification
To explore the economic significance of the mechanisms highlighted by the
model, I quantify the impact of trading with related parties and the role of un-
certainty in the exit decision. The first counterfactual analysis considers the role
of trading with related parties. More specifically, I compute how many additional
exports would result if all firms had traded with related parties in 2009. Under this
scenario, all firms originally trading at arm’s length would have a lower probabil-
ity of exiting in 2009, which in turns generates additional exports. I assume that
these additional surviving firms have exports similar to average firms exporting to
non-related firms in 2009. As an alternative scenario, I assume that these firms
experience the average contraction in exports experienced by firms exporting to re-
lated parties. Results from performing this counterfactual analysis show that the
2009 contraction in U.S. exports would have been between 10% and 12% smaller
under this scenario.
The second counterfactual analysis assumes that uncertainty in 2009 drops
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to its first tercile for all firms with uncertainty above the third tercile. In this
scenario, all firms facing uncertainty above the third tercile have a higher probability
of surviving, and this in turns generates additional exports. I assume that additional
firms surviving in this scenario have the average export level of all firms exporting
to their respective country in 2009. Results indicate that the contraction of exports
in 2009 would have been reduced by 8% under this scenario.
3.4 Robustness Exercises
There are a number of potential concerns about these results. The main
concern is whether these results are specific to the uncertainty measure used. In
order to test this, I use the annual average stock market volatility in the foreign
destination over the period as an alternative measure of uncertainty. The results,
reported in Table 3.4, confirm that uncertainty increases the exit probability. A one
standard deviation increase of stock market volatility increases the probability of
exiting by 2.5% for the average firm while moving from the 5th percentile to the
75th percentile increases this probability by 4.4%.
Second, a key identification assumption is that the final good is consumed in
the foreign country, so that uncertainty over the foreign country demand affects the
firm’s decision to export through related parties or at arm’s length. If instead U.S.
firms export via related parties to a foreign country with the intention to ship back
the good, then foreign demand conditions in general, and uncertainty in particular,
are irrelevant to the organizational choice. Note than if reshipment is more likely for
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related parties than arms-length trade, the impact of uncertainty would be higher
than the one estimated above. Such a multi-stage production process involving U.S.
exports is more probable for exports within NAFTA or China. Hence, I reestimate
the model taking out exports to NAFTA and China from the sample. Results are
reported in Table 3.5. These regressions confirm all previous results; moreover,
the impact of uncertainty is stronger when I eliminate all export flows to Canada,
Mexico and China.
Third, a potential concern is whether the estimated impact of uncertainty is
driven solely by the 2008-9 recession (GTC), with no impact of uncertainty before
2008. However, reestimating the model for the 2002-2007 period, before the GTC
started, confirms the baseline results and shows that uncertainty plays a significant
role in firms’ exit decisions even in periods of relative stability, see Table 3.6 for
detailed results.
Fourth, results may depend on unobserved factors, such as productivity and
other firm’s characteristics. Controlling for a timer-varying firm-level TFP measure,
as computed by the Census Bureau, does not affect previous findings.4 This result
is reported in the first column of Table 3.7; the other columns include other firm
characteristics such as whether the firm is importing and total domestic sales. All
results and conclusions remain the same after introducing these controls. Similarly,
4The TFP index measure is constructed using the following formula:
lnTFPe(t) = lnQe(t)− αK lnKe(t)− αL lnLe(t)− αM lnMe(t)
where Q is real output, K is real capital, L is labor input, M is real materials, α denotes factor
elasticities, the subscript e denotes individual establishments and t denotes time. Factor elasticities
are industry-level cost shares for each input. See more details in Foster, Grim, and Haltiwanger
(2014).
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results may be affected by unobserved characteristics at the industry or destination
level. In order to control for these unobserved characteristics, I reestimate the model
using industry and country-specific baseline hazards, where industries are defined
using the 2-digits harmonized classification. These industry-specific and country-
specific baseline hazards incorporate permanent characteristics of industries and
destinations. Results are reported in 3.8 and are robust to incorporating these
additional controls. Note that country-specific hazard rates allow to control for the
impact of PTA agreements on the probability of exiting.
Fifth, results may be affected by firms reentering in the future. Empirically,
this does not seem to be the case, as most firms exit permanently. Moreover, adding
a dummy for previous spells to control for this reentry behavior does not change
results. Additionally, results could depend on the frequency of the data or the esti-
mator used. However, results are robust to using data at the semi-annual frequency
and to using the Cox proportional hazard model, instead of the discrete approach
followed in the main specification; results are reported in Table 3.9.
Sixth, the empirical analysis uses firm-destination-product as it level of anal-
ysis. However, firms do not take decision independently across destinations and
markets. In order to control for this, I run several robustness exercises: first, I
included a dummy to check whether the firm is exiting in another foreign market;
second, I allowed standard errors to be clustered at firm-level to account for common
shocks at firm level; third, I included domestic sales as a control in the regression




I examine how firms’ global sourcing strategies affect their responses to eco-
nomic crises such as the 2008-2009 recession. I model firms’ entry, exit and sourcing
decisions (integrated production or outsourcing) under demand uncertainty. Uncer-
tainty increases the option value of waiting, resulting in less integration as well as
less entry and exit. Additionally, I show that trade decisions of integrated firms
are less sensitive to uncertainty shocks. These heterogeneous responses to shocks
highlight the role of sourcing strategies in the way firms adjust and contrast with
the homogeneous responses predicted by the deterministic model.
I develop a theory-consistent measure of foreign demand uncertainty following
closely the model. Then, I use U.S. firm-level export data for the 2002-2011 period
to test the predictions of the model for the exit decision. In doing so, I exploit the
fact that U.S. customs data is one of the few databases that records the ownership
relation between trading parties for every transaction. I find that integration reduces
the probability that a firm exits by as much as 8%, while uncertainty increases this
probability by as much as 22%. Quantifying the impact of these results, I find that
if all firms traded to related parties, the 2009 collapse in exports would have been
reduced by between 10% and 12%. Also, if uncertainty was reduced to the first
tercile for all firms, the reduction on exports of 2009 would have been 8% smaller.
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3.6 Tables
Table 3.4: Firms’ Survival and Alternative Uncertainty Measures
Dep var: Exit (1) (2) (3) (4)
Related Party 0.804*** 0.917*** 0.799*** 0.914***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Crisis (2009) 1.082*** 1.099*** 1.079*** 1.05***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP (log) 0.959*** 0.968*** 0.974*** 0.974***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Uncertainty AR(1) 1.046*** 1.232***
(0.004) (0.004)
Stock Market Volatility 1.027*** 1.041***
(0.003) (0.001)
Stock Market Return 0.9539** 0.856***
(0.021) (0.009)
Observations (rounded) 15,300,000 12,700,000 12,700,000 11,900,000
Firms characteristics No Yes No Yes
Clustered standard errors at firm-destination-product in parentheses
Hazard function is non-parametric.
Coefficients are presented in their exponential form.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05
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Table 3.5: Estimation without China and NAFTA
Dep var: Exit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Related Party 0.845*** 0.913*** 0.934*** 0.841*** 0.908*** 0.932***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP (log) 0.969*** 0.966*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 0.974*** 0.98***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Uncertainty AR(1) 1.046*** 1.076*** 1.252***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Crisis (2009) 1.06*** 1.062*** 1.081*** 1.055*** 1.052*** 1.032***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Employees (log) 0.963*** 0.973*** 0.964*** 0.975***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age (log) 1.016*** 1.004*** 1.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exports (log) 0.803*** 0.803***
(0.001) (0.001)
Stock Market Volatitly 1.016*** 1.02*** 1.025***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Stock Market Return 0.89*** 0.896*** 0.811***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations (rounded) 8,130,000 8,130,000 8,130,000 7,030,000 7,030,000 7,030,000
Clustered standard errors at firm-destination-product in parentheses
Hazard function is non-parametric.
Coefficients are presented in their exponential form.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05
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Table 3.6: Estimation without GTC
Dep var: Exit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Related Party 0.824*** 0.904*** 0.932*** 0.814*** 0.896*** 0.924***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP (log) 0.963*** 0.961*** 0.97*** 0.979*** 0.974*** 0.99***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Uncertainty AR(1) 1.05*** 1.046*** 1.183***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Employees (log) 0.956*** 0.969*** 0.956*** 0.97***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age (log) 1.018*** 0.994*** 1.018*** 0.993***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exports (log) 0.79*** 0.787***
(0.001) (0.001)
Stock Market Volatility 1.012*** 1.033*** 1.065***
(0.00179) (0.00184) (0.00179)
Stock Market Return 0.884*** 0.848*** 0.887***
(0.0119) (0.0123) (0.0121)
Observations (rounded) 7,822,000 7,822,000 7,822,000 6,568,000 6,568,000 6,568,000
Clustered standard errors at firm-destination-product in parentheses
Hazard function is non-parametric.
Coefficients are presented in their exponential form.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05
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Table 3.7: Additional Firms’ Characteristics
Dep var: Exit (1) (2) (3)
Related Party 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.919***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
GDP (log) 0.973*** 0.973*** 0.98***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Uncertainty AR(1) 1.155*** 1.156*** 1.156***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Crisis 1.08*** 1.08*** 1.079***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Employees (log) 0.974*** 0.974*** 0.971***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age (log) 0.993*** 0.993*** 0.992***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Exports (log) 0.776*** 0.776*** 0.776***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)




Domestic Sales (log) 0.988***
(0.001)
Observations (rounded) 7,822,000 7,822,000 7,822,000
Clustered standard errors at firm-destination-product in
parentheses
Hazard function is non-parametric.
Coefficients are presented in their exponential form.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05
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Table 3.8: Estimation using Industry-specific Baseline
Hazard
Dep var: Exit (1) (2) (3)
Related Party 0.885*** 0.926*** 0.936***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
GDP (log) 0.965*** 0.961*** 0.98***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Uncertainty AR(1) 1.033*** 1.055*** 1.138***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Crisis 1.031*** 1.042*** 1.061***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Employees (log) 0.965*** 0.977***
(0.001) (0.001)




Observations (rounded) 14,300,000 14,300,000 12,700,000
Clustered standard errors at firm-destination-product in
parentheses
Hazard function is non-parametric.
Coefficients are presented in their exponential form.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05
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Table 3.9: Estimation using Cox Proportional Hazard
Dep var: Exit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Related Party 0.919*** 0.953*** 0.964*** 0.916*** 0.951*** 0.963***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP (log) 0.986*** 0.985*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.988*** 0.99***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Uncertainty AR(1) 1.025*** 1.036*** 1.097***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Crisis (2009) 1.025*** 1.026*** 1.033*** 1.03*** 1.027*** 1.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Employees (log) 0.982*** 0.987*** 0.981*** 0.988***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age (log) 1.006*** 0.997*** 0.995***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exports (log) 0.89*** 0.887***
(0.001) (0.001)
Stock Market Volatility 1.01*** 1.072*** 1.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Stock Market Return 0.967*** 0.971*** 0.942***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations (rounded) 14,300,000 14,300,000 12,700,000 12,700,000 12,700,000 11,900,000
Clustered standard errors at firm-destination-product in parentheses
Hazard function is non-parametric.
Coefficients are presented in their exponential form.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05
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Chapter 4: Trade Collapse: The Role of Economic and Policy Un-
certainty in the Great Recession
Note: This chapter is coauthored with Kyle Handley and Nuno Limão
4.1 Overview
Firms face uncertainty about future conditions affecting their costs, demand,
and profitability. Sources of uncertainty range from purely economic shocks - such
as productivity or tastes - to policy shocks - such as monetary and fiscal innova-
tions, tax and regulatory reforms. These uncertainties about future conditions are
especially important when firms must decide on costly irreversible investments such
as, adopting a new technology, producing or selling in a new market, or the decision
to close a plant or abandon a market outright.
The recent “Great Recession” and slow recovery renewed concerns about the
impact of uncertainty on economic activity. Existing frameworks used to study such
impacts focus on uncertainty from purely economic shocks but generally ignore other
sources such as uncertainty about future policy. However, uncertainty about future
taxes, regulatory reforms, and other policies can be quite important and in fact
some prominent policy makers and economists believe that policy uncertainty helps
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to explain the weak recovery in the U.S.1 Furthermore, available models are usually
not able to encompass multiple sources of uncertainty, and less so how these multiple
sources interact. Moreover, it can argued that uncertainty about trade policy also
increased during this recession. For example, the G-20 repeatedly pledged that
“We will not repeat the historic mistakes of protectionism of previous eras.” which
shows that the fear of a trade war, similar to the one in the 1930’s, was widespread.2
Despite these concerns among policy makers about the impact of policy uncertainty,
there is relatively little firm evidence about its economic impacts and how it interacts
with economic uncertainty.
The impact of uncertainty on certain firm investments is theoretically under-
stood (cf. Bernanke (1983); Dixit (1989)) and there is some empirical evidence
linking the two (Bloom, Bond, and Reenen (2007); Bloom (2009)). The empirical
evidence is particularly scarce when it comes to policy uncertainty, even though
thousands of firms worldwide rank it as an important business constraint (World
Bank (2004)). Furthermore, studies that consider multiple sources of uncertainty
are virtually nonexistent. The scarce evidence is in part due to the fact that it is
hard to measure policy uncertainty, identify its causal impact on specific investment
decisions (Bloom, Bond, and Reenen (2007)), and unbundle it from other sources of
uncertainty, such as economic uncertainty. The international trade setting provides
an ideal framework to overcome these problems. First, firms’ entry to an export
1See for example, “Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee,” August 9, 2011,
< http://federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20110809.htm >; “Uncertainty and the
Slow Recovery,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2010. Becker, Gary S., Steven J. Davis and Kevin
M. Murphy
2 G-20 Communique, April 9, 2009. http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/en/summit-
aims/summit-communique/
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market involves a sunk cost (cf. Roberts and Tybout (1997)) and once firms are
operating in a foreign market, they are subject to additional policy uncertainty (e.g.
the threat of trade wars). Unlike many other activities, firms’ international transac-
tions have to be registered, thus generating very detailed firm-level data that allows
to identify market entry (and its associated investments) as well as other export
outcomes . Furthermore, this detailed information is available at a high frequency,
a key feature to identify the impact of uncertainty. Finally, the institutional setting
for international trade, mainly trade agreements, the WTO and tariffs levels, pro-
vides variation in policy uncertainty over countries and products as well as a good
way to measure policy uncertainty.3
The trade setting is also extremely interesting in its own right. First, global
integration and the increasing share of exports in firms’ sales have considerably
increased exposure to foreign policy uncertainty. Second, while a significant portion
of trade analysis assumes policy is fixed, Handley (2014) and Handley and Limão
(Forthcoming) show that policy can be quite uncertain, which has direct effects
on exporting and also makes current tariff changes less credible, attenuating their
impact on investment and trade even in context of low economic uncertainty. Third,
the impact of trade policy uncertainty during a high economic uncertainty period
has not been explored.
During the most recent economic downturn, the so called “Great Recession”,
worldwide trade experienced the greatest contraction since World War II, as world
3Moreover, trade policy is one of the main concern for exporting firms. For example, Japanese
firms ranked trade policy first in terms of the uncertainty they face and second in terms of the
impact on their management decisions among the sources of policy uncertainty (see Morikawa
(2013)).
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exports decreased by 12 percent in 2009. The collapse affected many different coun-
tries and the U.S. was no exception. U.S. export and import volumes dropped 18.0
percent and 25.9 percent respectively in 2009 (see U.S. Census Bureau (2015)). A
collapse of international trade of such magnitude attracted a lot of attention, espe-
cially since the contraction in GDP was milder.4 Several hypotheses to explain it
have emerged: (i) changes in the composition of demand (Eaton et al. (2013)); (ii)
the collapse of trade credit (Chor and Manova (2012)); (iii) the disintegration of in-
ternational supply chains (Bems, Johnson, and Yi (2011)); (iv) the inventory cycles
of firms (Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010)); and (v) economic uncertainty
(Novy and Taylor (2014)). The overall consensus in the literature is that these
explanations cannot account for the bulk of the “Great Trade Collapse” (GTC).
Moreover, proposed explanations focus on the contraction but ignore the subse-
quent fast recovery of international trade. U.S. exports grew more than 31% from
the 4th quarter of 2009 to the 4th quarter of 2010.5 Hence, explanations of the GTC
not only need to account for the contraction but must also be consistent with such
a recovery.
These facts lead us to explore a different explanation of the GTC and the
recovery: changes in uncertainty about other countries’ policies combined with eco-
nomic uncertainty. Our main motivation for this hypothesis is the widespread fear
of a return to protection not seen since the trade wars of the 1930s. Three factors
lent credibility to an increase in the risk of protectionism. First, there was large
4For example, according to the World Bank U.S. GDP contracted only 2.04% during 2009 while
U.S. international trade decreased a 22.8%.
5Furthermore, the growth from the trough of the recession to the end of 2010 in U.S. exports
was a remarkable 68% in 6 quarters
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scale government intervention to stimulate markets but prevent free-riding of for-
eign countries. For example, the “buy American” clause in the US stimulus bill
discriminated against foreign firms (Eichengreen and Irwin (2010)). Second, uni-
lateral liberalization by several countries before the crisis implied that more than
30% of applied tariffs worldwide were well below binding ceilings negotiated at the
WTO (Foletti et al. (2011)). This meant that the potential scale of WTO-legal
tariff increases was large. Third, the world trade system had not been tested in a
coordinated downturn of this magnitude since the 1930’s, which is one reason for
the repeated assurances to eschew protectionism.
Despite these fears of a return to protectionism, the WTO and other organi-
zations monitored increases in applied protection and ultimately found only limited
increases.6 But in our framework, a backslide to protectionism need not actually
occur to affect real activity. Only that firms expect a trade war with a higher prob-
ability during the GTC is required.7 Traces of uncertainty-related trade frictions
were evident. First, the decline in trade was larger for consumer durable and cap-
ital goods, which require larger fixed investments (Bems, Johnson, and Yi (2011)).
Second, the IMF (2010) found the exports of crisis countries to non-crisis ones can
be explained by contemporaneous changes in income and other covariates, whereas
their imports cannot. This suggests a higher perceived likelihood of protection in
6 WTO, OECD and UNCTAD 2010, “Report on G20 Trade and Investment Measures.” Kee,
Neagu, and Nicita (2013) find increases in applied protection accounted for a small share of the
collapse, but there is heterogeneity across countries.
7More specifically, Kee, Neagu, and Nicita (2013) find that the increase in protectionism affected
only 1% of traded products and 2% of the trade collapse. This is in sharp contrast with the Great
Depression of 1930, where increases in barriers affected 35% of tariff schedule lines and accounted
for a large fraction of the trade contraction (see Madsen (2001)).
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crisis relative to non-crisis countries. Moreover, in those products that were directly
targeted by protection, trade declines were large, which suggests that expectations
of large losses conditional on a policy shock were warranted. Third, Bown and
Crowley (2013) show evidence of negative correlation between economic shocks and
barriers to trade before 2008-9 recession. Hence firms’ expectations before the GTC
naturally include some positive probability of a policy amplification channel in the
case of a recession in the foreign destination. However, when this backslide to pro-
tectionism did not take place, uncertainty declined and helped foster the recovery
of international trade.
More specifically, we address the following questions in this chapter: Did un-
certainty play a role during the GTC? What was the role of economic and policy
uncertainty in the collapse and subsequent recovery? Our approach to answering
these questions is first, to document the trade dynamics of U.S. firms during the
GTC and second, to empirically assess the role of economic uncertainty and trade
policy uncertainty (TPU) in the collapse, guided by a theoretical model that en-
compasses both economic and policy uncertainty and allows us to unbundle both
sources of uncertainty.
In order to explore the dynamics of U.S. exporting firms during the GTC,
we use, for the first time in the literature, confidential detailed firm-level from the
Census Bureau.8 The descriptive exploration of these data highlights three key
8Our main source of information for firms export transaction is the Longitudinal Firm Trade
Transaction Database (LFTTD). This database links trade transactions to the firms that make
them and allows us to track firms over time. Importantly, this dataset records for each trade
transactions the product classification, the value and quantity shipped, the date of the shipment,
and the destination country, among other things. This detailed information allows us to track
firms’ export dynamics across countries, products and over time.
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findings: First, the collapse was strong but was followed by a quick recovery. The
collapse started in the fourth quarter of 2008 and reached its trough in the second
quarter of 2009. Most of the export variables recovered by the end of 2010 and
2011. Second, the intensive margin -adjustment of existing trade flows- played
a central role but the extensive margin -the creation/destruction of trade flows-
represented a significant share of the contraction in the U.S., in sharp contrast to
other countries. We find that the extensive margin represented around 40% in terms
of values and that around 13% of U.S. firms stopped exporting during the GTC;
also, it took more than 8 quarters for the number of U.S. firms exporting to get
back to their level before the recessions. Third, heterogeneity across product, firms
and destinations show significant differences in the adjustment Importantly, trade
institutions affected significantly the margin of adjustment of U.S. firms during
the GTC. Firms exporting to countries with preferential trade agreements (PTA)
adjust significantly less through the extensive margin than firms exporting to non-
PTA countries.9 This difference in the adjustment margin is consistent with firms
assigning a positive probability of trade wars during the GTC.
We then develop a dynamic model of heterogeneous firms that face policy and
economic uncertainty to guide our estimation approach. We build on Handley and
Limão (Forthcoming) and generalize it in two ways that are central for the analysis
of the GTC. First, we focus on demand uncertainty, which allows us to capture both
trade policy uncertainty (TPU) (as in Handley and Limão (Forthcoming)) but also
9PTAs are agreements among a countries that involves a preferential treatment of trade among
members of PTA relative to non-members. Free trade agreements (FTA) are the most common
form of PTAs. In general, PTAs implies a commitment to lower trade barriers and to no trade
barriers in the case of FTAs.
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economic uncertainty. Second, while Handley and Limão (Forthcoming) focus on
entry, we examine the dynamics of exporting more broadly, including re-entry. To
capture these central elements in a tractable way that permits estimation using firm-
level data we abstract from certain general equilibrium effects, such as the impacts
of entry on the price index analyzed by Handley and Limão (2013) in the context of
China’s export boom to the U.S.10 Firms have to pay a sunk cost to start exporting.
This sunk cost combined with the uncertainty in the demand level generates an
option value of waiting to enter a foreign market.
As a first step, we model demand uncertainty originating from trade policy and
the aggregate income under the assumption that shocks to both variables arrive at
the same time (i.e. when a shock arrives both the policy and the income level draw a
new value). In this setting an increase in uncertainty reduces entry and also reduces
re-entry. Introducing a correlation between the policy realization and the economic
realization increases or decreases the impact on entry depending on the sign of the
correlation. A negative correlation, low income is associated with high tariffs and
vice-versa, between the sources of uncertainty decreases entry even more because
firms internalize that a recession in their foreign market increases the probability
that a future policy shock hurts profits even more. Next, we incorporate the fact
that the persistences of economic and policy shocks are different. More specifically,
we allow for different arrival rates of shocks by assuming that an economic shock is a
necessary condition for a policy shock but it is not sufficient. In the theory section,
10Handley and Limão (2013) show that allowing for general equilibrium effects in the context of
a model with uncertainty generates an attenuation of the uncertainty effect, which under certain
general assumptions does not dominate the partial equilibrium effect.
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we show that the impact of uncertainty on firms’ export decisions is summarized by
a multiplicative factor that captures the expected profit loss if economic conditions
get worse than the current realization. This factor is the key of the empirical analysis
since it captures the role of demand uncertainty in firms’ decisions. Thus, in order
to empirically assess the role of uncertainty we need a measure of this expected
profit losses if conditions worsen in some future period. Our approach to measure
this uncertainty factor is to compute the expected contraction of nominal GDP in
the foreign destination if a bad economic shock arrives.
In order to unbundle the economic and policy uncertainty, we proceed in two
steps. First, we interact our uncertainty GDP measure with an indicator that cap-
tures whether the foreign destination has a PTA with the U.S., since having a trade
agreement lowers significantly the probability of a trade war. Second, following
Broda, Limao, and Weinstein (2008) we exploit the fact that countries during a
trade war would increase their tariffs heterogeneously across products and that for-
eign destination market power in the industry is a key driver of this heterogeneity.
This strategy allows us to unbundle the effect of multiple sources of uncertainty by
comparing the impact of economic uncertainty with and without policy uncertainty
(PTA countries vs non-PTA countries) and the impact of economic uncertainty de-
pending on the level of a policy threat that could take place (high market power vs
low market power). We then estimate a flexible specification to identify the impact
of demand uncertainty and disentangle economic and policy uncertainty. We allow
for time-varying impact of uncertainty in order to avoid imposing a particular tim-
ing on the GTC. Importantly, we use quarterly frequency data, since using annual
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frequency can mask some of the characteristic of the GTC. Additionally, we control
for changes in GDP in the foreign destination and include several fixed effects at
the country, industry, and quarter-year level to control for other potential factors
affecting export outcomes.
We find that uncertainty has a negative impact on the number of varieties
exported and that its effect increased during GTC compared to the baseline period
2002-2008. The negative impact of uncertainty reaches its peak during the first four
quarters of the GTC and then decreases. After estimating the empirical model,
we disentangle the sources of uncertainty by computing the difference in export
outcomes across PTA and non-PTA partners and using comparing industries with
high and low market power. We find that the negative impact of uncertainty during
the GTC and the subsequent recovery is stronger for partners without a PTA,
until the end of 2010 when the differences became insignificant. This suggests that
firms assigned some probability of a trade war -additional policy uncertainty- at the
beginning of GTC but that at some point around the end of 2010 firms dropped this
expectation, fueled by the lack of changes in policy variables in foreign destinations.
Disentangling economic and policy uncertainty with market power confirms that the
impact of uncertainty is stronger when the threat of bad policy shocks stronger (i.e.
higher market power in the foreign destination) and this difference only manifests
for non-PTA partners. In the quantification exercises, we find that uncertainty is
responsible for around 50% of the GTC and a similar magnitude for the recovery.
Furthermore, the reduction of the impact of uncertainty played an important role
fostering the recovery. The recovery in net entry during 2010 would have been 81%
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smaller if the uncertainty impact had remained at the level observed during the first
four quarters of the GTC.
The chapter is organized as follows: the next section focuses on the descrip-
tive analysis of the GTC. In the third section, we build a theoretical model that
incorporates the key elements from the descriptive evidence and introduces multiple
sources of uncertainty. Finally in the fourth section we take our model and main
predictions to the data and evaluate the impact of uncertainty during the GTC.
4.2 Firm-level Anatomy of the Great Trade Collapse
The 2008 financial crisis was followed by the Great Recession and a remarkable
collapse in international trade. According to the WTO, world trade fell by 12% in
2009 while world GDP fell only by 2.7%. This is the greatest contraction of world
trade since World War II. The Great Trade Collapse (GTC) showed a remarkable
synchronization across countries (see Antonakakis (2012) and Martins and Araújo
(2009)) but its depth was heterogenous across countries. The declines were partic-
ularly large for certain developed countries such as the U.S., where in 2009 imports
decreased by 22.7% and exports contracted by 14.2% (Census Bureau, 2011). This
collapse is more remarkable given that U.S. GDP contracted only by 3.5% in 2009
(Worldbank, 2012). The depth and speed of the collapse has been examined for
some specific countries including the U.S. (see Bems, Johnson, and Yi (2013) for a
survey). However, previous work for the U.S. has employed aggregate data and has
therefore not examined the dynamics of U.S. trade at the firm and product level,
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which is crucial to understand the causes and consequences of the collapse.
The strong collapse of 2008-9 was followed by a relatively fast recovery. This
recovery has not received much attention. U.S. quarterly exports were 25% higher
on average in 2010 compared to the same quarter of 2009 and U.S. exports in the
fourth quarter of 2010 were 34% higher than the same quarter in 2008. Therefore,
our contribution in this section is to provide a detailed anatomy of U.S. firms’
trade dynamics in the GTC by employing detailed customs transaction data and
information on firms. Due to the timing of the crisis, starting in the last quarter of
2008, we focus on quarterly frequency data, as does most of the work on the GTC
does.
4.2.1 Aggregate Exports
Total exports of goods to a particular country can be decomposed into the
number of firms exporting, the number of products exported, how much these firm-
products trade in each transaction and the number of transactions. Thus, we start
by looking at the evolution of each of these components in order to provide a first
approximation to the trade dynamics during the Great Trade Collapse.
Aggregate U.S. exports reached their pre-crisis peak in the second quarter of
2008 after several quarters of sustained growth. One year later, in the second quarter
of 2009, aggregate exports were only 73% of that peak value. The recovery started
in the third quarter of 2009 and annual exports in 2009 were about 81% of their
total in 2008. However, it was not until the last quarter of 2010 that total exports in
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any given quarter exceeded the pre-crisis peak. Total exports in 2010 were roughly
the same nominal value as the total in 2008.
The number of export transactions followed a similar pattern to exports but
with a faster recovery. More specifically, the number of transactions returns to its
pre-crisis level in the last quarter of 2009, a full year before the recovery of total
exports. This implies that the average value of transactions dropped during 2010.
The number of both exporting firms and varieties reached their peaks in the
third quarter of 2008. Relative to this point, in the second quarter of 2009 there
were 13% fewer exporting firms and 11% fewer varieties (where the latter varies
slightly depending on the definition of a variety: firm-destination, firm-product,
firm-product-destination), as we can see in figure 4.1 below. This is particularly
striking given that the number of firms and varieties prior to the crisis had been
growing at an annual average rate of 3.8% and 5.5% respectively. This strong fall
during the GTC in the number of varieties exported from the U.S. points to a
significant action in the destruction of trade flows, henceforth the exit margin.
The collapse in the number of U.S. exporting firms is much stronger than
that reported for the few other countries where such information has been analyzed.
Between October 2008 and April 2009 the number of exporters in France declined by
7.6% (Bricongne et al. (2012b)) while the corresponding number was almost double
for the US, 13%. The comparison with Belgium is even more striking: Behrens,
Corcos, and Mion (2013) find an increase in exporting firms of about 1% between
the first semester of 2008 and that of 2009, while in the U.S. there was a decrease
of 12% in the same period.
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While the drop for the number of firms and number of varieties was similar,
their recovery pattern was very different. Varieties recovered to their pre-crisis levels
by the end of 2010, but in 2011 the number of firms exporting was still below its
pre-crisis level. This suggests that firms that survived the GTC expanded their
export baskets in terms of products, countries or both, and by 2011 this increase
was enough to compensate for the firms that stopped exporting during the GTC.
As we will show below this substitution is reflected in Table 4.3, which shows that
the intensive margin contributed on average 50% to total export growth prior to the
crisis but 70% starting in 2010 (and continuing in 2011).
Figure 4.1: Evolution of Export Firm Varieties
All numbers of varieties are indexed to their value in the third quarter of 2008. A
firm variety is defined as a unique combination of firm and the corresponding level of
disaggregation.
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4.2.2 Decomposing the GTC
In order to better understand firm export dynamics over the GTC, we de-
compose total exports into their margins. We do so by exploiting customs data at
the firm-product-destination level, henceforth variety level. First, we compute the
midpoint growth rate of exports and distinguish between the evolution of its exten-
sive margin (i.e. the creation and destruction of firm-country-destination flows in a
given quarter) and intensive margin (i.e. changes in the export value of continuing
varieties). Second, we explore whether there are heterogeneous responses during the
GTC by repeating the decompositions for mutually exclusive subsamples defined in
terms of different characteristics of either firms, products and/or destinations.11
The aggregate mid-point growth rate between a quarter, q, and the previous





[X(q) +X(q − 1)]
As we show in the appendix (eq. B.1.1) this can be re-written as a weighted average





where i, c, k index firm, destination and product respectively; gick(q) is the midpoint
11In order to avoid capturing spurious extensive margin changes during 2006-2011 due to classi-
fication changes in the U.S. custom schedule we applied the concordance developed by Pierce and
Schott (2009) to have a stable product classification.
85
growth rate for firm i′s exports of product p to country c in quarter q; and sick(q)
is its share in total exports in q.
We then decompose the growth into an intensive and extensive margin (at firm-
destination-product level) by defining four sets of flows indexed by m. The extensive
margin is decomposed into (i) Entry (xick(q) > 0 and xick(q − 4) = 0) and (ii) Exit
(xick(q) = 0 and xick(q − 4) > 0), while the intensive margin is decomposed into (i)
Growers (xick(q) > xick(q − 4) > 0) and (ii) Shrinkers (xick(q − 4) > xick(q) > 0).
Denoting Im = 1 if a flow belongs to group m we can then write the aggregate






Im × sick(q)× gick(q) (4.2.1)
for m = ENick, EXick, GRick, SHick This decomposition allows us to compute
the net extensive and net intensive margin by adding up the positive and negative
components of each respective margin as we can see in the above expression.
Figure 4.2 presents the evolution of the net extensive and net intensive margin
computed according to (4.2.1). This figure shows that intensive and extensive mar-
gins followed a similar path in terms of their signs during the great collapse. The
decline in the intensive margin was faster and more pronounced than the extensive
margin. One potential explanation for this difference in the behavior across margins
is the fact that adjustments through the extensive margin usually require paying,
or at least taking into account, fixed costs or sunk costs or both, and these costs
could dampen firms’ responses.
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of Export Net Margins
This decomposition also shows the importance of the extensive margin in the
recent evolution of U.S. exports. Before the crisis the extensive margin accounted
for about half of US export growth, 55% and 53% in the third quarter of 2007 and
2008, respectively. One year later, in the third quarter of 2009, it accounted for
38% of the observed decline, less than the intensive share but quite large still. After
exports started to grow again the extensive margin contributed positively, but a
substantially smaller share than prior to the crisis, e.g. 33% in the third quarter
of 2009 (see Table in 4.3 appendix for details). In countries such as France the
contribution of the extensive margin was considerably smaller.12
12Bricongne et al. (2012b) report that on average for 2006 and 2007 the net extensive margin
represented 32 % of the growth rate at quarterly frequency for France. This share dropped to 10%
during the GTC period of September 2008 and April 2009. Our results are not directly comparable
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In figure 4.4 we decompose the net extensive margin into its components. In
the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, both the entry and exit margins
changed by similar amounts relative to q−4, but exit fell twice as much in the second
quarter of 2009 (about 13 percentage points). Thus, exit was more important in
shaping the net extensive margin during the GTC. In contrast to the extensive
margin, both components of the intensive margin showed similar magnitudes during
2009 (see figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3: Intensive Margin
Growers scale corresponds to the left axis while Shrinkers scale
corresponds to the right axis.
Figure 4.4: Extensive Margin
Entry scale corresponds to the left axis while Exit scale
corresponds to the right axis.
Summing up, midpoint decompositions show that (i) the extensive margin
played an important role in the recent evolution of U.S. exports, and accounted
for around 40% of the GTC; (ii) the intensive margin collapse (and recovery) was
somewhat faster and stronger than the extensive margin; and (iii) the exit margin
played a more important role than entry during the collapse. In the next subsection
to the ones reported by Behrens, Corcos, and Mion (2013) for Belgium since they use a more broad
definition of the intensive margin that includes all product-country adding, switching and dropping
at firm level.
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we exploit detailed information about firms, products and destination to explore
heterogeneous responses.
4.2.2.1 Firm Heterogeneity
Related Parties and the GTC: Related Parties trade represents a significant
part of U.S. international trade. For example, in 2006 around 47% of U.S. total
imports and 35% of U.S. total exports were between related parties. Hence exploring
whether there are differences in the evolution of the extensive and intensive margins
between related parties and arm’s length trade compared to the overall behavior may
potentially provide a better understanding of GTC. Applying the decomposition for
firms trading to related parties, we observe differences in the margin contributions
as well as in the timing with respect to the overall pattern (see figure 1.1 in the
appendix of chapter 1) In the related parties case, the intensive margin takes a
more prominent role and the collapse of this margin starts earlier than in the full
sample. The opposite is true for the extensive margin for the related parties sample
compared to the full sample. As expected, these differences are more striking if we
compare related parties with arms length trade (see figure 1.2 in the appendix of
chapter 1). At its peak, the drop in the extensive margin for arms length trade is
more than double the one corresponding to related parties, while the opposite holds
for the case of the intensive margin, as the drop in the intensive margin is higher
for related parties than for arms length trade. Previous chapters explore the role of
uncertainty in the organization of trade and how organizational choice affects firms’
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responses to changes in their environment.
Age and Size: Firms are heterogeneous in several dimensions, such as produc-
tivity, age, size and location, and potentially these heterogeneities can affect how
firms respond to shocks such as the GTC. In order to explore whether this is the
case, we run decompositions splitting the sample of firms according to firm age and
employment size. In the case of employment size we split the sample of firms in
five categories: 1-49 employees, 50-249 employees, 250-999 employees, 1000-2499
employees and 2500 and more employees. Results clearly indicate that bigger firms
in terms of employment adjust more through the intensive margin while small and
medium firms adjust similarly across margins. This implies that bigger firms weath-
ered the GTC while remaining active in foreign markets while a significant number
of smaller and medium firms exited foreign markets. This is in line with models that
highlight the role of firm productivity in export activities since firm productivity is
directly related to firm’s employment size.
In the case of age, we define the follow four categories for firm age: 1-4 years,
5-9 years, 10-19 years and 20 or more years. We find that younger firms adjust
almost exclusively through the extensive margin, while old firms adjust through
the intensive margin. Furthermore, the decompositions for the other age categories
show a monotone relationship between age and the role of the intensive margin.
This relationship between age and the intensive margin role suggests that firms go
through a learning and selection process that matters for their response to shocks.
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4.2.2.2 Destination Heterogeneity
Free Trade Agreements: The GTC fueled a fear of increased protectionism and
trade wars as a response to the collapse in domestic activity. One argument for free
trade agreements is that they can provide insurance against such trade wars (c.f.
Perroni and Whalley (2000)). If that is the case then all else equal, we should find
that the crisis had less of a negative impact on exports to PTA partners. We explore
this in the econometric section guided by our theoretical model. As a first step, we
provide some aggregate and firm-level descriptive evidence that suggests this may
be the case. First, we can see in figure 4.5 that the share of US exports to PTA
countries underwent a steep decline from 45% in 2003 to 40% in the third quarter
of 2008. But starting in the first quarter in 2009 that decline halted and the share
started to increase. By 2011 it had stabilized around 41%.
We then decompose the margins of export growth for PTA partners vs. other
countries.13 Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show a clear difference in the role of the extensive
margin. Exports towards PTAs around the GTC are more strongly affected by the
decline in the intensive margin than the extensive one (left hand side of figure), while
for non-PTAs the contribution of both margins is closer (right hand side figure).14
More specifically, we see that for PTAs the extensive margin accounted for
between 46% and 80% of the total growth in the pre-crisis quarters. In contrast,
during the strong contraction from the third quarter of 2008 to the third quarter of
13Note that we left outside of these exercises those countries that change categories between
2007 and 2011 in order to avoid any contamination.
14See Tables 4.4 and 4.5 in the appendix for details.
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Figure 4.5: Share of U.S. Exports to PTA Countries
2009, the extensive margin accounted only 28% of the total decline. For non-PTA
countries the extensive margin share of the contraction during the same period was
43%. Furthermore, the contribution of the extensive margin for non-PTA countries
was higher in each quarter of the GTC.
Figure 4.6: PTA Countries Figure 4.7: Non PTA Countries
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In sum, U.S. firms responded to the crisis relatively more by lowering export
values rather than exiting in PTA than in non-PTA countries. This is consistent
with the possibility that U.S. exporters to countries with PTAs assigned a relatively
lower increase in the probability of a “bad” policy shock in PTA markets as foreign
economic conditions worsened.
4.2.2.3 Product Heterogeneity
High importer market power: If a trade war did break out then countries would
increase their protection differentially across products. Evidence in Broda, Limao,
and Weinstein (2008) shows that, as predicted by several theoretical models, pro-
tection in goods that are not regulated by trade agreements is higher in industries
where importers have more market power. They measure market power by estimat-
ing the inverse foreign export supply elasticity faced by an importer and find that
across a range of countries market power tends to be concentrated in a particular
set of industries. We thus use their classification of goods with high (or medium)
market power and examine if the aggregate PTA pattern we described above is par-
ticularly strong for such goods. Recall that previously we found that the decline
in PTA share was reversed during the crisis. In figure 4.8, we find that pattern
is also present for high market power goods. The share declined steeply from the
start of the sample period, stabilized in the first quarter of 2009 and then increased.
Moreover, the PTA share for low market power goods, represented by the dashed
line, also declined starting in 2006 but did so more slowly, and continue to decline
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through the start of the crisis; this share stabilized later at a lower average share
than for high market power industries.
Figure 4.8: Share of U.S. Exports to PTA Countries by Market Power
Durable Goods and the GTC: Several papers in the literature studying the
GTC highlight the role of durable in the contraction of international trade (see e.g.
Bricongne et al. (2012b) and Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) among others).
The explanation is that durable goods consumption is more volatile cyclically than
the consumption of non-durable goods, and since the share of durable goods is higher
in international trade than in GDP (see Engel and Wang (2010)), a negative demand
shock to durable goods would translate into a higher contraction of international
trade than GDP (see Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010)). To examine this, we
perform the decomposition separately for durable and non-durable goods according
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to the classification used by Engel and Wang (2010). First, results show that the
collapse is stronger for U.S. firms exporting durable goods in line with the results
in the literature for other countries and for U.S. at aggregate data. The average
contraction during the first four quarters of the GTC was 24 points for durable
goods and this contraction was 17% higher than the overall contraction and 55%
higher than the contraction for non-durable goods. Second, the intensive margin
was the more important margin in the GTC for durable goods and it took a slightly
bigger share of the contraction than in the benchmark. However, the extensive
margin still showed significant action during the GTC. For example, the extensive
margin represented almost a quarter of the average contraction during the first year
of the GTC.
This section explores U.S. exporting firms dynamics during the GTC and later
recovery, exploiting disaggregated firm-level data from the Census Bureau. First, we
find that the intensive margin played a central role but that the extensive margin also
took a significant share, in contrast to other countries such as France (see Bricongne
et al. (2012b)) and Belgium (see Behrens, Corcos, and Mion (2013)). This significant
role of the extensive margin is mostly due to an increase in the exit margin, as we
observe when we compare the extensive margin components and track the number
of U.S. firms exporting over time. Second, heterogeneities across product, firms
and destinations show significant differences in their adjustment during the GTC.
Notably, PTAs significantly reduce the adjustment through the extensive margin in
the GTC. This reduction in the destruction of trade flows to PTAs is aligned with
firms assigning some positive probability of a trade war, assuming that PTAs provide
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safeguard from protectionism. A potential issue with these descriptive results is
whether the frequency and/or aggregation level affect some of the main findings.
In order to check this, we perform the same set of exercises modifying both the
frequency of the data and the aggregation level considered. More specifically, we
repeat the decompositions using monthly and half-yearly frequency and change the
aggregation from firm-country-product to firm-country. In both cases, all the main
findings are robust to these exercises. Motivated by these findings and the role of
uncertainty during the recession, we build a stochastic framework of international
trade in the next section that not only incorporates economic uncertainty but also
policy uncertainty and explores how these sources may interact.
4.3 A Theory of Export Dynamics under Multiple Sources of Uncer-
tainty
We now develop a dynamic model of firm export decisions under multiple
sources of uncertainty that will guide the estimation of the impact of uncertainty
during the GTC. We generalize Handley and Limão (Forthcoming) in several direc-
tions. First, we introduce uncertainty in the foreign demand level, encompassing
both trade policy uncertainty (as in Handley and Limão (Forthcoming)) and eco-
nomic uncertainty. We do this in two steps. Initially, we impose that both sources of
uncertainty have a unique arrival rate so both shocks - economic and policy - arrive
at the same time. Then, we generalize the demand regime to allow for heterogeneity
in the persistence across sources of uncertainty. More specifically, we incorporate
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the fact that policy shocks arrive less frequently than economic shocks. Second, we
examine the dynamics of exporting more broadly than Handley and Limão (Forth-
coming), by including entry, re-entry and allowing export capital to depreciate with
a certain probability in each period. In order to extend the framework in these
dimensions, we abstract from some general equilibrium effects of uncertainty that
are explored by Handley and Limão (2013) in the context of China’s export boom
to the U.S and its accession to the WTO.
4.3.1 Economic Environment
We start by deriving the operating profit for a monopolistically competitive
firm that exports a differentiated good, denoted by v, to country i. In order to
focus on the export decision as the only one subject to uncertainty, we assume that
in each period t the firm can observe all relevant information before making its
production and pricing decisions for that period. This assumption, and the absence
of any adjustment costs, implies that, after entry with a particular technology, firms
simply maximize operating profits, πivt, period by period. Thus, πivt can be derived
similarly to monopolistic competition models in standard deterministic settings.
There are V + 1 industries; one produces a homogeneous, freely traded good,
the numeraire, and the remaining V industries produce differentiated goods. Total
expenditure on goods in country i is denoted by Yi with a fixed exogenous fraction
εV spent on each industry V and 1 − ΣεV on the numeraire. Consumers have
constant elasticity of substitution preferences over goods in each industry V with
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where DiV t can be interpreted as the demand parameter in country i for the industry
V that v belongs to. The consumer price is equal to the producer price, pivt, times
the advalorem tariff policy factor in industry V , τiV t ≥ 1. From the individual
firm’s perspective, the compound demand term, aiV T , is exogenous and summarizes
all payoff relevant information for the current period. Thus for now, we assume that
the firm observes only aiV T . When we unbundle the sources of demand uncertainty
we will return to the determination of DiV t and τiV t and whether there is any
informational value for the firm to know each independently.
The supply side is also standard in trade models. There is a single factor, labor,
which has constant marginal productivity in the numeraire sector, so the wage is
normalized to unity. Differentiated goods are produced with a constant marginal
cost, characterized by a labor coefficient of cv, which is heterogeneous across firms.
As we noted above, at the start of each period firms observe the demand conditions
before pricing and know their productivity and σ. Therefore they choose prices
to maximize operating profits in each period, πivt = (pivt − cv) qivt, leading to the
standard mark-up rule over cost, pv = cv/ρ. Using the optimal price and demand
we obtain the export revenue received by the producer, and the associated gross
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operating profit:
pivtqivt = aiV tc
1−σ
v σ̃σ (4.3.2)
πivt = aiV tc
1−σ
v σ̃ (4.3.3)
where σ̃ ≡ (1− ρ) ρσ−1.15 Given the environment we can analyze firm decisions in
any given industry-export market separately so below we omit the industry sub-
script; unless otherwise stated all the variables except cv vary by industry-export
market.
4.3.2 Exporters Dynamics
We now examine firms’ export dynamics. We focus on export, rather than do-
mestic, entry decisions by assuming there are no entry costs for the domestic market
and there is a constant mass of domestic firms in each industry. This implies that
the number of domestic firms active in their domestic market is constant and that
an endogenous subset of these exports, which we now determine. Given that all
firms already produce domestically, they face no uncertainty about their produc-
tivity when deciding whether to enter into exporting. Firms face foreign demand
uncertainty about the path of at, which they take as given. We also assume that the
mass of exporters relative to domestic producers is sufficiently small that their entry
15We can extend the framework to allow for upgrades and downgrades of technology; for now
(4.3.3) represents the gross exporting profit of a firm that drew a technology cv and observed
demand conditions in importer i industry V of aiV t.
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decisions have a negligible impact on the price index in the importing country.16
To start exporting a firm must incur a sunk cost, K. Given the current
conditions it will be optimal to enter if the expected value of exporting, Πe, net
of K is at least as high as the expected value of waiting. So the marginal entrant is












Before entering the firm can observe the current conditions in the market, at,
and uses this along with information about the demand “regime” defined below to
form expectations regarding future profits. Firms believe that a demand shock in
the following period occurs with probability γ and when it does the new demand
parameter, a′, is drawn from some distribution H (a). Firms take the demand regime
r = {γ,H} as given and time-invariant. One advantage of this characterization is
that it allows for persistent demand but it is still tractable. Moreover, different
regimes can encompass different settings, e.g. when γ = 0 there is no uncertainty
about demand and when it is unity demand is i.i.d; alternatively when γ ∈ (0, 1)
there are imperfectly anticipated shocks of uncertain magnitude. When we unbun-
dle demand uncertainty we will describe the regime in terms of more fundamental
16It is well known that under this structure DiV t = εV Yit (PiV t)
σ−1
where PiV t is the standard
CES price aggregator over varieties in each V sold in i. The standard assumption that we also
make is that monopolistically competitive firms are sufficiently small relative to the total number
(measure) of firms in industry V available in country i to take into account any effect that they
may have on the price index or aggregate goods’ expenditure. To this we add a “small” exporter
assumption which allows us to provide sharper results by focusing on the direct effects of the
demand uncertainty on operating profits rather than indirect general equilibrium effects. Handley
and Limão (2013) allow for general equilibrium effects of policy uncertainty via impacts on the
price index. Doing so introduces adjustment dynamics, as the price index adjusts to entry and exit,
and tends to attenuate, rather than overturn, the direct effects of tariff policy on entry decisions.
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economic and policy processes.
We can generalize certain results to allow for period fixed costs, export par-
ticipation in any given period after entry and endogenous exit. However, because of
data limitations we will not be able to distinguish between certain types of decisions.
For example, if firms can exit and then repay the sunk cost to enter then we will be
unable to distinguish this from non-participation decisions because of low demand
in a given period, because we do not observe capital expenditures on particular ex-
port decisions. Thus, the theory will focus on a simple setting where firms have no
per period fixed cost, so that after entry they always optimally choose to export.
However, we allow a firm’s entry capital to depreciate, and when it does so fully
the firm can only export if it pays a sunk cost, which is independent of whether or
not it previously exported. The depreciation process is very simple: at the end of
each period the export capital either fully depreciates or remains intact. The firm
correctly expects this to occur with a fixed probability d. This process generates
exit from exporting without firm death, to be consistent with the data. We also
allow for re-entry, which is again observed in the data, provided the firm decides to
pay K again. Given the setup, the entry decision is independent of whether a firm
will ever be able to re-enter that market or not after re-paying the cost, provided we
use an effective discount rate that reflects the probability that the capital survives.
We prove this in the appendix (see B.2.6). However, the intuition should be clear:
the re-entry decision of any given firm is independent of its past export status if it
has lost all its export capital (there is no other measure of experience or presence in
the market that is relevant for exporting); and so each entry decision can be made
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independently of future re-entry. This implies that we can solve the dynamic entry
decision problem as if the firm had only one possibility to enter and had to choose
when to do so, and then note that if it ever loses its capital (with probability d)
it will again be in the position to make another entry decision unless the firm as a
whole dies (probability δ) so the firm’s effective discount rate used to value future
payoffs is β = (1− δ) (1− d) < 1.17
The expected value of starting to export at time t conditional on observing
current market conditions at is
Πe(at, c, r) = π(at, c) + β[(1− γ)Πe(at, c, r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
No Shock
+ γEΠe(a′, c, r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shock
]. (4.3.5)
which includes current operating profits upon entering and the discounted future
value. Without a shock the firm value next period is still Πe(at, c, r). If a shock
arrives then a new demand is drawn with some value, a′. So the third term is the
ex-ante expected value of exporting following a shock, where E denotes expectation
over the H distribution. This is simply EΠe(a′, c, r) = Eπ(a′, c)/ (1− β), which is
time invariant.18 The conditional mean of a and the expected value of exporting,
Πe(at, c, r), vary over time since they depend on current conditions.
We then compute the expected value of waiting as
17Since there is a fixed probability of death, δ, there is an equal probability of new firms being
born to replace those that die, which maintains a constant mass of firms.
18The reason is simple: the distribution of future conditions after a shock, H(a′), is time invariant
so even if there is a new a at t+ 1 this provides no additional information at time t about future
conditions.
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Πw (c, r) =0 + β (1− γ + γH(ā))Πw (c, r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wait
(4.3.6)
+ β γ (1−H(ā)) (EΠe (a′ ≥ ā, c, r)−K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Enter
A non-exporter at time t receives zero profits from that activity today. In the
following period the continuation value is still Πw if either demand is unchanged,
with probability 1 − γ, or changes but goes to some level that is not sufficiently
high, with probability γH(ā). If demand changes and is above some endogenous
trigger level, a′ ≥ ā, then we obtain the third term, reflecting the expected value of
exporting net of the sunk cost, K, conditional on the new demand level being heigh
enough to trigger entry. The conditional expected value of exporting if a′ ≥ ā is
given by
EΠe (a′ ≥ ā, c, r) =Eπ (a′ ≥ ā, c, r) + β(1− γ)EΠe (a′ ≥ ā, c, r) (4.3.7)
+ βγEΠe(a′, c, r)
This equation is structurally the same as (4.3.5), but it is time invariant be-
cause profit flows are evaluated ex-ante at the conditional expected value of export-
ing for a firm that enters following a sufficiently favorable demand shock.
We can determine a threshold demand level acv = ā (cv) such that a firm
with costs cv would be indifferent between starting to export or wait. Instead,
we characterize which firms will invest and enter at any observed current demand.
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We can do so since a is common to all firms exporting to a given market in a given
industry and the marginal cost is the only source of heterogeneity among such firms.
Assuming a continuum of firms in any given industry with productivity that can
be ranked according to a strictly increasing CDF, we can find the marginal export







. We find this cutoff by using the entry condition in (4.3.4) and the value
functions in (4.3.5), (4.3.6) and (4.3.7), and the expression for EΠe. As will be clear,
if a firm has costs equal to this threshold then in that period all other firms with
lower costs would also be exporters. The closed form expression for cUt generalizes
the result in Handley and Limão (Forthcoming) to allow for uncertainty in demand
rather than only on tariff policy.



















a′ ≥ at, cUt
)
1− β(1− γ)
The intuition for this equation is that the three terms in the right hand side
should cover at least the sunk cost of entry. In the special case where γ = 0, there is
no demand uncertainty and the marginal entrant in this deterministic demand case
would have a marginal cost satisfying K =
π(at,cDt )









When demand conditions can change in future periods, then current profit is dis-
counted at a higher rate that captures the probability that a demand shock will
arrive, so K must now cover the value of profits until the policy changes (first term)
plus the ex-ante present value of expected profits following a shock (second term),
and the present value of the expected loss of entering today, given that demand con-
ditions will eventually improve (third term). This last term is negative and captures
the option value of waiting.
By combining this expression with the operating profit function, we solve
directly for cUt as a function of the current demand. We obtain
cUt =
[
1− β + βγω (at)













Thus, the cutoff under uncertainty is lower than the deterministic cutoff when-
ever the uncertainty term, denoted by Ut, is lower than unity. From this equation we
see that demand uncertainty makes entry more stringent if and only if ω (at)−1 ≤ 0.
In the appendix (see B.2.1), we derive this term as
ω (at)− 1 = −H(at)
at − E(a′ ≤ at)
at
≤ 0 (4.3.11)
This is the proportional reduction in operating profits expected to occur if we
start at at and a shock occurs that (with probability H(at)) worsens conditions. As
usual with this type of framework, even though a shock can generate higher or lower
demand levels, it is only the latter possibility that affects the entry decision, since
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the benefits of demand levels above the entry trigger also accrue to waiting firms.
We will refer to increases in γ as increases in demand uncertainty, since they
imply that demand is more likely to be subject to a shock and a new draw from
the distribution. Note that increases in γ lower entry for any at. This occurs even
though increases in γ can increase the conditional mean of demand if at is below its
long-run mean (or decrease it if at is above it). We can neutralize the first moment
component of this effect by examining shocks to γ when demand is at its long-run
mean, i.e. at = E (a′), such that E (aT |at) = E (a′) for all T is independent of γ. We
will refer to the latter as pure risk γ shocks and note that they too lower entry.19
Another type of pure risk shock is a mean-preserving spread (MPS) in H,
the underlying demand distribution. This shock leaves the long-run mean, E (a′),
unchanged by definition and also implies that the conditional mean, E (aT |at) for
all T , is unchanged. Moreover, we can show the following
Remark 1: Ifγ > 0, then a mean-preserving spread in H (a) reduces entry
for all at < a
max.
We prove this remark in the appendix (see B.2.2). The basic intuition is that
H affects entry only via ω(·) (see expression 4.3.11). A MPS in H adds weight
to both tails, but the one that is relevant for ω is the bad news, which lowers the
expected profit loss term conditional on worsening conditions. For the MPS (or any
other factor that works via ω) to affect entry it is obvious we require γ > 0 and any





19In this case HL show that Et (aT |at) = E (a′) for all T and that any increases in γ impart a
mean-preserving spread in the distribution of future a.
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4.3.3 Economic and Policy Sources of Demand Uncertainty
We now unbundle demand uncertainty into two of its fundamental components:
economic and policy uncertainty. We examine how each of these components affects
firm decisions and how the two interact.
While a is the only payoff relevant variable for firms, it may not be directly
observable. However, if firms can observe its underlying components then they can
form expectations about a to make dynamic decisions. We first assume that the
economic and policy shocks arrive simultaneously and firms know their distribu-
tion. Subsequently, we examine the impact of different arrival rates to allow for
different degrees of persistence across sources of uncertainty. All variables below
can vary by importer i so we omit the subscript. Under this model’s structure,
DV t = εV Yt (PV t)
σ−1 where PV t is the standard CES price aggregator over varieties
in each V sold in a country at period t. Given our assumptions regarding small
exporters and the fixed mass and productivity of domestic firms, we have a fixed
PV . The aggregate price index for a country is then P̃ =
∏
(PV )
εV so we can rewrite
the demand term as follows:










= yt × ςV t (4.3.12)








is the policy price effect. This formulation allows us to focus on the
aggregate real income effect, yt, and policy effect, ςV t. The latter can be interpreted
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as a price substitution effect. When the relative price of a taxed good increases then
there is substitution within the industry at a rate σ > 1 and between this industry
and others industries at a unit elasticity. Given the structure of the model, the
source of exogenous shocks we consider for the policy effect are tariffs, and for real
income the labor endowment.
Firms know εV and believe that conditional on a shock, real income and the
policy effect have a joint density f (y, ς). Let the corresponding CDF for a be





f (y, ς) dydς.
To illustrate the points clearly we assume f (y, ς) is a bivariate log normal
distribution with correlation η and mean and variance denoted by µx and Σ
2
x re-
spectively for x ∈ {y, ς}. Then conditional on a shock the distribution of a in any
given industry is at = εyt/ςt ∼lnN (µ,Σ2), where the parameters are directly related
to the underlying distributions, as we show below. To match risk shocks to the data
we now focus on an increase in risk of lnx, defined as a MPS of its marginal
distribution conditional on a shock, i.e. a MPS of N (µx,Σ
2
x), which is equivalent to
an increase in Σ2x.
Proposition 7. (Sources of demand risk and interaction effects) Suppose
that the income and policy shocks, x ∈ {y, ς} arrive simultaneously at rate γ > 0.
Conditional on a shock these variables have correlation η and follow a bivariate
lnN(µx,Σ
2
x) and the demand is distributed a = εy/ς ∼lnN (µ,Σ2). Then for any
at ∈ (0, exp (µ)] and for some at > exp (µ) we obtain the following:
(a) an increase in risk in either component increases risk in ln a if and only if
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η ∈ [−1, Σx
Σ6=x
] and lowers export entry.
(b) a decrease in η increases risk in ln a and lowers export entry. Moreover
this effect is increasing in the risk of either component.
(c) if η < 0 then increases in risk in (ln) income and (ln) policy are comple-





> 0, and lowering entry.
(d) All the effects in (a)-(c) are increasing in γ.
Proof. Given f (y, ς) is a bivariate log normal and the definition of a we have a =




x − 2ηΣyΣς) where x ∈ {y, ς}. None of
the shocks considered affect µ so we need only check they increase Σ2 as stated. We
then show when this increase in Σ2 lowers entry.
(a) An increase in risk in either lnx is equivalent to an increase in either Σ2x,
which increases risk in ln a if and only if ∂Σ
2
∂Σ2x
> 0, i.e. if and only if η ∈ (− Σx
Σ6=x
, 1].
(b) A decrease in η implies an increase in risk in ln a since −∂Σ2
∂η
= 2ΣyΣς ,






> 0 if and only if η < 0.





> 0 as shown in previous section.
To prove that an increase in risk in ln a (i.e. an increase in Σ2), lowers entry
when γ > 0 and at ∈ (0, exp (µ)] and some at > exp (µ) we need only show that the
new distribution of a, denoted by M(a), implies a lower ω. Recall from the previous
result that





[M (a)−H (a)] da
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so we need only show that there are at such that
∫ at
0
M (a) da ≥
∫ at
0
H (a) da with
equality at some critical ā > exp (µ). If at = exp (µ) then the inequality holds
strictly since two log normal variables with the same µ and different Σ2 have a single
crossing at their common median exp (µ). So M (exp (µ)) = H (exp (µ)) = 1/2 and
M crosses from above if it has higher Σ2. Therefore there is some δ > 0 such that
ω > ωM .
It is natural to evaluate the risk shocks to ln a at its geometric mean, which is
also the median at, such that at that point when the shock hits the new probability
of a shock that worsens conditions is the same as before and equal to 1/2. However,
the proposition shows that the results also hold for all lower at and some above it.
The reason it may not hold for all at is that we are considering geometric mean
preserving spreads of the variables and so the riskier distributions will give rise to
higher arithmetic means.
Corollaries: Suppose that preferential trade agreements lower Σm. Then for at ∈
(0, exp (µ)] and for some at > exp (µ)
1. Agreements increase entry for any η ∈ (− Σx
Σ6=x
, 1].
2. Agreements have a stronger impact on export entry in countries with higher
Σy if η < 0.
3. An increase in exporter (ln) income risk will have a smaller negative effect on
export entry to PTA countries if η < 0.
4. An increase in the arrival rate of shocks will have a smaller impact on entry
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of PTA countries if η < 0.
5. For non-PTA importers, an increase in the arrival rate of shocks will have a
larger impact for countries-industries with higher Σ2ς such as those with higher
market power.
The interaction of risks depends on the parameter η that captures the cor-
relation between sources of uncertainty. High tariffs are positively correlated with
recessions as long as η < 0 and this is plausible since protection often increases
during downturns (c.f. Bown and Crowley (2013)).
After considering this setting where both economic and policy shocks arrive at
the same time, we now turn to the case where there is heterogeneity in the arrival
rates across sources of uncertainty.
4.3.4 Heterogeneous Shock Persistence
When both income and policy shocks to demand arrive simultaneously and
their subsequent realizations are independent of their previous values, firms only
need to know at and H(·) to make optimal decisions. However, the income and
policy shocks are likely to follow different processes. In this section, we capture one
key difference between processes: the higher persistence of policy relative to income.
More specifically, we assume that firms believe that an economic shock is necessary
but not sufficient for a policy shock. We could allow for more general processes at the
cost of tractability. Our approach captures two reasonably important features of the
relationship between these shocks: the difference in the persistence as we mentioned
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before and the fact that a policy change requires a change in the economic conditions.
Given that these processes now have different persistence, we must rederive the
optimal entry decision.
Let γ denote the arrival of y shocks and γτ the probability of arrival of a policy
shock conditional on the arrival of an economic shock. So our initial approach is
a special case where γτ = 1, and when γτ = 0 there is no uncertainty in policy.













that solve (4.3.4) in this generalized demand regime r = {γ, γτ , H}.
Note that now firms need to know not only at but also its components yt and τt
in order to compute Πe(·) and Πw(·). The functional form of the expected value
of starting to export at time t conditional on observing current market conditions
at(yt, τt) is still given by (4.3.5), but now the term when shocks arrive must be
modified. This leads to the following expression:
Πe(at, c, r) = π(at, c) + β (1− γ)Πe(at, c, r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
No Shock
(4.3.13)
+ βγ[(1− γτ )EyΠe(a′|τt, c, r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Economic Shock Only
+ γτEaΠe(a(y′, τ ′), c, r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Economic & Policy Shocks
]
where now the shock term is split in two components. The second component is
similar to our previous approach since both shocks arrive jointly in this case. Hence,
this term is the ex-ante expected value of exporting following both shocks, where Ea
denotes expectation over the H distribution. Again, this is simply EaΠe(a′, c, r) =
Eπ(a′, c, r)/ (1− β). The first component refers to the ex-ante value of exporting
when only the economic shock takes place, where Ey denotes the expectation over
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the distribution H holding τ = τt. This value of exporting is EyΠe(a′|τt, c, r) =
Eyπ(a′|τt, c, r)/(1−β(1−γγτ ))+βγγτEπ(a′, c, r)/((1− β) (1−β(1−γγτ )). Note that
EyΠe(a′|τt, c, r) depends on current market conditions, thus it varies over time. This
contrasts with EΠe(a′, c, r), which is time invariant in the initial demand regime.
Now the generalized expression for the value of waiting is:
Πw (at, c, r) =0 + β (1− γ) Πw (at, c, r) (4.3.14)
+ βγ(1− γτ )H(ā|τt)EyΠw (a < ā|τt, c, r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wait-Economic shock
+
+ βγ(1− γτ ) (1−H(ā|τt)) (EyΠe (a > ā|τt, c, r)−K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Enter-Economic shock
+ βγγτ [H(ā)EaΠw (a < ā, c, r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wait-Economic & Policy shocks
+ (1−H(ā)) (EaΠe (a > ā, c, r)−K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Enter-Economic & Policy shocks
]
A non-exporter receives zero profit from exporting today. If no shock arrives, which
occurs with probability (1−γ), the continuation value remains the same Πw(at, c, r).
With probability γ(1 − γτ )H(ā|τt) a pure economic shock arrives that is not suffi-
ciently high to trigger entry given the policy level τt, hence the continuation value
is EyΠw (a < ā|τt, c, r). In case that the economic shock is high enough to trigger
entry, which occurs with probability γ(1 − γτ )(1 − H(ā|τt)), then we get a term
that is the expected value of exporting conditional on a′ > ā|τ = τt minus the
sunk cost to start exporting. The last case when both shocks arrive is similar to
what we discussed in the initial demand regime for (4.3.6). Both the conditional
value of exporting if a′ > ā, EaΠe(a′ > ā), and the conditional value of exporting if
a′ > ā|τ = τt, EyΠe(a′ > ā|τ = τt), follow the same structure as (4.3.13). Note that
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now the value of waiting depends on the current realization of at because shocks to
y and τ may not arrive jointly, while in our initial demand regime this was not the
case.
Solving for the marginal entrant for any given at(yt, τt), we obtain an expression
for K which is a generalized version of (4.3.8), and we verify that the latter is
obtained by setting γτ = 1 (see appendix B.2.3 for the details). Then we solve for
the expression for cUt :
cUt =Ut × cDt (4.3.15)
Ut =
[
1− βγ(γτω(at) + (1− γτ )ω(at|τt)φ(at, γ))




This generalized demand regime with different arrival rates for economic and policy
shocks generates a lower cutoff than the deterministic setting as long as Ut < 1, as
was the case when both shocks arrive at the same time (see (4.3.10)). The difference
between these expressions is that now we have two terms instead of one capturing the
proportional reduction in operating profits expected to occur if we start at at since
two different types of shocks can arrive. More specifically, these terms correspond
to conditions worsening due to only an economic shock arriving, ω(at|τt), or both
economic and policy shocks arriving, ω(at). These terms are defined as
ω(at) =−H(at)








and φ(at, γ) =
1−β(1−γ(1−H(at)))
1−β(1−γ) adjusts for the fact that economic shocks alone have
a different discount factor. Note that ω(at) and ω(at|τt) cannot be ranked without
information about τt. In the appendix, we show that Ut < 1. Hence, introducing
uncertainty under ageneralized demand regime that allows for different arrival rates
of economic and policy shocks makes it harder for firms to start exporting.
Remark 2: An increase in the economic shock arrival rate reduces entry
while an increase in the policy shock arrival rate reduces entry when τt
is sufficiently low.
We show in the appendix that an increase in the arrival rate of economic shocks
reduces entry for at > amin,
∂ ln cU
∂ ln γ
< 0. In contrast, the effect of an increase in the
arrival rate of policy shocks depends on the difference between ω(at) and ω(at|τt). If
the profit reduction with only economic shocks is smaller than the profit reduction
with both economic and policy shocks, then ω(at) > ω(at|τt) and an increase in γτ
reduces entry. On the contrary, if ω(at|τt) > ω(at) then an increase in the arrival
rate of policy shock will induce entry. The intuition is that if the current realization
of the policy variable is good (i.e. below the average), a higher arrival rate increases
the probability of a bad policy realization and reduces entry; while a bad current
realization of the policy variable combined with a higher arrival rate of policy shocks
induces entry because there is a lower probability of getting a bad shock that reduces
the profits.
Remark 3: Under the generalized demand regime when γ > 0, a mean-
preserving spread in F (y) reduces entry if F (y) and G(ς) are independent
and FMPS(yt) ≤ F (yt).
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The intuition is similar to our result when shocks arrive jointly. A mean-
preserving spread adds more weight to the tails and since the entry decision focuses
on the left tail (i.e. smaller realizations of income), then a MPS reduces entry. The
independence assumption is used to simplify the proof.
Thus we show that uncertainty reduces entry even allowing for differences in
the arrival rates of shocks. The entry condition shows that firms now compute two
uncertainty terms that measure the expected profits loss when both shocks arrives
and when only an economic shock arrives. This guides our empirical implementation
to disentangle the sources of uncertainty.
4.4 Estimation
We now employ this model to estimate the impact of uncertainty during the
GTC. More specifically, we focus on unbundling the impact of economic uncertainty
and the impact of policy uncertainty during the recent trade collapse. Our empiri-
cal implementation follows closely the model which allows for different arrivals for
economic and policy shocks.
The model focuses on the marginal cost cutoff as a function of the demand
regime and current demand shifter, and this allows us to express the number of
firms exporting to destination i in an industry V , NtV i, as the mass of domestic
producers in the industry with marginal cost below the cutoff. Assuming that Nv
is the total mass of domestic producers in industry V , NtV i = G(c
U
tV i) ×NV where
G(c) is the cumulative distribution function of marginal cost. Assuming that firm
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productivity follows a Pareto distribution such that G(c) = (c/cV )
k where k > 0,
then lnNtV i = k ln c
U
tV i − k ln cV + lnNV . Differencing over time, we obtain
∆ lnNtV i =k∆ ln c
U
tV i (4.4.1)
under the assumption that the mass of domestic producers and the location param-
eter of the Pareto distribution are time invariant. In order to obtain an estimation
equation, we approximate the cutoff ln cUtV i in (4.4.1) around x = xo, γ = g > 0
and γτ = 0 where x denotes the other variables that affect entry independently
of policy and economic uncertainty. Note that we are approximating the equation
around a point where there is an initial level of economic uncertainty and no policy
uncertainty, a scenario that describes the initial period. We obtain the following
estimation equation:


















w for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} summarize the parameters, xtV i denotes the
demand shifter and utV i is a random term capturing measurement error.
20 Parame-
ters b1y(γt, γτ,t) and b
1
w(γτ,t) allow us to separate the impact of economic uncertainty
alone and combined economic and policy uncertainty. Importantly, these parame-
ters embed the arrival rates of economic and policy shocks at time t and the arrival





















w = 1− β, b3y = b3w = βg
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rate of economic shocks alone at time t, respectively. Therefore, these parameters
are potentially changing over time as these arrival rates change. In order to accom-
modate this possibility, we use a flexible specification that allows these parameters
to change over time.
The observables are ∆xtV i, the uncertainty measure for economic shocks only,
ω(at−1|τt−1), and the uncertainty measure for both shocks, ω(at−1). Several terms
are embodied in the demand shifter change, ∆xtV i. We control directly for changes
in nominal income (GDP), ∆ ln yti. Changes in applied tariffs are small over the
time period we consider and previous research has shown they changed little over
the financial crisis period (see e.g. Bown and Crowley (2013)). We also introduce
industry effects to absorb industry expenditure shares, αV , and country fixed effects
to control for the trend growth in the price index, αi. Also, we include quarter-year
fixed effects to control for changes in the general worldwide conditions.
The key variables to model empirically are the following: (i) the conditional ex-




where H(at) is the joint distribution of policy and income
conditional on an income shock, and (ii) the conditional expected value of a bad eco-




is the distribution of policy and income conditional on an income shock only. To
model the income component, we compute the marginal distribution of economic
uncertainty over future income from the expected value of GDP. We estimate
an AR(1) model in log changes from 1991 to 2001 for each country separately
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at quarterly frequency.21 We then compute the expected proportional change in
the level of GDP for each country if a bad shock happens. We use the 5th per-
centile of the empirical GDP distribution as our definition of a bad shock, letting
uncY i =
(
Yt − E[Y 0.05t+1 |Yt+1 < Yt]
)
/Yt for fixed t = 2001 (see appendix B.3.1 for
details). Thus, economic uncertainty, uncY i, is constant over time and varies across
countries.
To measure the conditional expected value of the combination of a bad eco-
nomic and policy shock, we start with our measure of economic uncertainty and
add a bad policy shock. Hence, we approximate ω (at−1) ≈ uncY i × ζ(ς threat) where
ζ(ς threat) is a factor that captures the additional loss due to the policy shock on
top of the economic shock measured by uncY i. Our first step to capture ζ(ς
threat)
is to allow for a differential impact of economic uncertainty between PTA and non-
PTA partners. This captures the fact that PTAs reduce or eliminate the ability
of foreign governments to worsen the policy level, e.g. increase tariffs.22 This ap-
proach implicitly assumes that the main source of variation in policy uncertainty
is destination-specific and that there is not much variation in the policy threat
across industries conditional on a destination. In a second step, we allow the policy
threat level to be a function of the market power of destination i in industry V ,
ζ(ς threat;mktpwrV i) where mktpwrV i denotes the market power of industry V at
destination i. Note here that we are not limiting what is the policy variable that
21Specifically, we model ∆ỹt+1 = a + ρ∆ỹt + εt+1, where ε ∼ N (0, σ2) and ∆ỹt+1 ∼ N (a +
∆ỹt, σ
2).
22 In the period under analysis U.S. has PTAs with the following countries: Israel, Canada,
Mexico, Jordan, Australia, Chile, Singapore, Bahrain, Morocco, Oman, Peru, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.
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the foreign government is using. This policy variable can be either optimal tariffs,
tariff bindings, or non-trade barriers. The only assumption is that each of these
policy variables are set by the foreign government according to the market power of
the industry V .
Rewriting the estimation equation (4.4.2) for the case that the heterogeneity
across PTA and non-PTA partners captures all the variation in the policy threat,
we have:
∆ lnNtV i =
b̃1 × uncY i
b2y + b
3
y (1− uncY i)
+
b̃2 × PTAit × uncY i
b2y + b
3
y (1− uncY i)
+ ax∆xtV i + utV i (4.4.3)




w × ζ(ς threat) and b̃2 =
(
−b1w × ζ(ς threat)
)
. Note that b̃1 and b̃2
are potentially changing over time since they are functions of the arrival rates of
economic and policy shocks.
We then estimate the following specification
























× PTAit + a2 ×∆PTAit
+ (c0 + c1 × PTAit)×∆ ln yit + αt + αi + αV + uiV t
The first line captures the impact of uncertainty and its evolution over time.
Qp denotes a dummy for each period of four quarters starting in the fourth quarter
of year p until the third quarter of year p+1.
∑2010
p=2008 bp×Qp captures the difference
120
in the impact of both economic and policy uncertainty in period p with respect to





p × Qp measures changes in the impact of uncertainty due to
turning off policy uncertainty in the baseline period , bPTA, and over time relative
to the initial period. The second line captures the differences between PTA and
non-PTA partners in terms of the intercept and changes in the potential impact
of PTAs over the periods. We include these terms to control for potential factors
affecting the PTA vs Non-PTA comparison that may bias our estimates of the
impact of uncertainty. Finally, the third line captures the impact of the demand
shifter and several fixed effects to control for potential issues that we mentioned
before. Estimation results are presented in Table 4.7. In order to unbundle the
impact of economic uncertainty and policy uncertainty and their changes over time,
however, looking at the estimated coefficients is not enough and we need to test
different linear combinations of coefficients capturing the impact of uncertainty.
For countries without a PTA, the expected change in the number of varieties
between the initial period and, the crisis period, between the fourth quarter of 2008
to the third quarter of 2009, due to uncertainty equals the coefficient of uncertainty
interacted with the period dummy times the average uncertainty level. That is,
E∆ lnN08Q4V i|Non−Pta = (b408 × ¯unc). This expected change in the number of vari-
eties captures the change in the combined impact of economic and policy uncertainty.
Note that the baseline effect of uncertainty is absorbed by the country fixed effect.
Similarly, the expected change in the number of varieties for PTA partners combines
coefficients interacted with the period dummy for the overall effect of uncertainty
121
and the reduction that arises due to shutting down the policy channel through
a PTA with the change in the intercept for PTA countries in the period. That






+ aPta408 . In order to explore whether
multiple sources of uncertainty matter for the expected change in the number of
varieties, we test if E∆ lnNpV i|Non−Pta and E∆ lnNpV i|Pta are significantly different
from each other. Note that these tests are double differences: the first difference
is between the period p and the baseline period within each group, for PTA and
non-PTA countries; and the second is the difference between the differences across
PTA versus non-PTA countries. Table 4.1 shows the result of computing each of
the expected changes in the number of varieties for all four-quarter periods p after
the start of the GTC.
Table 4.1: Uncertainty impact on Variety Growth - PTA vs Non-PTA
Countries
non-PTA PTA Difference




· uncY i + aPTAp
Q408-Q309 -8.1% 2.3% -10.4%*
Q409-Q310 -2.4% 7.2% -9.6%***
Q410-Q311 -4.4% -5.5% 1.1%
Notes: Conditional on country, time, industry FEs, and income.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10
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Results shows that between 2008-q4 and 2010-q3 there are significant differ-
ences in the expected change in the number of varieties between countries with PTAs
and countries without PTAs. More specifically, the expected change in the number
of varieties for PTA countries is 9.6% and 10.4% higher for countries with a PTA,
during the first two year of the GTC, respectively. In the final period, changes in
varieties are not significantly different between PTAs and non-PTAs. This timing of
the difference between PTA and non-PTA countries suggests that at the beginning
of the GTC firms believed that an additional policy shock might arrive, worsen-
ing their expected profits in the foreign destination if the firms was exporting to a
non-PTA partner. This remained true until the end of 2010, after which the differ-
ence between the PTA and non-PTA countries is not significant. This suggests that
firms after 2010 stopped worrying about a potential policy shock, given the lack of
changes in actual policy. This difference in the impact of uncertainty across PTA
and non-PTA partners is in line with our descriptive evidence that trade to PTA
countries adjusted more through the intensive margin and less through the extensive
margin compared to non-PTA countries (see Figures 4.6 and 4.7).23
The results based on the difference across PTA and non-PTA countries capture
the additional negative impact of economic uncertainty due to the possibility of
an additional negative policy shock. However, this approach ignores how foreign
countries set their policy variables and also ignores heterogeneities across industries
in these potential new policy levels. In case of a trade war, countries would set tariffs
23This is also consistent with the fact that the share of trade to PTA countries stopped decreasing
in 2008 and stabilized during the 2008-2011 period, as shown in Figure 4.5.
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to maximize their unilateral objective functions. There is theoretical and empirical
evidence showing this optimal unilateral tariff is proportional to a country’s import
market power (Broda, Limao, and Weinstein (2008)). Thus, we classify industries
at the 2-digit HS level as high market power if the elasticity measure estimated
in Broda, Limao, and Weinstein (2008) is above the upper tercile and low market
otherwise.
Formally, we estimate the following specification:




























× PTAit + a2 ×∆PTAit
+ aM ×MV i + aPTAM ×MV i × PTAit
+ (c0 + c1 × PTAit)×∆ ln yit + αt + αi + αV + uiV t
where f(bX ;Q
2010




p ×Qp and MV i is an indicator if country i has
low market power in industry V . In this specification, we identify the effect of high
market power uncertainty on non-PTA partners through bM and the heterogenous
effect for PTA partners through bPTAM , and estimate how these effects change over
time through the period indicators. Results are presented in Table 4.8. Given
our flexible specification, in order to unbundle the impact of economic and policy
uncertainty we need to test for differences in the expected change in the number of
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varieties across high and low market power industries. We focus on countries without
a PTA, since having a PTA reduces how much foreign countries can adjust their
policy variables. In the case of low market power industries, the expected change







where we evaluate this effect at the average level of uncertainty. Since this is a
difference between the base period and period p for low market power industries,
the coefficient that captures the specific intercept is dropped in the difference. The
expected change in the number of varieties for high market power industries is
captured by the baseline impact of uncertainty, bp × ¯unc. Results of testing the
difference in the impact of uncertainty on the expected change of varieties between
high and low market power industries, E∆ lnNpV i|Non−PtaHM − E∆ lnNpV i|
Non−Pta
LM ,
are presented in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Uncertainty impact on Variety Growth - Market Power
Non-PTA PTA
High Market Power Low Market Power Difference Difference





Q408-Q309 -5.6% -2.4% -3.2%*** 0.9%
Q409-Q310 -2.0% 1.5% -3.5%*** -0.35%
Q410-Q311 -4.6% -2.3% -2.3%** 6.9%***
Notes: Conditional on country, time, industry FEs, and income.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10
Table 4.2 shows that the impact of uncertainty on the expected change in
the number of varieties during the GTC is stronger for industries where the foreign
destination has a higher market power and this is the case only for countries without
a PTA with the U.S., as theory suggests should be the case given that market
power captures how much profits can deteriorate if a bad policy shock arrives. Note
that this heterogeneous impact of uncertainty is significant after conditioning on
several fixed effects and allowing for period-varying intercepts for low market power
industries. Furthermore, if we compare the difference between high and low market
power for PTA and non-PTA countries the differences are even higher.
Summarizing, demand uncertainty has a strong negative impact on the number
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of varieties exported to the foreign destination. The baseline effect of uncertainty
is on average -4.9% for net entry between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the third
quarter of 2011. The first four quarters of the GTC show the strongest impact of
uncertainty, -8.1%. Unbundling the sources of demand uncertainty, we find that
turning off the policy source of uncertainty reduces the impact of demand uncer-
tainty significantly. This is the case whether we use PTAs or market power to
unbundle the sources of uncertainty. For example, the difference in the impact of
uncertainty on the expected change of the number of varieties between PTA and
non-PTA countries is -10.4% in the beginning of the GTC. When we use hetero-
geneity in the market power of the foreign destination-industries, to unbundle the
sources of demand uncertainty, we find that economic uncertainty has a stronger
impact on industries where destinations have a higher market power, but only for
countries without PTAs with the U.S.
4.4.1 Quantification
After exploring the role of demand uncertainty and distinguishing between
policy uncertainty and economic uncertainty, we now turn to quantify the impacts
of uncertainty on aggregate export dynamic. We do that by exploiting our flexible
specification that allows us to perform several quantifications. First, we turn off the
uncertainty effect during the GTC and compute the counterfactual path of U.S. ex-
ports. We do this by predicting the dependent variable at country-industry level for
each quarter using our empirical model without allowing the impact of uncertainty
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to change during the GTC, and then aggregating the predicted values to obtain an
aggregate measure for each quarter. Note that the effect of uncertainty during the
baseline period (2002:Q1 to 2008:Q3) is absorbed by the set of extensive fixed effects
that we include in the regression. Hence this first quantification evaluates whether
the change in the impact of uncertainty during the GTC matters for the dynamic
observed path of exports,
Figure 4.9: Quantifying the Role of Uncertainty - Number of Varieties
Figure 4.9 shows the results of this first quantification. More specifically,
the figure plots the observed aggregate growth rate of number of varieties and the
predicted growth rates with and without allowing for the impact of uncertainty
to change after the onset of the GTC. A clear pattern emerges from this figure,
since turning off the change in the impact of uncertainty after the fourth quarter of
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2008 implies a significant underestimate of the contraction and overestimate of the
recovery. In contrast, allowing for a time-varying impact of uncertainty generates
a prediction that is almost equal to the observed value for each quarter. Moreover,
the observed net entry growth rate drops around 22.5 points from its pre-crisis level
to its trough in the second quarter of 2009, and uncertainty represents almost 10.5
points of this total contraction.
Figure 4.10: Quantifying the Role of Uncertainty
- Number of Varieties for non-PTA Partners
Figure 4.11: Quantifying the Role of Uncertainty
- Number of Varieties for PTA Partners
When we break this quantification between PTA partners and non-PTA part-
ners, we observe first that the contraction on the number of varieties is almost 30%
stronger for non-PTA partners. In both cases, the time-varying impact of uncer-
tainty represents a significant share of the contraction, around 10 points of the total
contraction.
Performing the quantification for total exports confirms the key role of uncer-
tainty. For example, the growth rate of exports dropped to -31.22% at the trough of
the GTC but this contraction reaches only -17.30% without allowing a time-varying
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impact of uncertainty. Hence -13.98% of the collapse corresponds to uncertainty (see
Figure 4.15 in the Appendix). When distinguishing between PTAs and non-PTAs
partners, we find that the contraction during the GTC was 10 points higher for
non-PTAs partners in the second quarter of 2009 and that in both cases the time
varying effects represented at least 12 points of the total contraction in the same
quarter (see Figures 4.16 and 4.17 in the Appendix).
Our second quantification exercise explores the role of the reduction in uncer-
tainty in the recovery after the GTC reached it trough. In this quantification, we
keep the impact of uncertainty at its level of 2008:Q4-2009:Q3 and construct the
counterfactual aggregate growth rate of the number of varieties exported. Figure
4.12 plots the results from this quantification exercise. The red dashed line denotes
the predicted aggregate net entry if the impact of uncertainty had remained fixed
at its level during the first four quarters of the GTC. The solid line shows the pre-
dicted aggregate net entry when allowing for time-varying impact of uncertainty.
The difference between the two lines shows that the reduction in the impact of un-
certainty during 2010 and 2011 played a significant role in the recovery. The average
growth rate of net entry during 2010 is 6.5 points and the reduction on the impact
of uncertainty accounts for 5.3 points.
In this second quantification, distinguishing between PTA partners and non-
PTA partners we observe that time-varying effect of uncertainty is more important
for non-PTA partners. More specifically, the reduction on the time-varying effect
of uncertainty represent around 88% of the recovery for non-PTA partners, while
it represents about 58% for PTA partners during the 2010. This difference is more
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Figure 4.12: Time-varying Impact of Uncertainty - Number of Varieties
striking during 2011 where the reduction on the impact of uncertainty represents
52% of the recovery for non-PTA partners while its represents nothing for PTA part-
ners. Note that this difference in time patterns across PTA and non-PTA partners
is consistent with the PTA partners not subject to additional policy uncertainty.
Figure 4.13: Time-varying Impact of Uncertainty
- Number of Varieties for non-PTA partners
Figure 4.14: Time-varying Impact of Uncertainty
- Number of Varieties for PTA partners
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When repeating the quantification for exports, we find that the recovery would
have been 30% smaller in the 2010 and 2011 on average if the impact of uncertainty
have remained at the initial level during the GTC. (See Figure 4.18 in the Appendix).
Repeating the exercises distinguishing between PTA and non-PTA partners, we
observe that the role of time varying uncertainty is important for both cases but
actually the time-varying impact of uncertainty accounts for a higher share of the
recovery for the PTA partners (See Figures 4.19 and 4.20 in the Appendix).
4.4.2 Robustness
In this section, we perform several robustness checks to our main findings
on the impact of demand uncertainty and its sources. Our benchmark estimation
compares the growth rate of the number of varieties, defined as the number of firms
at country-industry level per quarter. As a first robustness check, we compute the
mid-point growth rate of the number of varieties instead of the standard growth
rate. The mid-point growth rate allows us to include observations both for entry
and exit, in contrast to the standard growth rate that requires flows to be present
for at least two periods in order to be included into the computation. The results
of the estimation using mid-point growth rates are presented in Tables 4.7 and
4.8 and confirm the negative impact of uncertainty and the additional negative
impact of policy uncertainty, either following the PTA or the market power approach
to identify the impact of policy uncertainty. For example, turning off the policy
uncertainty channel reduces the negative impact of uncertainty on mid-point growth
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rate by -5.90% on average after the start of the GTC, a very similar magnitude to
the impact we find using the standard growth rate.
More disaggregated trade flows can generate additional entry and exit dynam-
ics and in doing so can capture stronger impacts for time-varying covariates. Hence
we reestimate our benchmark estimation (4.4.3) aggregating trade flows up to the
country level, where there is one observation of the number of firms or firm-product
varieties exporting per country-quarter. Table 4.9 presents the results of estimat-
ing our benchmark specification at this more aggregated level. Results confirms
that demand uncertainty has a negative impact on the number of varieties and the
number of firms. Furthermore, the difference in the expected change in the number
of varieties due to uncertainty between PTA and non-PTA countries is on average
-7.16%, slightly above the difference in our benchmark specification.
To determine if the results are robust to the presence of outliers we run robust
regressions that downweight outliers. These robust regressions start by computing
Huber weights and then use Bi-weights after convergence has been achieved. Results
are presented in 4.10 and confirm the negative impact of uncertainty and its growing
importance during the GTC.
Previous chapters focus on the role of related-party for trade adjustment to
uncertainty. Our empirical analysis does not include related-party trade controls
explicit. However, the impact of related-party trade and its variation across indus-
try and country is captured by country and industry fixed effects that absorb the
constant component across the sample.24
24In future work we may explicitly control for this.
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4.5 Conclusions
We assess the impact of demand uncertainty for U.S. exports during the “Great
Trade Collapse” using a model of heterogeneous firm export dynamics with multiple
sources of demand uncertainty. We show that uncertainty reduces entry in export
markets and that multiple sources of uncertainty have a stronger impact on firms’
export decisions. We use the model to explore an alternative explanation for the
Great Trade Collapse and its subsequent recovery: the combination of economic un-
certainty and heightened uncertainty about other countries’ policies. Initially, firms
feared an increased in protectionism fueled by the recession, and this contracted
trade even more. After this return to protectionism did not materialize, demand
uncertainty declined, helping the fast recovery.
Guided by the model developed, we construct theory-consistent measures of
demand uncertainty and disentangle economic and policy uncertainty. We then es-
timate the impact of uncertainty during the GTC. We find that uncertainty reduced
the number of varieties exported significantly and that turning off the policy un-
certainty reduces the impact of uncertainty by 5.5% on average during the GTC.
Uncertainty alone accounted for around 50% of the contraction from the pre-crisis
level to the trough of the recession. Additionally, our quantifications show that if un-
certainty had remained constant at its level prevailing during the first four quarters
of the GTC, then the recovery would have been around half of the observed growth
rate. Our findings suggest that policy and economic uncertainty played a significant
role during the Great Trade Collapse, and that preferential trade agreements reduce
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the impact of economic uncertainty by reducing policy uncertainty.
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4.6 Tables
Table 4.3: Decomposition of U.S. Exports Growth (2007-2011)
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin Total
Growth RateGrowers Shrinkers Net Entry Exit Net
2007:Q1 0.25 -0.21 0.04 0.28 -0.22 0.06 0.10
2007:Q2 0.25 -0.21 0.04 0.28 -0.24 0.04 0.08
2007:Q3 0.26 -0.21 0.05 0.3 -0.24 0.06 0.11
2007:Q4 0.27 -0.21 0.06 0.31 -0.24 0.07 0.13
2008:Q1 0.28 -0.18 0.10 0.29 -0.24 0.05 0.15
2008:Q2 0.27 -0.19 0.08 0.30 -0.21 0.09 0.17
2008:Q3 0.27 -0.20 0.07 0.30 -0.22 0.08 0.15
2008:Q4 0.21 -0.27 -0.06 0.27 -0.27 0.00 -0.06
2009:Q1 0.16 -0.36 -0.2 0.24 -0.31 -0.07 -0.27
2009:Q2 0.15 -0.36 -0.21 0.24 -0.34 -0.10 -0.31
2009:Q3 0.17 -0.33 -0.16 0.23 -0.33 -0.10 -0.26
2009:Q4 0.24 -0.25 -0.01 0.26 -0.27 -0.01 -0.02
2010:Q1 0.31 -0.18 0.13 0.29 -0.23 0.06 0.19
2010:Q2 0.34 -0.17 0.17 0.28 -0.22 0.06 0.23
2010:Q3 0.30 -0.18 0.12 0.27 -0.21 0.06 0.18
2010:Q4 0.28 -0.19 0.09 0.27 -0.21 0.06 0.15
2011:Q1 0.28 -0.18 0.10 0.26 -0.22 0.04 0.14
2011:Q2 0.29 -0.18 0.11 0.26 -0.22 0.04 0.15
2011:Q3 0.29 -0.18 0.11 0.26 -0.22 0.04 0.15
2011:Q4 0.26 -0.2 0.06 0.26 -0.23 0.03 0.09
Mid-point growth rate decomposition defined at firm-country-product level.
Intensive margin refers to flows that exist in quarters q and q − 4 where growers and shrinkers
correspond to flows with a positive and negative growth, respectively.
Extensive margin refers to flow without positive value in both q and q − 4 quarters where entry
corresponds to flows that exist in q only while exit corresponds to flow that exist in q − 4 only.
See B.1.1 for mode details.
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Table 4.4: Decomposition of U.S. Exports Growth - PTA countries (2007-2011)
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin Total
Growth RateGrowers Shrinkers Net Entry Exit Net
2007:Q1 0.23 -0.22 0.01 0.23 -0.20 0.03 0.04
2007:Q2 0.22 -0.21 0.01 0.24 -0.20 0.04 0.05
2007:Q3 0.23 -0.21 0.02 0.26 -0.20 0.06 0.08
2007:Q4 0.25 -0.22 0.03 0.27 -0.21 0.06 0.09
2008:Q1 0.25 -0.18 0.07 0.25 -0.19 0.06 0.13
2008:Q2 0.27 -0.20 0.07 0.26 -0.18 0.08 0.15
2008:Q3 0.27 -0.20 0.07 0.25 -0.19 0.06 0.13
2008:Q4 0.21 -0.27 -0.06 0.23 -0.22 0.01 -0.05
2009:Q1 0.15 -0.38 -0.23 0.20 -0.28 -0.08 -0.31
2009:Q2 0.15 -0.41 -0.26 0.19 -0.29 -0.10 -0.36
2009:Q3 0.17 -0.35 -0.18 0.19 -0.26 -0.07 -0.25
2009:Q4 0.24 -0.26 -0.02 0.21 -0.21 0.00 -0.02
2010:Q1 0.34 -0.17 0.17 0.25 -0.19 0.06 0.23
2010:Q2 0.37 -0.15 0.22 0.24 -0.18 0.06 0.28
2010:Q3 0.30 -0.16 0.14 0.22 -0.17 0.05 0.19
2010:Q4 0.27 -0.18 0.09 0.23 -0.17 0.06 0.15
2011:Q1 0.29 -0.16 0.13 0.21 -0.17 0.04 0.17
2011:Q2 0.29 -0.17 0.12 0.21 -0.17 0.04 0.16
2011:Q3 0.29 -0.16 0.13 0.20 -0.16 0.04 0.17
2011:Q4 0.28 -0.18 0.10 0.21 -0.17 0.04 0.14
Mid-point growth rate decomposition defined at firm-country-product level.
Intensive margin refers to flows that exist in quarters q and q − 4 where growers and shrinkers
correspond to flows with a positive and negative growth, respectively.
Extensive margin refers to flow without positive value in both q and q − 4 quarters where entry
corresponds to flows that exist in q only while exit corresponds to flow that exist in q − 4 only.
See B.1.1 for mode details.
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Table 4.5: Decomposition of U.S. Exports Growth - Non-PTA countries (2007-2011)
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin Total
Growth RateGrowers Shrinkers Net Entry Exit Net
2007:Q1 0.26 -0.20 0.06 0.30 -0.23 0.07 0.13
2007:Q2 0.27 -0.21 0.06 0.30 -0.25 0.05 0.11
2007:Q3 0.27 -0.21 0.06 0.31 -0.25 0.06 0.12
2007:Q4 0.29 -0.21 0.08 0.32 -0.25 0.07 0.15
2008:Q1 0.29 -0.19 0.10 0.30 -0.26 0.04 0.14
2008:Q2 0.27 -0.19 0.08 0.31 -0.22 0.09 0.17
2008:Q3 0.27 -0.21 0.06 0.32 -0.24 0.08 0.14
2008:Q4 0.22 -0.27 -0.05 0.29 -0.29 0.00 -0.05
2009:Q1 0.17 -0.36 -0.19 0.25 -0.32 -0.07 -0.26
2009:Q2 0.15 -0.35 -0.20 0.26 -0.35 -0.09 -0.29
2009:Q3 0.17 -0.33 -0.16 0.24 -0.36 -0.12 -0.28
2009:Q4 0.24 -0.25 -0.01 0.28 -0.29 -0.01 -0.02
2010:Q1 0.30 -0.19 0.11 0.30 -0.25 0.05 0.16
2010:Q2 0.32 -0.18 0.14 0.30 -0.25 0.05 0.19
2010:Q3 0.31 -0.19 0.12 0.29 -0.23 0.06 0.18
2010:Q4 0.29 -0.19 0.10 0.29 -0.22 0.07 0.17
2011:Q1 0.28 -0.18 0.10 0.29 -0.23 0.06 0.16
2011:Q2 0.29 -0.18 0.11 0.28 -0.24 0.04 0.15
2011:Q3 0.28 -0.19 0.09 0.29 -0.24 0.05 0.14
2011:Q4 0.25 -0.22 0.03 0.28 -0.25 0.03 0.06
Mid-point growth rate decomposition defined at firm-country-product level.
Intensive margin refers to flows that exist in quarters q and q − 4 where growers and shrinkers
correspond to flows with a positive and negative growth, respectively.
Extensive margin refers to flow without positive value in both q and q − 4 quarters where entry
corresponds to flows that exist in q only while exit corresponds to flow that exist in q − 4 only.
See B.1.1 for mode details.
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Table 4.6: Decomposition of U.S. Exports Growth - Durable and Non-durable (2007-2011)










2007:Q1 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.14
2007:Q2 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.10
2007:Q3 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.14
2007:Q4 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.14
2008:Q1 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.18
2008:Q2 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.18
2008:Q3 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.17
2008:Q4 -0.09 0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04
2009:Q1 -0.23 -0.06 -0.29 -0.14 -0.07 -0.21
2009:Q2 -0.25 -0.10 -0.35 -0.14 -0.04 -0.18
2009:Q3 -0.17 -0.08 -0.25 -0.11 -0.08 -0.19
2009:Q4 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.02 0.03
2010:Q1 0.12 0.03 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.19
2010:Q2 0.19 0.05 0.24 0.11 0.04 0.15
2010:Q3 0.14 0.06 0.20 0.09 0.04 0.13
2010:Q4 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.13
2011:Q1 0.11 0.02 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.11
2011:Q2 0.09 0.03 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.15
2011:Q3 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.02 0.12
2011:Q4 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.05
Mid-point growth rate decomposition defined at firm-country-product level.
Goods classified in durable and non-durable according to classification by Engel and Wang (2010).
Intensive margin refers to flows that exist in quarters q and q−4 where growers and shrinkers correspond
to flows with a positive and negative growth, respectively.
Extensive margin refers to flow without positive value in both q and q − 4 quarters where entry corre-
sponds to flows that exist in q only while exit corresponds to flow that exist in q − 4 only.
See B.1.1 for mode details.
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Table 4.7: Impact of Uncertainty on Growth of U.S. Exported Varieties (2003-2011)
Net Entry Net Entry (Entry-Exit) Entry Exit
(midpoint growth)
Uncertainty (no PTA)
Uncertainty*Q408 -0.354*** -0.210** -0.0707 0.140***
(0.097) (0.086) (0.046) (0.051)
Uncertainty*Q409 -0.105 -0.0499 0.0557 0.106**
(0.067) (0.075) (0.038) (0.050)
Uncertainty*Q410 -0.193*** -0.175*** 0.0196 0.195***
(0.050) (0.051) (0.041) (0.033)
Uncertainty (PTA)
PTA*Uncertainty*Q408 1.754*** 1.442*** 0.697*** -0.746**
(0.498) (0.490) (0.239) (0.298)
PTA*Q408 -0.299*** -0.238*** -0.125*** 0.112***
(0.064) (0.067) (0.036) (0.037)
PTA*Uncertainty*Q409 1.586*** 1.534*** 1.004*** -0.530**
(0.371) (0.325) (0.227) (0.215)
PTA*Q409 -0.269*** -0.255*** -0.181*** 0.0741*
(0.070) (0.061) (0.041) (0.041)
PTA*Uncertainty*Q410 0.00211 -0.136 -0.0222 0.113
(0.281) (0.281) (0.237) (0.191)
PTA*Q410 -0.0113 0.0153 -0.0217 -0.037
(0.052) (0.052) (0.044) (0.033)
PTA*Uncertainty -1.319* -1.187* -0.978** 0.21
(0.774) (0.704) (0.439) (0.406)
PTA 0.267** 0.239** 0.197** -0.0425
(0.132) (0.117) (0.080) (0.062)
Change in PTA -0.0153 -0.0133 -0.0119 0.00138
(0.026) (0.024) (0.010) (0.015)
Change in GDP 0.282*** 0.246*** 0.103*** -0.143***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.023) (0.023)
PTA*Change in GDP -0.134 -0.0924 -0.0273 0.065
(0.106) (0.098) (0.049) (0.065)
Number of Observations 166,933 185,853 185,853 185,853
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.099 0.082
Aggregation Level Country-Hs2 Country-Hs2 Country-Hs2 Country-Hs2
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis (country).
We use uncertainty estimates from AR(1) country-specific regressions. See details on document.
The number of observations in midpoint growth specifications is higher because they allow for zeros at the start
or end of each period.
*,**,*** Sig. different from 0 at 10%,5% and 1
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Uncertainty*Q408 -0.212* -0.104 -0.0187 0.0849*
(0.109) (0.090) (0.050) (0.050)
Uncertainty*Q408*Market Power -0.188*** -0.148*** -0.0735** 0.0744***
(0.053) (0.040) (0.030) (0.024)
Uncertainty*Q409 0.0165 0.064 0.0857* 0.0216
(0.070) (0.077) (0.047) (0.047)
Uncertainty*Q409*Market Power -0.161*** -0.157*** -0.0438 0.113***
(0.054) (0.043) (0.027) (0.032)
Uncertainty*Q410 -0.0982 -0.102 0.0549 0.157***
(0.064) (0.061) (0.047) (0.034)
Uncertainty*Q410*Market Power -0.124** -0.102** -0.0510* 0.0511
(0.050) (0.043) (0.027) (0.032)
Uncertainty*Market power 0.162*** 0.143*** 0.170*** 0.0266
(0.018) (0.018) (0.040) (0.035)
Uncertainty (PTA)
PTA*Uncertainty*Q408 1.701*** 1.409*** 0.616** 0.793***
(0.488) (0.500) (0.275) (0.275)
PTA*Uncertainty*Q408*Market Power 0.0488 0.0393 0.121 0.0821
(0.171) (0.159) (0.111) (0.087)
PTA*Q408 -0.296*** -0.237*** -0.125*** 0.111***
(0.064) (0.067) (0.036) (0.037)
PTA*Uncertainty*Q409 1.586*** 1.534*** 0.957*** -0.577**
(0.392) (0.347) (0.233) (0.233)
PTA*Uncertainty*Q409*Market Power -0.0303 -0.0152 0.071 0.0861
(0.108) (0.092) (0.057) (0.063)
PTA*Q409 -0.266*** -0.254*** -0.181*** 0.0725*
(0.069) (0.061) (0.041) (0.041)
PTA*Uncertainty*Q410 -0.229 -0.341 -0.214 0.127
(0.286) (0.297) (0.220) (0.203)
PTA*Uncertainty*Q410*Market Power 0.326*** 0.299*** 0.287*** -0.0125
(0.089) (0.085) (0.066) (0.054)
PTA*Q410 -0.00922 0.0161 -0.0217 -0.0378
(0.052) (0.052) (0.044) (0.033)
PTA*Market power 0.0264 0.0125 0.0861 0.0736
(0.018) (0.018) (0.068) (0.079)
PTA*Uncertainty -1.154 -1.055 -0.53 0.525
(0.710) (0.651) (0.507) (0.353)
PTA*Uncertainty*Market Power -0.250** -0.202* -0.677 -0.475
(0.114) (0.110) (0.406) (0.466)
PTA 0.249** 0.231** 0.14 -0.0914
(0.123) (0.110) (0.090) (0.065)
Change in PTA -0.0153 -0.0133 -0.0119 0.00142
(0.026) (0.024) (0.010) (0.015)
Change in GDP 0.282*** 0.246*** 0.103*** -0.143***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.023) (0.023)
PTA*Change in GDP -0.134 -0.092 -0.0268 0.0651
(0.106) (0.098) (0.049) (0.065)
Number of Observations 166,933 185,853 185,853 185,853
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.1 0.083
Aggregation Level Country-Hs2 Country-Hs2 Country-Hs2 Country-Hs2
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis (country).
We use uncertainty estimates from AR(1) country-specific regressions. See details on document.
Number of observations in midpoint growth specifications is higher since they allow for zeros at the start or end of each
period.
*,**,*** Sig. different from 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Uncertainty*Q408 -0.349*** -0.379*** -0.178
(0.118) (0.130) (0.430)
Uncertainty*Q409 -0.0602 -0.0352 0.1
(0.126) (0.105) (0.418)
Uncertainty*Q410 -0.0990** -0.0935*** -0.282
(0.041) (0.029) (0.250)
Uncertainty (PTA)
PTA*Uncertainty*Q408 1.823*** 1.869*** -0.683
(0.490) (0.440) (2.049)
PTA*Q408 -0.289*** -0.286*** 0.0341
(0.085) (0.069) (0.313)
PTA*Uncertainty*Q409 0.788*** 0.594** -1.203
(0.283) (0.290) (1.219)
PTA*Q409 -0.129** -0.0841 0.264
(0.055) (0.054) (0.207)
PTA*Uncertainty*Q410 0.105 0.392 -2.384
(0.339) (0.255) (1.607)
PTA*Q410 -0.0156 -0.0618 0.344
(0.060) (0.045) (0.287)
PTA*Uncertainty -1.112 -0.902 -1.176
(0.831) (0.610) (2.883)
PTA 0.224 0.179* 0.286
(0.137) (0.100) (0.479)
Change in PTA -0.0108 0.00341 0.0433
(0.014) (0.013) (0.064)
Change in GDP 0.330*** 0.305*** 0.358**
(0.063) (0.060) (0.151)
PTA*Change in GDP -0.17 -0.132 -0.154
(0.106) (0.113) (0.216)
Number of Observations 2,387 2,387 2,387
R-squared 0.529 0.527 0.189
Aggregation Level Country Country Country
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects No No No
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis (country).
We use uncertainty estimates from AR(1) country-specific regressions.
See details on document.
Number of observations in midpoint growth specifications is higher since
they allow for zeros at the start or end of each period.
*,**,*** Sig. different from 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 4.10: Impact of Uncertainty on Growth of U.S. Ex-


























Change in PTA -0.0102 0.01
(0.038) (0.018)
Change in GDP 0.481*** 0.413***
(0.074) (0.022)
PTA*Change in GDP -0.322 -0.286***
(0.226) (0.074)
Number of Observations 166,933 166,933
R-squared 0.024 0.044
Aggregation Level Country-Hs2 Country-Hs2
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis (country).
We use uncertainty estimates from AR(1) country-specific re-
gressions. See details on document.
The number of observations in midpoint growth specifications
is higher because they allow for zeros at the start or end of each
period.
*,**,*** Sig. different from 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
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4.7 Figures
Figure 4.15: Quantifying the Role of Uncertainty - Exports
Figure 4.16: Quantifying the Role of Uncertainty
- Exports for non-PTA partners
Figure 4.17: Quantifying the Role of Uncertainty
- Exports for PTA partners
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Figure 4.18: Time-varying Impact of Uncertainty - Exports
Figure 4.19: Time-varying Impact of Uncertainty
- Exports to non-PTA partners
Figure 4.20: Time-varying Impact of Uncertainty
- Exports to PTA partners
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Appendix A: Global Sourcing under Uncertainty: Theory
A.1 Incomplete Contracts
Taking the initial preferences and the setup (see section 2), I obtain that the































Since output if not contractable, then parties (entrepreneur and manufacturer)





















































In order to solve for the demand thresholds that describe the decision rule
of a firm, I needexpressions for either each of the value functions Vw, Vo, Vv or
alternative find expressions for the difference of the value functions. I follow the
second approach and construct the differences between the relevant pair of value
functions for each decision. The three relevant difference between value function
are: (Vo − Vw), (Vv − Vw) and (Vv − Vo).
A.2.1 Value of Outsourcing - Value of waiting




1− β + βγ
+
βγ[G(Aev)−G(Axo)]
1− β + βγ




1− β + βγ
[EVo(Aeo < A < Aev)− fe]
+
βγG(Axo)
1− β + βγ




1− β + βγ
EVw(A < Aeo) +
βγ[1−G(Aev)]
1− β + βγ
fe
Note that EVw(A < Axo) = EVw(A < Aeo) = Vw(A) since the value of waiting
for non-exporter is independent of the current realization. Focusing on the value
of exporting via outsourcing, the next step is to express EVo(Axo < A < Aev) and
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EVo(Aeo < A < Aev) as a function of Vo(A) using (2.2.5). After some manipulations:
Vo(A)− Vw(A) =
πo(A)− fp
1− β + βγ
+
βγ








1− β + βγλexo
where λrsk ≡ [1−G(Ark)+G(Ask)], k ∈ {o, v} and r, s ∈ {e, x}. λexo captures the prob-
ability that a shock outside of the inaction band for an exporter with outsourcing
arrives.
This expression A.2.1 is intuitive. The difference between the value of export-
ing via outsourcing and the value of waiting is equal to discounted current profits,
plus the discounted profits from the inaction band plus the difference between the
sunk costs to start and stop exporting adjusted by their probability.
A.2.2 Value of Integration - Value of Outsourcing
Combining the expressions for Vv(A) and Vo(A) , (2.2.5) and (2.2.6) respec-
tively and after some algebra,
Vv(A)− Vo(A) =
πv(A)− πo(A)
1− β + βγ
+
βγ[1−G(Aev)]fv













1− β + βγλexv
]
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The intuition is similar to A.2.1. The difference between the organizational forms
to export is equal to the discounted difference of today profits plus the discounted
difference in profits across the inaction band of both organizational forms and the
discounted difference in the sunk costs.
A.2.3 Value of Integration - Value of Waiting
Combining the expressions for Vv(A) and Vw(A) , (2.2.7) and (2.2.6) respec-
tively, and following the same approach as the previous expressions for the differences
between value functions, I obtain
Vv(A)− Vw(A) =
πv(A)− fp
1− β + βγ
+
βγ[1−G(Aev)][fv + fe]− βγG(Axv)fx













1− β + βγλexv
]
Notice that this difference correspond to the cases where A < Aeo which is the case
for Axv .
A.2.4 Entry with Outsourcing
After computing the difference between the value functions Vo(A) and Vw(A) ,

















where λ̃xo = 1− γG(Axo). Note that γ ∈ (0, 1) and G(Axo) < 1 then λ̃xo < 1.
From the expression above is easy to show that Aeo > AeDo . Noting that
fe =
πo(AeDo )
1−β (see A.2.8 for the derivation of the expression on the deterministic
framework) and rearranging the entry condition, I obtain:
πo(Aeo)− πo(AeDo ) =βγG(Axo)[fe + fx] +
βγ




Then πo(Aeo)− πo(AeDo ) > 0⇒ Aeo > AeDo .
A.2.5 Integration Decision















1− β + βγ
[






1− β + βγ
[















where λ̃xv = 1− γG(Axv).
This condition allows U.S. to show that Aev > AeDv as follows. Reexpressing the
integration condition, recalling that fv =
πv(AeDv )−πo(AeDv )
1−β (see A.2.8 for the derivation
of this expression) and using the functional form of the profit function
Aev −AeDv ∝
βγ[G(Aev)−G(Avx)]
1− β + βγ
[






1− β + βγ
[











Hence Aev > AeDv since the right hand side of the equation is positive. Note that
showing that the first term is higher that the second term is sufficient to prove that
RHS > 0.
Γ =βγ[G(Aev)−G(Avx)] [πv(Aev)− Eπv(Avx < A < Aev)]
− βγ[G(Aev)−G(Axo)] [πo(Aev)− Eπo(Axo < A < Aev)]
=βγ[G(Aev)−G(Axo)]
[
πv(Aev − Ā)− πo(Aev − Ā)
]
+ βγ[G(Axo)−G(Avx)] [πv(Aev)− Eπv(Avx < A < Axo)]
where I apply the second mean theorem for integration in the last step. By con-
struction, Aev ≥ Ā since Ā ∈ [Axo ,Aev]. Then Γ > 0 and Aev > AeDv .
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A.2.6 Exit from Outsourcing
Since the exit condition for an outsourcing exporter is fx = Vw(Axo)− Vo(Axo)
and replacing the RHS using A.2.1, I obtain
fx =−
πo(Axo)− fp












1− β + βγ[1−G(Aeo)]
where λ̃xo = 1 − γ(1 − G(Aeo)). Reorganizing this conditionand replacing the exit
condition in the deterministic framework (see A.2.8 for the expression), I get
πo(Axo)− πo(AxDo ) =−
βγ[G(Aoe)−G(Axo)]
1− β + βγ
[Eπo(Axo < A < Aoe)− πo(Axo)]
− βγ[G(Aev)−G(Aoe)]fe − βγ[1−G(Aoe)]fx
πo(Axo)− πo(AxDo ) <0
This is the case since Aeo > Axo and Aev > Aeo. Hence ∂π∂A > 0 implies A
x
o < AxDo .
153
A.2.7 Exit from Vertical Integration
A vertical integrated exporter make the decision to exit if fx = Vw(Axv) −






















where λ̃xv = 1− γ(1−G(Aev)).
Reorganizing this condition, I obtain
πv(Axv)− πv(AxDv ) =−
βγ















− βγ[1−G(Aev)][fv + fe + fx]
πv(Axv)− πv(AxDv ) <0
since first term is negative because πv > πo and the first term is higher, in absolute
value, than the second term, and all remaining terms are negative. Since ∂π
∂A > 0
then Axv < AxDv .
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A.2.8 Exit across Sourcing Decision
In order to compare the exit threshold across sourcing decisions, combining












1− β + βγ






1− β + βγ


















1− β + βγ
+ βγ[1−G(Ave)]fv
πo(Axo)− πv(Axv) >0
Since πv > πo for a given A and ∂π∂A > 0 then A
x
o > Axv
Note that this result also implies that introducing foreign demand uncertainty
expands the difference between the exit threshold across. This is the case since
πv(AxDv ) = πo(AxDo ) and this implies that [πo(Aox)−πv(Axv)] > [πo(AoDx )−πv(AxDv )].
Note that since uncertainty reduce both threshold then it has to be the case that
the reduction on integration exit threshold is bigger than the reduction on the exit
from outsourcing threshold.Deterministic Framework
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A.3 The Deterministic Framework as Benchmark
In the deterministic framework firms compare the discounted value of the
profits of their current state to the sunk cost and resulting profits from switching
states. This implies that for a given demand level At the productivity cutoff for
entry with outsourcing θeDo is defined as
πo(At, θeDo )− fp
1− β
= fe ⇔ θeDo =
[




where ρ = (1− α)/α. Hence firms with productivity θi just above θeDo will pay the
sunk cost and start exporting via outsourcing. However, since firms can integrate
and get a higher flow of profits by paying an additional sunk cost, firms with high
enough productivity will integrate rather than outsource. More specifically, firms




o will start exporting with integration. Formally, θ
eD
v is defined
as follows for a given demand level of At:
πv(At, θeDv )− πo(At, θeDv )
1− β






In the case of the exit decision, for a given demand level At, firms that are currently
exporting via outsourcing will exit if their productivity level is below the exit pro-
ductivity cutoff, i.e. θi < θ
xD







= fx ⇔ θxDo =
[




Note that since θ > 0, it will be optimal for some firms to exit if and only if






= fx ⇔ θxDv =
[










A.4 Parametrizing Firms’ Decisions
A.4.1 Productivity Cutoff Entry with Outsourcing
The entry condition is






− βγG(Axo)[fx + fe]




, and firms will exit
as soon as the profit flow cannot cover the fixed per period costs.
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For the marginal firm that Aeo = At,
[1− β]fe =ψo[θoe ]
α



























ln[θoe ] = ln[θ
oD

















where ρ = (1− α)/α.
A.4.2 Productivity Cutoff Exit from Outsourcing
For the marginal firm that Axo = At it is the case that




1− β + βγ















ln θxo = ln θ
xD




βγ[1−G(Atξxo )][fe + fx]






Note that κo1(x) > 0 since fp − [1− β]fx > 0 and G(Atξxo ) ≤ 1; and κo2(x) > 0 since
A ≥ At for the integration interval.
A.4.3 Productivity Cutoff Integration
For the case that the firm Aev = At
[1− β]fv =(ψv − ψo)θ
α
1−αAev + βγ










[πv(A)− πo(Axo)− (ψv − ψo)θ
α
1−αAev]dG
[1− β + βγ]
− βγG(Axv)fv



























where ϕ = ψv
ψv−ψo . Taking logs
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ln θve = ln θ
vD
e + ρ ln [1 + κ
v


















1− β + βγ
A.4.4 Productivity Cutoff Exit from Integration




and exploiting the inaction band expression, the exit condition for an integrated
firm is




















1− β + βγ















βγ[1−G(Atξev)][fv + fe + fx]














1− β + βγ
Then taking logs
ln θvx = ln θ
vD








A.4.5 Productivity Cutoffs Ranking
Proving that θxo > θ
x
v is trivially after showing that Axv < Axo for any produc-
tivity level. For the marginal integrated that is going to exit such that Axv = At
with productivity θxv , then it has to be the case that Axo > At. Similarly for the
marginal firm exporting via outsourcing that is going to exit such that Axo = At












(1− β)fe + fp + βγG(Atξeo)[fx + fe]
+
ρ





























































































[(1− β)fe + fp + βγG(Atξeo)[fx + fe]]
[fe + fx]
(1− ξeo)





∂At > 0 and uncertainty reduces the response to changes in current
realization. From here it easy to spot that the cross-partial between uncertainty and























1− β + βγ − βγ
∫ At
Atξeo
[A2t −A(At − 1)]/A2tdG
]
[






















∂At > 0 noting that
∂ ln θoDe
∂At < 0
A.5.2 Entry - Integration
A.5.2.1 Arrival rate
Totally differentiating with respect to γ















































(1− β)[κv2 + ϕκv3]/γ



























. After some algebra, it is











(1− β)[κv2 + ϕκv3]/γ








1− β + βγ
]





since κv2(e) + ϕκ
v




3(e)) > 0. Hence uncertainty delays
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βγ ∫ AtAtξxv AA2t dG
































































































[1 + κv2(e) + κ
v
3(e)][1− β + βγ]
> 0
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A.5.3 Exit - Outsourcing
A.5.3.1 Arrival Rate
Computing the total differential with respect to γ






































































[1− β + βγ]
]
Ξxo =0













































































A.5.4 Exit - Vertical Integration
A.5.4.1 Arrival Rate






− βγ [fv + fe + fx]


























































































1− β + βγ




< 0 since κv2(x) > κ
v











At dG. Hence as a first order effect
uncertainty delays the decision to stop exporting under integration.
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A.5.4.2 Current Realization










































































[1− β + βγ][fv + fe + fx]






















[1− β + βγ][fv + fe + fx]



















Then plugging back into the condition and after some algebra
d ln θvx
dAt

































1− β + βγ
]





dAt > 0 since all terms are positive and ω
x
v is a positive weight.
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A.5.5 Heterogeneity on The Impact of Demand Changes
A.5.5.1 Entry and Integration
d ln θve
dAt
































































1− β + βγ
+
ρ
1 + κv2(e) + κ
v
3(e)
ϕoβγ ∫ AtξxoAtξxv AA2t dG






















































Since d ln θ
v
d lnAt < 0 then the elasticity with respect to current demand level is higher
for outsourcing than integration.
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A.5.5.2 Exit across Organizational Forms
d ln θxv
d lnAt































































A.5.6 Foreign Demand Uncertainty Distribution
A.5.6.1 Exit with Outsourcing
The exit condition from outsourcing is the following for each firm








(1− β)fx =− [πo(Axo)− fp]− βγ[1−G(Aeo)][fe + fx]
+ βγ
G(Aeo)[πo(Axo)− πo(Aeo)]







1− β + βγ







1− β + βγ






1− β + βγ
This expression is particularly useful because the distribution function of the stochas-
tic process only shows up in the last term.
For the marginal firm that is exiting from outsourcing with productivity θxo
and Axo = At then
(1− β)fx = −([θxo ]
1





1− β + βγ
[θxo ]
1
ρ = [θxDo ]
1
ρ (1− βγ[fe + fx]
fp − (1− β)fx
)/
[
1− β + βγ − βγ
∫ Atξ
At G(z)dz/At




ρ = [θxDo ]
1
ρ (1− βγ[fe + fx]
fp − (1− β)fx
)
1− β + βγ
1− β + βγω(At)
Then consider G(z) and H(z) and the objective is to compare the exit pro-
ductivity threshold between the two demand distribution: θxo and θ
x′
o . In order to
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[1− β + βγω′(At)]
[1− β + βγω(At)]
Hence by comparing ω(At) and ω′(At) the productivity cutoff can be ranked. Note
thatif θxo < θ
x′
o then it should be the case that [1− β + βγω(At)] > [1− β + βγω′(At)]


























If G(z) FOSD H(z)if G(z) ≤ H(z) for all z with strict inequality for at least
one z, then ∆ω(At) ≥ 0 with strict inequality when it is the case that G(z) < H(z)
and θxo < θ
x′
o .
Now suppose that the distribution of demand H(A) is a mean-preserving
spread of G(A) such that G(A) and H(A) cross only once at Ã. Then for a current
realization At < Ã/ξ it is the case that
∫ Atξ
At [H(z) − G(z)]dz > 0 and ∆ω(At) > 0
which in turns implies that θxo < θ
x′
o . In the case that the current realization At > Ã,∫ Atξ






A.5.6.2 Entry with Outsourcing
Reexpressing the entry condition, I obtain:


















1− β + βγ
Parametrizing for At = Aeo








































1− β + βγ








[1− β + βγω′(At)]
[1− β + βγω(At)]
since ω′(At) < ω(At) if G(z) FOSD H(z) then θeo < θe
′
o .
Now suppose that the distribution of demand H(A) is a mean-preserving
174
spread of G(A) such that G(A) and H(A) cross only once at Ã. Then for a current
realization At < Ã it is the case that
∫ At
Atξeo
[H(z) − G(z)]dz > 0 and ∆ω(At) > 0
which in turns implies that θeo < θ
e′




[H(z) − G(z)]dz < 0 and ∆ω(At) < 0 which in turns implies




Rearranging the integration condition, integrating by parts and after the al-
gebra

















1− β + βγ
Parametrizing this expression for the marginal integrated firm Ave = At, I obtain
[θve ]
α
1−α = [θvDe ]
α
1−α
1− β + βγ
1− β + βγωv(At)







Consider two distribution G(z) and H(z) with respective θev and θ
e′
v integration








1− β + βγωv′(At)
1− β + βγωv(At)
Hence θe′v > θ
e
v if ω








and ∆ωv > 0 if G(z) FOSD H(z) since H(z) ≥ G(z) for all z with strict inequality
for at least one z. Hence θev < θ
e
v if G(z) FOSD H(z).
Now suppose that the distribution of demand H(A) is a mean-preserving
spread of G(A) such that G(A) and H(A) cross only once at Ã. Then for a current
realization At < Ã it is the case that ∆ωv > 0 which in turns implies that θev < θe′v .
In the case that the current realization At > Ã/ξxv , ∆ωv > 0 < 0 which in turns
implies that θev > θ
e′
v .
A.5.6.4 Exit with Vertical Integration
[1− β]fx =− [ψv[θ]
1
















1− β + βγ








1− βγ[fv + fe + fx]
fp − [1− β]fx
] [
1− β + βγ
1− β + βγωxv (At)
]









Consider two distribution G(z) and H(z) with respective θxv and θ
x′
v exit from







1− β + βγωx′v (At)















If G(z) FOSD H(z) then H(z) ≥ G(z) for all z with strict inequality for at




v . Now suppose that the distribution of
demand H(A) is a mean-preserving spread of G(A) such that G(A) and H(A) cross
only once at Ã. Then for a current realization At < Ã/ξev it is the case that ∆ωxv > 0
which in turns implies that θxv < θ
x′
v . In the case that the current realization At > Ã,
∆ω(At) < 0 which in turns implies that θxv > θx′v .
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Appendix B: Trade Collapse: The Role of Economic and Policy Un-
certainty in the Great Recession
B.1 Descriptive Section
B.1.1 Mid-point Decomposition













[xick(q) + xick(q − 4)]
[X(q) +X(q − 4)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
sick(q)
× [xick(q)− xick(q − 4)]1
2










where x denotes exports and i, c, k, q index firm, country, product and quarter re-
spectively; gick(q) is the midpoint growth rate of firm i exports of product k to
country c in quarter q; and sick(q) is the weight corresponding to gick(q) in total
exports.
Changes in exports at the firm-product-country level can be classified into:
(i) extensive positive (“Entry”) where xick(q) > 0 and xick(q − 4) = 0; (ii) ex-
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tensive negative (“Exit”) where xick(q) = 0 and xick(q − 4) > 0; (iii) intensive
positive (“Growers”) where xick(q) > xick(q − 4) > 0; and (iv) intensive negative
(“Shrinkers”) where xick(q−4) > xick(q) > 0. Thus, the aggregate midpoint growth































where NEck, NXck, CN1ck and CN2ck denote respectively the sets of entering,
exiting, growing and shrinking firms exporting product k to country c.
B.1.2 Counterfactuals
An alternative way to weight the contribution of the extensive and intensive
margin during the GTC is to perform some counterfactuals exercises. These coun-
terfactuals exercises allow us to consider what the GTC growth rate would have
been in the case that some of the margins do not adjust during the collapse. More
specifically, we compute how the mid-point growth rate would have been if entry,
exit and intensive margin growth rate behave as the previous 12 month.
To motivate this counterfactual exercise, recall that the quarterly mid-point

























=neq + nxq + cnq
where neq, nxq and cnq denotes the growth rate of entry, exit and continuation in
period q. Hence if we are interested in computing how much less or more growth
would have been if, say, the continuation growth rate remains at the pre-crisis level





[Xn(q) +Xn(q − 4)]
− Xn(q)−Xn(q − 4)1
2
[Xn(q) +Xn(q − 4)]
∣∣∣∣
counter,cnq−4
= neq + nxq + cnq − neq − nxq − cnq−4
= cnq − cnq−4
Thus we can easily compute how would have been the difference between the
actual growth rate and the counterfactual growth rate if the entry, exit or contin-
uation growth rate remains constant at pre-crisis level by computing the difference
between the actual growth rate of each margin between the periods under consid-
eration. In the following figure we present three different counterfactuals exercises
where the exit, extensive and intensive margins have been kept at their 2007 values
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respectively.
Figure (B.1) shows that the collapse during 2009 would have been significantly
lower if any of the margins would have not adjust during the GTC collapse. For
example, if the exit would have remained constant at its 2007 level, the collapse
would have been on average 10 percentage points lower. Furthermore, if on top of
the exit margin also the entry would have kept its 2007 level, the collapse would have
been on average 13 percentage points lower. Thus, if the extensive margin would
have remained at its 2007 levels, the collapse would have been 43% of the effective
contraction at the trough of the recession.1 Now turning to the intensive margin, the
collapse would have been, on average, 17 percentages points lower if the intensive
margin during 2009 would have behave as in 2007. At the trough of the collapse,
the fall would have been 70% lower if the intensive margin remains at its 2007 level.
Summing up, these counterfactual exercises show that the intensive margin generates
the higher gains if its behavior would have remained at pre-crisis level. However,
the contribution of the net extensive margin in these counterfactuals exercises is
significant and shows that the GTC would have been considerable smaller if the
extensive margin would have remained at its pre-crisis level. For example, in the
second quarter of 2009, the extensive margin represents 37% of the counterfactuals
gains while the intensive margin adds the other 63%.
1More specifically, the collapse at the second quarter of 2009 reached a remarkable contraction
of 29.8% while the counterfactual contraction, under the assumption that the extensive margin
behaved as in the second quarter of 2007, is 12.5%.
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Figure B.1: Counterfactuals Growth Rates
B.2 A Theory of Export Dynamics under Multiple Sources of Uncer-
tainty
B.2.1 Derivation of Cutoff Initial Regime
To derive the cutoff, we first combine (4.3.6) and (4.3.7)
Πw(c, r) =
βγ(1−H(ā))
1− β + βγ(1−H(ā))
[
Eπ (a′ ≥ ā, c, r)





1− β + βγ
]






















Then replacing the profit function and writing the expression for cUt
cUt =Ut × cDt
Ut =
1− β + βγω(at)
1− β + βγ
≤ 1
ω(at) =
at −H(at) [at − E(a′ ≤ at)]
at
≤ 1
From here it is direct to prove that ω(at) ≤ 1 and Ut ≤ 1. Note that the(
at − H(at) [at − E(a′ ≤ at)]
)
< at since H(at) ≤ 1 because H(.) is CDF function
and E(a′ ≤ at) ≤ at by definition then ω(at) ≤ 1. Thus, Ut(at) ≤ 1 since β ∈ (0, 1)
and γ ∈ (0, 1).
B.2.2 Proof of Remark 1
From (4.3.10) we see that H affects entry only through ω and the latter only
affects entry if γ > 0. Consider M which is a AMPS of H then there is more entry
under H if ω > ωM . First rewrite ω as


























where first line uses definition of ω and of conditional mean and second uses h (a|a ≤ at) =
h (a) /H (at) and dH (a) = h (a) da. Third uses integration by parts and fourth sim-
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plifies. We can do the same for ωM and subtract from ω to obtain










> 0 for all at < a
max
where the inequality holds if M is an AMPS of H.
B.2.3 Derivation of Cutoff with different arrival rates
The solution of the cutoff in the generalized demand regime follows the ap-
proach of focusing on the difference between the value of waiting and the value of
exporting. More specifically, the entry condition for any firm with productivity c is
Πe [at(Yt, τt)]− Πw [at(Yt, τt)] =K (B.2.1)
W [at(Yt, τt)] =K
where W [at(Yt, τt)] denotes Πe [at(Yt, τt)]− Πw [at(Yt, τt)] .
Using (4.3.14) and rewriting (4.3.13) to exploit symmetry between the value
functions we obtain the initial expression
W [at(Yt, τt)] =
π(at(Yt, τt))
1− β + βγ
+
K
1− β + βγ
[βγ(1− γτ )H(a > ā|τt) + βγγτ (1−H(ā))]
+
βγ(1− γτ )H(ā|τt)
1− β + βγ
{






1− β + βγ
{





Working first withA1, note that since Πw only depends on τ then EyΠw [a′(Y ′, τt)|a < ā] =
Πw [a(Yt, τt)]. Then what we need to find an expression connecting Πe [a(Y t, τt)] and
EΠe [a′(Y ′, τt)|a < ā]. Using (4.3.13) and taking differences between the value of ex-
porting, we find
EyΠe [a′(Y ′, τt)|a < ā] =
Eyπ[(Y ′, τt)|a < ā]− π(at(Yt, τt))
(1− β(1− γ))
+ Πe [at(Yt, τt)] (B.2.2)
Plugging this expression back and after some algebra, we obtain
W [at(Yt, τt)] =
π(at(Yt, τt))
1− β + βγ[1− (1− γτ )H(ā|τt)]
(B.2.3)
+
K [βγ(1− γτ )H(a > ā|τt) + βγγτ (1−H(ā))]





Eyπ[(Y ′, τt)|a < ā]− π(at(Yt, τt))





EaΠe [a′(Y ′, τ ′)|a < ā]− EaΠw [a′(Y ′, τ ′)|a < ā]
}
1− β + βγ[1− (1− γτ )H(ā|τt)]
Note that first two lines of the last equation captures the differences in the
profits today, the entry cost saved if a shock above entry threshold arrives, plus
the additional profits if shocks are below the entry cutoff when only a income shock
arrives. The last line captures the differences between the value functions when both
shocks arrives such that they are below the entry threshold. Taking expectations of
(B.2.3) with respect to a conditional on a < ā, we obtain
EaW [a′(Y ′, τ ′)|a < ā] =
Ea[π(a(Y, τ))|a < ā]
1− β + βγ[1−H(ā)]
+
Kβγ(1−H(ā))
1− β + βγ[1−H(ā)]
(B.2.4)
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Plugging (B.2.4) into (B.2.3) and then into (B.2.1), we obtain
K =
π(at(Yt, τt)) +K [βγ(1− γτ )H(a > ā|τt) + βγγτ (1−H(ā))]






Eyπ[(Y ′, τt)|a < ā]− π(at(Yt, τt))










1− β + βγ[1− (1− γτ )H(ā|τt)]





βγγτH(ā) {Ea[π(a(Y, τ))|a < ā]− π(at(Yt, τt))}
[1− β] [1− β + βγ(1−H(ā)) + βγγτH(ā)]
(B.2.6)
+
βγ(1− γτ )H(ā|τt) [1− β + βγ(1−H(ā))]
[1− β] [1− β + βγ(1−H(ā)) + βγγτH(ā)]
×
{
Eyπ[(Y ′, τt)|a < ā]− π(at(Yt, τt))
(1− β(1− γ))
}
then we find the expression for cUt for any given at
cUt =Ut × cDt (B.2.7)
Ut =
[
1− βγ (γτω(at) + (1− γτ )φ(at, γ)ω(at|τt))








at]. From here it is easy to see that c
U < cD since Ut < 1 because ω(at) ∈ (0, 1),
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ω(at|τt) ∈ (0, 1) and φ(at, γ) ∈ (0, 1). Formally,
Ut =
[
1− βγγτω(at) + βγ(1− γτ )φ(at, γ)ω(at|τt)





1− β + βγ[1− (1− γt)H(at)− γτω(at)− (1− γτ )φ(at, γ)ω(at|τt)]




βγγτω(at) + βγ(1− γτ )φ(at, γ)ω(at|τt)
1− β + βγ(1− (1− γt)H(at))
]
> 0
and this directly implies Ut < 1 as long as at > amin and γ > 0.
B.2.4 Comparative Statics
Taking logs on (B.2.7)









ln(1− β + βγ[1− (1− γτ )H(at)− γτω(at)− (1− γτ )φ(at, γ)ω(at|τt)])





γτω(at) + (1− γτ )ω(at|τt)[1− β]ν(γ, at)(
1 + Uσ−1t
)
(1− β + βγ[1− (1− γτ )H(at)])
< 0
This is negative because ω(at) ≥ 0, ω(at|τt) ≥ 0 and v(γ, at) ≥ 0 where
v(γ, at) summarizes a number of parameters and it is equal to v(γ, at) =
(1−βγH(at))/(1−β+βγ)2 +(1−γτ )(βγH(at))2/(1−β+βγ)2. Note that an
increase in γ also generates an increase in the arrival rate of policy shock, since
a economic is a necessary condition for the policy shock. In order to control
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at γτ = 0 to eliminate the effect of an increase of







γτω(at) + (1− γτ )ω(at|τt)[1− β]ν(γ, at)(
1 + Uσ−1t
)
(1− β + βγ[1− (1− γτ )H(at)])
< 0







1− β + βγ(1−H(at))
1− β + βγ[1− (1− γτ )H(at)]
Then cUt is either increasing or decreasing on γτ depending whether ω(aτ ) −
ω(aτ |τt) > 0 and this depends on τt.































< 0. The same























Uσ−1t [1− β + βγ(1− (1− γt)H(at))]
− 1
σ − 1
βγγtEa(a < at)/at + βγ(1− γt)φ(at, γ)Ea(a < at|τt)/at
Uσ−1t [1− β + βγ(1− (1− γt)H(at))]
< 0
Then it is the case that
∂ ln cUt
∂at












B.2.5 MPS in the 2 arrival process
Consider M which is a AMPS of F and that G remains the same. Then there



































































where the first line applies the definition of conditional expectation and exploits the
assumption of independence between F and G, the second line integrates by parts
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F (z)dz] > 0∀x
then ω(at) − ωM(at) < 0 for all at. ω(at|τt) − ωM(at|τt) < 0 follows directly from
the more general result. Hence the numerator of the negative term in Ut is bigger
with a AMPS of F . Since the denominator of the negative term in Ut is decreasing
in H(at), then as long as H
′(at) ≤ H(at), a AMPS of F reduce entry.
B.2.6 Equivalence of higher discount and depreciation
In the text we claim that if a firm’s export capital fully depreciates in any given
period with exogenous probability d and re-entry requires payment of the original
sunk cost then the firm’s entry decision is independent of whether it will ever be
able to re-enter that market or not after re-paying the cost if we use an effective
discount rate β = (1− δ) (1− d) < 1. We show this explicitly in this appendix
by incorporating the value of re-entry and solving for the cutoff to show it yields
the same we obtain in the text. The expected value of starting to export at time t
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conditional on observing at is
Πe(at) = π(at) + δ(1− γ)$(at) + δγV
where V is the expected continuation value if there is a shock and $ is the expected
profits that incorporate the probability that export capital depreciates. These terms
are defined as follows:
V = (1− d)EΠe(a′) + d ((1−H(ā)) (EΠe (a′ | a′ ≥ ā)−K) +H(ā)Πw(c))
$(at < ā) =Πe(at) + dΠw(at < ā)
$(at ≥ ā) = (1− d) Πe(at) + d (Πe(at)−K)
and the unconditional expected value of $ can be defined as
$e = (1− d)EΠe(a′) + d ((1−H(ā)) (EΠe (a′ | a′ ≥ ā)−K) +H(ā)Πw(c))
note that $e = V .
In this setting the value of exporting Πe needs to be adjusted to the probability
of depreciation. Focusing in the expected value of exporting EΠe
EΠe(a′) = Eπ(a′) + δ (1− γ)$e + δγV
= Eπ(a′) + δV
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Now we need expressions for EΠe (a′ | a′ ≥ ā) and Πw. Starting with the EΠe (a′ | a′ ≥ ā):
EΠe (a′ | a′ ≥ ā) = Eπ (a′ | a′ ≥ ā) + δ(1− γ)EΠe (a′ | a′ ≥ ā)− δ(1− γ)dK + δγV
EΠe (a′ | a′ ≥ ā) =
Eπ (a′ | a′ ≥ ā) + δγV − δ(1− γ)dK
1− δ(1− γ)
Now focusing on Πw
Πw = 0 + δ[(1− γ)Πw + γH(ā))Πw + γ(1−H(ā))(EΠe (a′ | a′ ≥ ā)−K)
Πw =
δγH
1− δ (1− γ(1−H))
(
Eπ (a′ | a′ ≥ ā)
1− δ(1− γ)
+





V ≡ ((1− d)EΠe(a′) + d ((1−H) (EΠe (a′ | a′ ≥ ā)−K) +HΠw))






V (1− δ (1− d)) = (1− d)Eπ(a′) + d(1−H) (Eπ (a
′ | a′ ≥ ā))
1− δ (1− γ(1−H))
+d
(δγV − (1− δ(1− γ) (1− d))K)
1− δ (1− γ(1−H))
V =
[1− δ (1− γ(1−H))] (1− d)Eπ(a′)
(1− δ) (1− δ (1− d) (1− γ(1−H)))
+
d(1−H) (Eπ (a′ | a′ ≥ ā)− (1− δ (1− d) (1− γ))K)
(1− δ) (1− δ (1− d) (1− γ(1−H)))













H [π(ā)− Eπ (a′ | a′ ≥ ā)](
1− β̃(1− γ)
)
This is the same expression we obtained by assuming an effective discount rate of β̃
and ignoring the continuation payoff when the firm has to restart.
B.3 Empirical Section
B.3.1 Uncertainty Measure
In order to construct our measure of uncertainty, we model the Gross Domestic
Product stochastic process for foreign destinations. More specifically, we assume
that ln gdpc(t) for country c follows an AR(1) process in differences with a Gaussian
distributed error term:
∆ ln gdpc(t+ 1) = ac + ρc∆ ln gdpc(t) + εc(t+ 1)
We estimate destination-specific parameters for each destination using quar-
terly frequency data. We compute the uncertainty measure as the share of GDP
that a country will lose in the next period if a bad shock arrives.
uncc(t) = 1−
exp(ln gdpc(t) + ρ̂c∆ ln gdpc(t) + ε̂c,0.05)
gdpc(t)
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and more specifically we compute this measure at the fourth quarter of 2001.
Implicitly, this measure is approximating the expected profit loss using a two state
process, involving GDP at the fourth quarter of 2001 and a bad shock at the 0.05
percentile of the distribution. This approach simplifies the construction of the mea-
sure and highlights the role of severe shocks, such as the GTC, in firms’ decisions.
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